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The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Re-
form explained how issues surrounding consumer, and other ad-
hesive, arbitration agreements became divisive along predictable
political lines (progressive vs. conservative) and proposed an in-
termediate (centrist) position to resolve those issues. However,
The Politics of Arbitration Law did not argue the case for this
centrist position. It left those arguments for two more articles: (1)
The Centrist Case against Current (Conservative) Arbitration
Law, which argued against the overly-conservative parts of cur-
rent arbitration law; and (2) this article, which argues against
progressive proposals to repeal not only the overly-conservative
parts of current arbitration law, but also the parts of current ar-
bitration law that should be retained. While progressives would
prohibit enforcement of individuals’ adhesive arbitration agree-
ments, this article argues that such agreements generally should
be enforced, except when they are, to use an analogy from else-
where in consumer law, “unsafe.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation is the default process of dispute resolution in the
United States. Parties can contract into alternative processes of dis-
pute resolution—such as arbitration—but if they do not, then each
party retains the right to have the dispute resolved in litigation.1 In
other words, parties start with the right to litigate but can trade
away this right by agreeing to arbitrate.
Sometimes parties with an existing dispute contract to submit
that dispute to arbitration, but such post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments are relatively rare. More common are pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. These are contracts containing a clause providing that,
if a dispute arises, the parties will resolve that dispute in arbitration
rather than in court. These arbitration clauses typically are written
broadly to cover any dispute the parties’ relationship might produce,
1. Stephen J. Ware, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1.5(b)
(3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter Ware, PRINCIPLES].
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but can be written more narrowly to cover just some potential dis-
putes. Arbitration clauses appear in a wide variety of contracts in-
cluding those relating to employment, credit, goods, services, and real
estate.2
While arbitration clauses appear in many contracts between
businesses,3 they are also common in the “contracts of adhesion”4
businesses draft and present on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to individu-
als—typically consumers or employees. Until the 1980’s, such “adhe-
sive arbitration agreements” were generally unenforceable.5 From
1984 to 2006, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided many cases
that changed the law to result in routine enforcement of adhesive ar-
bitration agreements.6 The Court’s pro-enforcement majorities nearly
always included justices appointed by Democratic presidents, as well
as justices appointed by Republican presidents.7 This bi-partisan
support indicates that these Supreme Court decisions making adhe-
sive arbitration agreements enforceable were, although opposed by
many progressives and plaintiffs’ lawyers, well within the political
mainstream of that Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush era. Since then, how-
ever, the political center on consumer law has moved somewhat to
the left while the Supreme Court’s decisions on adhesive arbitration
law have moved further right, resulting in governing decisions that
sometimes diverge from the political mainstream.8
2. Id. § 2.3(a).
3. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 463–66 (2010) (observ-
ing that businesses frequently include arbitration clauses in contracts with other
businesses, particularly in contracts for the sale of goods, construction, and joint
ventures).
4. For the classic definition of “contract of adhesion,” see Todd D. Rakoff, Con-
tracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176–80
(1983). Some lawyers use the term “contract of adhesion” “to refer to a contract that is
not only adhesive but also grossly unfair. This misuse of the term creates confusion.
Probably most contracts of adhesion are simple and reasonable.” JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.43, at 348 n.3 (6th ed. 2009).
5. WARE, Principles, supra note 1, at § 2.7.
6. Id. §§ 2.27–2.28.
7. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for
Reform, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 711, 721–22, nn.49–58 (2016) [hereinafter Ware, Politics].
8. Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitra-
tion Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1229–30 (2016) [hereinafter Ware, Against Conserva-
tive]. A similar telling of this history says “By the early 2000s, an equilibrium had
developed in the arbitration war,” but this equilibrium was upset by “polarizing”
2010-2013 Supreme Court decisions in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.
63 (2010), AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011), and Amer-
ican Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). David Horton & An-
drea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer
Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 70–75 (2015) [hereinafter Horton & Chandrasekher,
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The Supreme Court’s post-2006 enforcement of adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements is controversial, and these controversies divide along
largely predictable political lines. Republican Supreme Court appoin-
tees vote to enforce adhesive arbitration agreements in decisions
from which Democratic Supreme Court appointees dissent.9 Bills to
overturn or reduce the scope of these decisions, such as the
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, receive little support from Republicans and
heavy support from Democrats.10 In July 2017, the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB), directed by a Democrat,11 issued an
important rule that would have further reduced the scope of these
Supreme Court decisions,12 but the Republican President and Con-
gress overturned both that rule and several Obama-era regulations
reducing enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements.13
The core of these controversies, as I detailed in The Politics of
Arbitration Law,14 is a debate about the level of consent the law
Revolution]. See also Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the Supreme Court’s Arbi-
tration Jurisprudence: Empowering the Already-Empowered, 17 NEV. L.J. 23, 36
(2016) (describing AT&T and Amex as “Phase III” of the Supreme Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence).
9. Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 713–74.
10. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 2151 1964 (2010) (“No residential mortgage
loan and no extension of credit under an open end consumer credit plan secured by
the principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms which require arbitration
or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or
settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”).
11. See 158 CONG. REC. E1419, E1420 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2012) (remarks of Rep.
Kaptur) (“Attorney General Richard Cordray, a Democrat”).
12. See CFPB Arbitration Agreements Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 1 (Jul. 19, 2017)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1040), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
201707_cfpb_Arbitration-Agreements-Rule.pdf [hereinafter, CFPB, Arbitration
Agreements Rule] (“[T]he final rule prohibits covered providers of certain consumer
financial products and services from using an agreement with a consumer that pro-
vides for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties to bar the consumer
from filing or participating in a class action concerning the covered consumer finan-
cial product or service. Second, the final rule requires covered providers that are in-
volved in an arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to submit
specified arbitral records to the Bureau and also to submit specified court records.”).
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized the CFPB to “prohibit or impose conditions or limita-
tions on the use of” pre-dispute arbitration agreements in all consumer financial ser-
vices contracts. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (a)–(c).
13. Sylvan Lane, Trump repeals consumer arbitration rule, wins banker praise,
THE HILL (Nov. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-con-
sumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking; Perry Cooper, Arbitration
Update: CFPB Rule Uncertain, Mixed Fates for Others, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (June 1,
2017), https://www.bna.com/arbitration-update-cfpb-n73014451803 (“A half dozen
Obama-era rules to limit mandatory arbitration have met a variety of fates in the four
months since Donald Trump became president.”).
14. Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 712.
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should require before it enforces an individual’s arbitration agree-
ment.15 Progressives tend to advocate requiring higher levels of con-
sent than are required by current law, while conservatives defend
current law. Five positions in this debate are summarized and placed
























At the Left end of the continuum is the Very Progressive Posi-
tion, which would require the highest level of consent—post-dispute
consent—before enforcing individuals’ agreements to arbitrate. Arbi-
tration agreements formed pre-dispute generally receive much lower
levels of consent than arbitration agreements formed post-dispute.
When parties form a pre-dispute arbitration agreement they may be
using a standard form document previously prepared by others, so
one or more of the parties may not, before signing or otherwise mani-
festing assent to the document, read the document or know that she
is agreeing to arbitrate.16 Most individuals manifesting assent to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements likely do not read the document’s ar-
bitration clause, let alone understand it and reflect on it, and they
are extremely unlikely to have discussed it with counsel or negotiated
it with the other party.17 In addition, pre-dispute arbitration clauses
are typically written broadly to cover “any dispute that may arise be-
tween the parties, so it is generally difficult—even for parties think-
ing about arbitration while forming the contract—to anticipate all
15. Id. at 718.
16. One study asked 668 people to answer a series of questions after reading a
credit card contract that included an arbitration clause. See Jeff Sovern et al.,
“Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (2015). Al-
though, “[T]he credit card contract unequivocally stated that such a dispute could not
be heard in court and could be decided only by an arbitrator . . . only 14% of the
respondents realized that the contract banned litigation in court.” Id. Another study
found that only 17% of electronics store employees who signed arbitration agreements
“reported signing either a mandatory arbitration agreement or the waiver of the right
to sue the employer.” Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship
Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381,
416 (2008).
17. See infra notes 56–68.
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the possible disputes that might arise and assess how a duty to arbi-
trate, rather than litigate, will affect each of them.”18
In contrast, parties forming post-dispute arbitration agreements
are much more likely to know that they are agreeing to arbitrate and
to appreciate some of the differences between arbitration and litiga-
tion.19 This heightened knowledge is dispositive for advocates of the
Very Progressive Position. For instance, Jean Braucher asserted that
“[c]onsumer ‘choice’ of arbitration can only be meaningful if it is a
post-dispute choice, when the consumer is represented by counsel. . . .
The best way to reform arbitration systems is to make pre-dispute
arbitration clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts.”20 This po-
sition, opposition to enforcing individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, is the Very Progressive Position on arbitration agree-
ments. It would require post-dispute consent for all individuals’ arbi-
tration agreements, and thus would enforce no adhesive arbitration
agreements because post-dispute arbitration agreements are not
adhesive.21
18. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON
ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 63–64 (2014).
19. Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 732.
20. Jean Braucher, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The Gateway
Thread—AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1167 (2000). See also Ja-
net Cooper Alexander, To Skin A Cat: Qui Tam Actions As A State Legislative Re-
sponse to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1210 (2013) (“[T]he better view
recognizes that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion can never be
truly voluntary”); Charles Knapp, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The
Gateway Thread—AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1173 (2000) (“I
think Jean Braucher has hit the nail in precisely the right place—if arbitration is so
economically sound for everybody, then let the consumer be persuaded ‘once the dis-
pute has arisen’ that arbitration is in her best interests too. The argument that ‘but
then the consumer might have a lawyer’ obviously proves too much.”); Victor D.
Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitra-
tion Clauses Are Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time
of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2017) (advocating following rule
“if firms wish to engage in binding arbitration with consumers and employees, these
firms could be limited to using binding arbitration agreements that are entered into
separately from the primary contract, after a dispute has arisen.”).
21. See Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1177 (defining “contract of adhesion” with seven
elements). A post-dispute arbitration agreement does not fit the seventh element of
the definition (“The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction con-
sidered as a whole is the payment of money”), and probably fits neither the third
element (“[t]he drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type rep-
resented by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine”), nor
fourth element (“[t]he form is presented to the adhering party with the representation
that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting
party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document.”).
Id.
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While the Very Progressive Position opposes enforcement of all
individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements, a somewhat lower
standard of consent, the Moderately Progressive Position, would en-
force pre-dispute arbitration agreements when those agreements are
not adhesive.22 However, consumers rarely form non-adhesive pre-
dispute contracts,23 and this is largely true of other individuals,24 so
nearly all pre-dispute arbitration agreements formed by individuals
are adhesive. Therefore, the Moderately Progressive Position’s prohi-
bition on individuals’ adhesive arbitration agreements would change
current consumer and employment arbitration law almost as much
as the Very Progressive Position’s prohibition on individuals’ pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements.
In contrast, the Centrist Position advocated in this article would
continue to enforce most adhesive arbitration agreements. The basic
principle underlying this Centrist Position is congruity. Arbitration
law should largely conform to non-arbitration law. In particular, ad-
hesive arbitration agreements should (with a few exceptions25) be as
enforceable as other adhesion contracts, not more or less so. Accord-
ingly, the Centrist Position defends current arbitration law’s use of
contract law’s low standards of consent, which enforce most adhesive
contract terms, including most adhesive arbitration agreements.26
However, the Centrist Position does not defend current arbitra-
tion law in its entirety, which is overly conservative as it enforces
adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesive
contracts. Current law not only uses contract law’s low standards of
consent, but also: (1) generally prevents courts from hearing defenses
to enforcement of contracts containing arbitration clauses; (2) ex-
empts arbitration agreements from otherwise-applicable legal limits
relating to class actions; and (3) generally prevents vacatur of legally-
22. For an example of a hypothetical non-adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment, see Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 735.
23. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”
(footnote omitted)); John E. Murray, Jr., The Judicial Vision of Contract: The Con-
structed Circle of Assent and Unconscionability, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 265 (2014)
[hereinafter, Murray Jr., Judicial Vision] (“[V]irtually all consumer contracts are
‘contracts of adhesion.’” (footnote omitted)); Zachary M. Rupiper, Note, Enforcement
Upon the Unwitting: The Overreaching Ability of Courts to Appoint Substitute Arbi-
tration Forums Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 411, 424 n.88
(2014) (“It is important to note that most consumer contracts are contracts of adhe-
sion, so negotiation generally does not occur.”).
24. Some high-level employees have individually-negotiated, rather than adhe-
sive, employment contracts.
25. See infra Section II.C.2.
26. See infra Section II.
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erroneous decisions. For these three reasons, current law reflects the
Very Conservative Position,27 and violates the principle that adhe-
sive arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other adhe-
sion contracts, not more or less so. The Centrist Position advocates
the following three changes to current law: (1) repeal the separability
doctrine; (2) treat arbitral class waivers like non-arbitral class waiv-
ers; and (3) vacate arbitrators’ legally-erroneous decisions on
mandatory-law claims.
This article is the third of three related articles that together ar-
ticulate a Centrist Position on adhesive arbitration law and argue for
that position over the Conservative and Progressive Positions. In the
first article I explained how issues surrounding consumer, and other
adhesive, arbitration agreements became divisive along predictable
political lines (progressive vs. conservative) and proposed an interme-
diate (centrist) position to resolve those issues.  I argued against cur-
rent law’s Very Conservative Position in the second article, The
Centrist Case against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law.28 Fi-
nally, this article argues for the Centrist Position over the Progres-
sive Positions.29
27. Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 743–44, 746 (“[T]he Very Conservative Posi-
tion exempts arbitration agreements from limits relating to (1) appealing legally-erro-
neous decisions, and (2) class actions. By removing these limits, the Very
Conservative Position effectively converts some adhesive arbitration agreements into
exculpatory clauses and enforces them in circumstances in which comparable non-
arbitration agreements would be unenforceable. . . . Current law adopts the Very Con-
servative Position.”). The Moderately Conservative Position prevents courts from
hearing defenses to enforcement, but would subject arbitration agreements to other-
wise-applicable legal limits relating to appealing legally-erroneous decisions and to
class actions. Id. at 746–48.
28. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8.
29. Others taking positions fairly characterized as “centrist” include Sarah Cole
and Jill Gross. Cole argues for prohibiting class waivers while continuing to enforce
consumers’ arbitration agreements. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater:
The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurispru-
dence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 470–71 (2011) (“[T]he primary objection to consumer
arbitration agreements is not that they fail to provide justice to most consumers, but
that these clauses preclude access to justice for those consumers, typically with low-
value claims, who would only be able to pursue their claim if they join with other
consumers.”); id. at 498 (advocating “legislation will permit consumers with low-value
claims, who are bound by arbitration agreements, to pursue class processes in either
arbitration or court.”). Cole’s publications neither support nor oppose the separability
doctrine or deferential judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions on claims arising under
mandatory law.
Similarly, Gross fears current law’s enforcement of class waivers will have an
“adverse impact on consumer arbitration, as it effectively eliminates the states’ ability
to preserve class arbitration as a procedural method of aggregating low-value claims.”
Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility and FAA Over-Preemption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION
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This article’s basic thesis is that adopting the Centrist Position is
likely to address progressives’ valid criticisms of current law. The
Progressive Positions generally rest on two assertions: (1) that adhe-
sive arbitration agreements are “forced” on consumers; and (2) have
effects that are, on balance, bad for consumers. While each of these
assertions has some validity under current law’s Very Conservative
Position, neither of these assertions would likely remain valid under
the Centrist Position of largely treating adhesive arbitration agree-
ments like other adhesion contracts.
The first assertion on which the Progressive Positions rest is that
adhesive arbitration agreements, or arbitrations arising out of such
agreements, are “forced” or “mandatory.” Section II of this article re-
buts these assertions by explaining that adhesion contracts are con-
tracts; and contracts are consensual, not forced or mandatory. As
noted above, an adhesive arbitration agreement is nearly always an
arbitration clause in broader contract that also contains several other
clauses. Section II explains that the arbitration clause is, with one
exception, no more “forced” on the consumers than are most of the
contracts’ other clauses. The one exception is arbitration law’s sepa-
rability doctrine, which generally prevents courts from hearing de-
fenses to enforcement of contracts containing arbitration clauses.
This at least possibly requires courts to enforce some “forced” arbitra-
tion clauses, such as arbitration clauses formed under duress. The
Centrist Position would enforce arbitration clauses only in contracts
not formed under duress, or other circumstances constituting a con-
tract-law defense to enforcement, and thus would end the one current
legal doctrine sometimes justifying assertions that adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements are “forced” or “mandatory.”30
25, 36 (2012); id. at 26 (criticizing “FAA over-preemption, [that] unduly shifts arbitra-
tion law-making power away from the states, in violation of the FAA’s savings
clause”). However, Gross endorses enforcement of at least one (federally regulated)
type of adhesive arbitration agreement. Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities
Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1178 (2010) (“[B]ecause securities arbitration is
markedly different from other forms of consumer arbitration, the SEC should not ex-
ercise its new power to ban PDAAs in securities customer account agreements, nor
should Congress, if it passes the AFA, extend it to encompass arbitration of securities
customer disputes”). Gross’s publications neither support nor oppose the separability
doctrine or deferential judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions on claims arising under
mandatory law.
30. Current law has at least one other category of truly “mandatory” arbitration,
but it does not involve adhesion contracts. See infra Section II.A.3 n.51.
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The second assertion underlying the Progressive Positions is that
the effects of enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements are, on bal-
ance, bad for consumers. This assertion generally rests on two more-
specific assertions:
1) Consumers with disputes against businesses tend to fare
worse in arbitration than they do in litigation;31 and
2) Enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements does not tend to
reduce the prices consumers pay for the goods and services cov-
ered by such agreements.32
The first of these more-specific assertions, Section III explains, is not
supported by the most relevant empirical data. That data does not
show consumers with disputes against businesses tend to fare worse
in arbitration than they do in litigation. And if new and more rele-
vant empirical data shows that consumers with claims against busi-
nesses tend to fare worse in arbitration than litigation, such data
would not significantly support prohibiting enforcement of consum-
ers’ adhesive arbitration agreements because such data would neces-
sarily be about what occurs under existing law, as distinguished from
what would occur if the law adopted centrist reforms. Adopting cen-
trist reforms would likely improve arbitration’s outcomes for consum-
ers with disputes against businesses.33 Enacting these reforms and
then gathering new data showing consumers with disputes against
businesses nevertheless still tend to fare worse in arbitration than
they do in litigation would be the data necessary to significantly sup-
port prohibiting enforcement of consumers’ adhesive arbitration
agreements.
In other words, empirical studies of consumer arbitration yield
data about arbitration’s outcomes under existing law—which in-
cludes widespread enforcement of arbitral class waivers and deferen-
tial judicial review of arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory law,34 as well
31. See infra Section III. That is, suppose enforceable arbitration agreements re-
sult in fewer successful claims by consumers against businesses and lower settlement
and award payments on claims that are successful, as well as more successful claims
by businesses against consumers and higher payments to businesses on their success-
ful claims.
32. See infra Section IV.
33. See infra Section III.B.2.
34. See infra Sections II.C.1., III.B.2.
A mandatory (or “nonwaivable”) rule creates rights that cannot be traded
away in a pre-dispute contract, but can be traded away in a post-dispute con-
tract (such as a settlement agreement). In contrast, a default rule creates
rights that can be traded away in a pre- or post-dispute contract. For exam-
ple, in a sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, the default rule
is that the seller’s place of business is the place for delivery of the goods, but
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as the separability doctrine. All three of these Very Conservative as-
pects of current law would be changed by the Centrist Position, and
these changes would likely make arbitration’s outcomes more
favorable to consumers than they are now. So even if empirical data
showed that enforceable adhesive arbitration agreements now tend
to produce worse (than litigation) outcomes for consumers, that
would not be a reason to prohibit consumers’ adhesive arbitration
agreements. That hypothetical data would instead be a reason to try
the Centrist Position—(1) repeal the separability doctrine, (2) treat
arbitral class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers, and (3) vacate
arbitrators’ legally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims—
and see if these three reforms bring arbitration’s outcomes in line
with litigation’s.
Section IV of this article counters assertions that enforcing adhe-
sive arbitration agreements has no effect on the prices consumers
pay. In contrast to these assertions, the standard view among econo-
mists across the ideological spectrum is that anything that lowers
businesses’ costs tends over time to reduce the prices those busi-
nesses charge. This analysis is supported by voluminous evidence
from a wide variety of sources.35 While the standard economic analy-
sis has not been shown empirically with respect to adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements, no reasoning suggests why it should apply any less
to adhesive arbitration agreements than to anything else that tends
to lower businesses’ costs. Although some suggest that the CFPB has
empirically shown the absence of a price-reducing effect from adhe-
sive arbitration agreements, the CFPB study they cite was not con-
clusive, and was followed by the CFPB repeatedly endorsing the
standard economic analysis’s conclusion that enforcement of adhesive
arbitration agreements tends to lower prices.36
Instead of denying that businesses’ savings from enforceable ad-
hesive arbitration agreements tend to lower consumer prices, Section
the parties can opt out of that default with a pre-dispute contract term re-
quiring delivery at some other location.
Default rules are very common in contract and commercial law.
Mandatory rules are common in many other areas of law, particularly in ar-
eas of law—such as consumer, employment, labor, securities, and franchise
law—replete with statutes and regulations prohibiting various arguably op-
pressive contract terms.
See Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 731.
35. See infra notes 196–206 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Section IV.E.
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V explains that the more sophisticated economic argument is that ad-
hesive arbitration agreements (and other non-salient adhesive con-
tract terms37) lower consumer prices too much. Rather than deny
that non-price contract terms (such as arbitration clauses) affect
prices, sophisticated economic scholarship on adhesion contracts gen-
erally begins with that tradeoff among price and other contract terms
and asks which legal rules tend to produce the best mix of price and
non-price (or salient and non-salient) contract terms. So the debate
between the Centrist and Progressive Positions is not about whether
markets and unregulated adhesive terms are perfect, but how we
should shape the legal rules that police adhesion contract terms to
make markets more effective and balance the interests of consumers
who benefit from enforceable arbitration clauses against the interests
of consumers who do not.
The Centrist Position in this debate should appeal to progres-
sives because it adopts the approach to consumer protection progres-
sives have taken for a century.38 That is to protect consumers from
transactions with a significant risk of harming them (unsafe transac-
tions), while permitting reasonably safe transactions. Similarly, the
Centrist Position on adhesive arbitration advocates enforcing adhe-
sive arbitration clauses that are safe for consumers, while prohibiting
those that are unsafe. “Unsafe” adhesive arbitration clauses include
arbitration clauses:
1) in contracts induced by duress, misrepresentation, or other
contract defense;
2) that deprive consumers of class actions; or
3) that preclude correction of legally-erroneous decisions of
mandatory law.
This list derives from current non-arbitration law. In other words,
centrist arbitration law does not try to reinvent the wheel by develop-
ing new bodies of law on these three complex topics, but instead de-
fers to the conclusions established areas of law have already reached
after a long period of evolution and testing through litigated cases.
First, the Centrist Position does not require arbitration law to
make the many difficult policy judgments required to develop
nuanced contract defenses, like duress and misrepresentation. To the
37. A non-salient contract term is one “buyers do not consider” so it “will not
affect buyers’ purchasing decisions.” Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Stan-
dard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003)
[hereinafter Korobkin, Bounded Rationality]. See infra Section V.A.
38. See infra Section V.B.
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contrary, centrist arbitration law defers to contract law on its de-
fenses and merely applies them to the right to litigate, by repealing
the separability doctrine. Second, the Centrist Position does not try to
resolve the long-running debate over class actions. Instead, centrist
arbitration law allows that debate to continue outside arbitration
law, which centrist arbitration law flexibly accommodates by making
arbitral class waivers as enforceable as comparable non-arbitral class
waivers. Third, the Centrist Position does not require arbitration law
to make the many difficult policy judgments about when paternalism
or externalities are severe enough to justify any of the many
mandatory rules of consumer law, employment law, and the like.
Rather, centrist arbitration law defers to such non-arbitration law on
which rules are mandatory by ensuring that arbitrators’ errors on
such law can be vacated de novo, while arbitrators’ errors on law con-
sisting of default rules can be vacated only under the deferential
standards of current arbitration law, such as FAA § 10.39
In sum, the Centrist Position incorporates the accumulated wis-
dom of large bodies of non-arbitration law to prohibit the categories of
adhesive arbitration agreements that contract, consumer, employ-
ment, and other non-arbitration law has already determined pose a
significant risk of harming consumers, while facilitating courts’
nuanced judgments about particular remaining adhesive arbitration
clauses by allowing courts to determine on a case-by-case basis which
of these remaining clauses unconscionable, for example, because
their procedures are claim-suppressing. As a result, adopting the
Centrist Position is likely to address progressives’ valid criticisms of
current law governing adhesive arbitration agreements. However,
the Centrist Position’s Burkean deference to current non-arbitration
law may disappoint some progressives who are displeased with cur-
rent non-arbitration law. Such progressives should channel their dis-
pleasure with current non-arbitration law toward efforts to reform
that law, or at least forthrightly acknowledge that their disappoint-
ment with the Centrist Position on arbitration law is merely an appli-
cation of their displeasure with broader non-arbitration law.
39. See infra note 91 (citing Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1259).
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II. ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ADHESIVE AGREEMENTS
A. Adhesion Contracts Are Not “Forced” or “Mandatory”
1. Generally
Progressives and plaintiffs’ lawyers often describe adhesive arbi-
tration agreements, or arbitration arising out of such agreements, as
“forced arbitration”40 or “mandatory arbitration.”41 This rhetoric is
40. See Richard M. Alderman, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Meets Arbi-
tration: Non-Parties and Arbitration, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 586, 612 (2012) (Ar-
bitration Fairness Act “would prohibit forced arbitration in all consumer contracts
and make it illegal for employers to force arbitration on their employees.”); Peter A.
Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1136 (2010) (“a cellular phone
service provider added a forced-arbitration clause to its existing contracts”); Paul Car-
rington, The Dark Side of Contract Law, Trial, May 2000, at 73, 76 (referring to “ex-
amples of how forced arbitration can hurt workers, consumers, and victims, which can
be used in educating the public and others about abuse of arbitration”); Mara Kent,
“Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 95, 116
(2005) (“Forced arbitration clauses are contested in the consumer lending context as
well.”); Adam Levitin, Mandatory Arbitration Offers Bargain-Basement Justice,
AMERICAN BANKER, (May 13 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/mandatory-arbitration-offers-bargain-basement-justice-1067419-1.html
(“[T]he financial services industry . . . would like to continue its current widespread
practice of eliminating consumer access to courts, including the right to bring class
actions. Consumers are instead forced to resolve disputes in individual arbitrations.”);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV.
L.J. 251, 268 (2007) (“[T]he forced arbitration of consumer, employment, civil rights,
statutory disputes, and other matters implicating public policy is what has concerned
commentators critical of the perceived excesses of the modern new arbitration re-
gime.”); J. Burton LeBlanc, Leveling the Playing Field, Trial, October 2013, at 6 (the
Arbitration Fairness Act would “eliminate predispute forced arbitration clauses in
employment, consumer, and civil rights cases, while still allowing consumers and
workers to choose arbitration after a dispute occurred.”); Press Release, Nat’l Assoc. of
Consumer Advocates, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., Pub. Citizen, U.S. P.I.R.G., During
National Consumer Protection Week, Consumer Advocates Warn About Harms of
Forced Arbitration (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/pr-
ncpw7-mar-2013.pdf; Department Inside the American Association for Justice, Public
Education Effort Works to End Forced Arbitration, Trial, December 2013, at 54
(“forced arbitration limits [consumers’] access to the courts.”); Nancy A. Welsh, Class
Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: An Example of
(and Opportunity for) Dispute System Design?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 381 (2017)
(“[O]pponents of the clauses have worked to increase public awareness by coining the
term ‘forced arbitration.’”).
41. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 2(4) (2013)
(“Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law because there is
inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions.”);
Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56
U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 831 n.1 (2002) (“I cannot understand how a person can be said
to have ‘voluntarily’ accepted arbitration when it is part of a small print contract of
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inapt because the arbitration clause of an adhesion contract is no
more “forced” or “mandatory” than most of that contract’s other
clauses.42
An example is the mortgage (or security interest), a common
clause of loan agreements and what enables the lender to take
collateral from the borrower if the borrower defaults on the loan.
I recently borrowed $220,000. The lender insisted that I grant it
a mortgage on my home. This clause was non-negotiable, take-
it-or-leave-it. I am confident that other lenders, when faced with
my request for a loan of that amount, would also have insisted
on this same non-negotiable clause. I am also confident that the
vast majority of other people borrowing that amount of money
would have no choice but to accept this clause as well. Does that
make my [mortgage or] mortgage payments involuntary or
mandatory? Of course not. I could have rented a home or per-
haps bought a smaller home without borrowed funds. There are
always alternatives, albeit more and less attractive ones. I con-
sented, in the absence of duress, to a contract containing the
lending industry’s take-it-or-leave-it clause, just as countless
people consent, in the absence of duress, to contracts containing
take-it-or-leave-it arbitration clauses. Calling the results of
these routine transactions mandatory arbitration is no more
sensible than referring to mandatory mortgages. Both the arbi-
tration and the mortgage are entirely voluntary.43
Most ordinary individuals granting mortgages are more likely to real-
ize the document they are signing is a “mortgage” than such individu-
als agreeing to arbitrate are to realize the document they are signing
is an “arbitration agreement.” However, this difference of labeling is
adhesion.”); Hope B. Eastman & David M. Rothenstein, The Fate of Mandatory Em-
ployment Arbitration Amidst Growing Opposition: A Call for Common Ground, 20
EMP. REL. L.J. 595, 595 (1995) (finding that “a growing number of. . .courts have up-
held and enforced mandatory agreements to arbitrate between employers and em-
ployees”) (emphasis omitted).
42. In contrast, the rare cases in which manifestations of agreement are truly
forced—as when “A grasps B’s hand and compels B by physical force to write his
name” above the signature line on a paper contract—result in contracts that are void-
able on the ground of duress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 cmt. a,
illus. 1 (1981). In the absence of duress, it is exaggerated and dramatic to say that a
contract containing an arbitration clause results in arbitration that is forced or
mandatory. See Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration,
and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 42–43 (2003) [here-
inafter, Ware, Contractual Arbitration].
43. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, supra note 42, at 43.
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less important than the substantive similarity that ordinary individ-
uals likely tend to be as ignorant of the differences in remedies avail-
able to secured creditors (like mortgagees) and unsecured creditors as
the differences between arbitration and litigation.
In discussing adhesive arbitration agreements, the rhetorically-
loaded phrases “forced arbitration” and “mandatory arbitration” are
inapt because they “ignore[ ] altogether the consensual element in
contracts” and “resolve[ ] linguistically the issues of the reality of con-
sent and the effect to be given to consent by fiat, rather than by anal-
ysis revealing the nature of the issues.”44
2. Separability Doctrine
Analysis of these issues shows that describing adhesive arbitra-
tion as “forced” or “mandatory” is accurate only in cases of duress and
perhaps conduct satisfying other defenses to contract enforcement.
While contract defenses (such as duress and misrepresentation) pro-
tect most rights that can be traded away by adhesion contracts, arbi-
tration law’s separability doctrine largely removes contract defenses’
protection from the main right traded away by an arbitration agree-
ment—the right to litigate.45 The separability doctrine, as reflected
in the three Supreme Court decisions addressing it,46 treats the arbi-
tration clause as a separately enforceable agreement from the con-
tract containing it: If the alleged defense is not focused on the
arbitration clause in particular, then the court enforces that clause to
require arbitration of whether the contract containing it is enforcea-
ble, as well as arbitration of the merits of the claims asserted by one
party against the other.47  For example, if a contract containing an
arbitration clause was formed under duress—imagine the contract’s
drafter pointing a gun at the other party and threatening to shoot if
the victim of duress does not sign the contract—then the separability
doctrine likely requires the victim to arbitrate her claim to rescind
the contract.48 We might plausibly call this “forced” or “mandatory”
44. See Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel, Thomas J. Stipanowich, & G. Richard
Shell, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW 2:36 n.5 (1995).
45. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1231; Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardenga, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.
63, 71 (2010).
46. See id.
47. Ware, Politics, supra note 7, at 743.
48. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 122–23 (2007) (“[T]he separability
doctrine is highlighted by the hypothetical case of an individual who signs an arbitra-
tion agreement with a gun to her head.  If an arbitration claim is brought against this
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arbitration because, but for the duress, the victim would have been
free to litigate, rather than arbitrate, her rescission claim. With more
of a stretch, we might even use the words “forced” or “mandatory” to
describe arbitration arising out of agreements formed under circum-
stances that satisfy other contract defenses covered by the separabil-
ity doctrine, such as undue influence, misrepresentation, and
perhaps even unconscionability. So to the extent critics of “forced” or
“mandatory” arbitration focus their criticism on the separability doc-
trine, they have a point against current (conservative) arbitration
law.49 However, the Centrist Position rejects the separability doc-
trine, so law reform adopting the Centrist Position would fully re-
spond to this criticism of current law enforcing adhesive arbitration
agreements.50
3. Adhesion Contract v. No Contract
Other types of arbitration that can be described as “forced” or
“mandatory” do not relate to adhesion contracts, but instead arise out
of statutes requiring parties to arbitrate, rather than litigate, even
though they never contracted for arbitration. For example, the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act requires chemical
manufacturers to arbitrate certain disputes with each other, even
though they did not contract for arbitration.51 Such non-contractual
individual and she moves the court to stay arbitration on the ground that ‘the making
of the agreement for arbitration . . . is . . . in issue,’ the separability doctrine requires
the court to deny her motion and compel arbitration.”).
49. The separability doctrine, I have long argued, undermines the voluntariness
of arbitration agreements and should be repealed. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 131 (1996) (“The separa-
bility doctrine is a legal fiction pretending that when a party alleges it has formed a
contract containing an arbitration clause, that party actually alleges it has formed
two contracts. In addition to the contract really alleged to have been formed, the sepa-
rability doctrine pretends that the party also alleges a fictional contract consisting of
just the arbitration clause, but no other terms. Enforcing this fictional contract de-
prives arbitration of its basis in voluntary consent, because the fictional contract
lacks a basis in voluntary consent.”).
50. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1234–48.
51. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2012). FIFRA requires arbitration not only of parties who did not
contract for it, but of parties who may not have contracted with each other at all.
FIFRA requires manufacturers of new pesticides to register with the EPA and submit
data including data from manufacturers of older pesticides when there is an overlap
in the ingredients used by the two manufacturers. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1985); 7 U.S.C. § 136a (c)(1)(F)(iii) (2012). The
new registrant must compensate the original data submitter, and if they cannot agree
on the amount of that compensation, FIFRA requires binding arbitration. 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a (c)(1)(F)(iii) (2012). See also Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573 (1985). Nothing in FIFRA
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arbitration is “mandatory,”52 unlike arbitration arising out of an ad-
hesion contract, which is as consensual as the rest of the adhesion
contract.53 For example, as noted above, almost no one refers to
“mandatory” or “forced” mortgages, even though most home buyers
face essentially all lenders’ take-it-or-leave-it insistence on substan-
tially similar adhesive mortgage clauses. We do not commonly speak
of mortgages, and most other adhesion contract terms used by entire
industries, as “forced” or “mandatory” because we understand that
consumers choose, under no duress, whether to buy the goods and
services those industries offer. Consumers may not know much about
the terms of the adhesion contracts they accept, but choosing to do
something while largely ignorant is quite different from being forced
to do it.
While one might imprecisely say a cellphone, for example, is a
“necessity” nowadays and all the major cellular providers’ contracts
include arbitration clauses, so circumstances “force” an average con-
sumer to agree to arbitrate; that is the sort of “force” contract law
conditions this duty to arbitrate on an existing contractual relationship between reg-
istrant and the original data submitter.
52. As is some arbitration that involves a contract. Many examples of “non-con-
tractual” arbitration do involve a contract, such as an employment contract or a con-
tract for the sale of an automobile. So in these contexts the duty to arbitrate is, in a
sense, assumed by contract. The difference between “contractual” and “non-contrac-
tual” arbitration is whether it is possible to form a contract of the relevant sort with-
out assuming the duty to arbitrate. For example, in transportation industries
governed by the Railway Labor Act, it is not possible to form an employment contract
without assuming the duty to arbitrate. In contrast, it is possible to form such an
employment contract elsewhere in the private sector. Accordingly, transportation em-
ployment arbitration is “non-contractual,” while other labor and employment arbitra-
tion is “contractual.” STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF
ARBITRATION LAW §78(a) at n.22 (2017). See also Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Secur-
ities Arbitration Different from Other Consumer and Employment Arbitration?, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 447, 454 (2008) (quotations omitted) (“What has just been said about
transportation employees governed by the Railway Labor Act is also true of securities
employees. Forming a contract of the relevant sort (securities employment) without
assuming the duty to arbitrate is impossible.”).
53. See also Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 695, 706 [hereinafter, Drahozal, Unfair] (“A frequent criticism of arbitration
in consumer contracts is that it is ‘mandatory.’ The criticism is rhetorically powerful
because viewing arbitration as ‘mandatory’ is contrary to the whole idea of arbitra-
tion: that it is the product of an agreement between the parties. But as Richard Spei-
del explained, this label is ‘misleading because it connotes arbitration that is
compelled by law regardless of consent.’ Arbitration is mandatory when required by
law, such as mandatory arbitration of public-employee grievances. No law requires
that parties to consumer contracts arbitrate disputes.”) (quoting Richard E. Speidel,
Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration
Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998)).
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generally accepts as legitimate. Contracts formed under such circum-
stances are consensual, rather than forced, because the consumer has
no right to a cellphone, let alone a cellphone with litigation rather
than arbitration. Having to choose between a cellphone with an arbi-
tration clause and no cellphone at all (or perhaps a prepaid
cellphone54) hardly resembles Jean Valjean’s choice (in Les Misér-
ables) between stealing bread and his child starving to death.55
Adhesion contracts are consensual because they are contracts.
Contracts are consensual because “manifestation of assent” is re-
quired to form a contract.56 Adhesion contracts are contracts, and
thus consensual, even when they are drafted by a business’s lawyers
and presented, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, to a less-sophisticated
and less-powerful party, like an ordinary consumer. Although this is
the long-established law throughout the United States, some scholars
critique it. For example, David Slawson wrote in 1971 that “practi-
cally no standard forms, at least as they are customarily used in con-
sumer transactions, are contracts. They cannot reasonably be
regarded as the manifested consent of their recipient because an is-
suer could not reasonably expect that a recipient would read and un-
derstand them.”57 This view that an ordinary individual’s consent to
an adhesion contract exists only to the extent she understands the
agreement’s terms may continue to resonate with some progressive
scholars,58 but it is not the law.59
54. Last I checked, prepaid cellphones were available without arbitration
clauses.
55. Victor Hugo, Les Misérables 147–48 (Isabel F. Hapgood trans., Planet eBook)
(1862) (ebook) https://www.planetebook.com/ebooks/Les-Miserables.pdf.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981). For a thoughtful argu-
ment that consideration subsumes manifestation of assent, see Val Ricks, Assent Is
Not an Element of Contract Formation, 61 KAN. L. REV. 591 (2013).
57. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 544 (1971).
58. See Braucher, supra note 20; Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The
Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006)
(“The liberal theory of voluntary exchange transactions between autonomous individ-
uals is now vestigial. The idea of voluntary willingness first decayed into consent,
then into assent, then into the mere possibility or opportunity for assent, then to
merely fictional assent, then to mere efficient rearrangement of entitlements without
any consent or assent.”); Todd D. Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1237 (“[E]nforcing boiler-
plate terms trenches on the freedom of the adhering party.”); id. at 1180–83 (arguing
that form terms should be presumptively unenforceable).
59. See Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 37, at 1204 (“Contract law
generally provides for the enforcement of the terms in form contracts, thus essentially
allowing the drafting party (almost always the seller in consumer contracts but some-
times the buyer in commercial contracts) to create its own private law to govern its
transactions. If the non-drafting party indicates his general assent to the form, courts
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Courts around the United States enforce most adhesion con-
tracts’ terms because, under contract law’s standards of consent,
most adhesion contracts’ terms are the products of mutual consent.60
Consent in contract law is generally objective rather than subjec-
tive.61 Specifically, contract law does not require knowing consent to
will enforce the terms contained therein whether or not that party approves of the
terms provided, understands those terms, has read them, or even has the vaguest
idea what the terms might be about. Limited exceptions are made to this rule, most
notably if the terms are found to be ‘unconscionable.’”); Tom W. Bell, Graduated Con-
sent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward A Theory of Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 17, 50 (2010) (“[M]ost courts, regard even take-it-or-leave-it, standard form
agreements, formed between powerful legal entities and relatively powerless natural
persons, as not only prima facie valid, but moreover as boons for social utility.”).
60. See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard
Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 472 (2008) (“[C]ourts focus narrowly on
particular terms and conditions in standard form contract cases, and refuse to enforce
only a limited number of provisions in a limited number of cases.”); id. at 471–72
(“Courts almost always find the requisite outward manifestation of assent based on
the act of signing a standard form contract. In cases in which the contracting parties
have unequal bargaining power, courts refuse to enforce standard form contract
terms only when the court concludes that both substantive and procedural unconscio-
nability were present when the parties signed the contract. Most contracts between
parties with relatively equal bargaining power are enforced.”); see also Alan M. White
& Cathy L. Manfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 250–51
(2002) (“[J]udiciary’s response to adhesion contracts . . . still is to assume manifesta-
tion of assent and to apply the ‘you signed it, you’re bound’ rule.”).
61. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
505, 527 (2008) (“Contract is animated by objective consent, then, because we cannot
reliably determine subjective consent and we need to be able to determine consent
. . . .”); Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119,
1133 (2006) (“[U]nder the now-dominant objective theory of contracts, subjective in-
tention is irrelevant, and the lack thereof should not prohibit the formation of a con-
tract.”); Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard
Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227,
252 (2007) [hereinafter Barnes, Fairer] (“The objective theory of contracts is the domi-
nant theory of mutual assent in modern contract law . . . .”); Korobkin, Bounded Ra-
tionality, supra note 37, at 1205 (“[G]iven the complexity of modern commerce . . .
[a]ctual [subjective] assent to each contract term in a transaction of any complexity
simply is not possible.”); Lauren E. Miller, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Fail-
ure of the Objective Theory to Promote Fairness in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43
IND. L. REV. 175, 177 (2008) (“Since the late nineteenth century, courts have applied
the objective theory to determine which manifestations amount to assent to form a
contract.”); W. David Slawson, supra note 57, at 542–43 (“Of course, a consensual
theory of contract does not require actual subjective consent to make a contract bind-
ing. It is enough that both parties act, verbally or nonverbally, so as to give each other
the reasonable expectation that they understand the meaning which is manifested by
either of them. That a person may inadvertently manifest what he does not intend is a
possibility which may produce unwanted contracts but which does not reduce the con-
sensual character of contract law. All consensual processes are grounded on mani-
fested rather than unmanifested thoughts, as, indeed, they must be.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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each term on an adhesion contract, but rather routinely enforces
most contract terms the adhering party probably did not know about,
let alone understand, when forming the contract.62 Courts generally
conclude that even though the business insisting on its adhesion con-
tract form document does not reasonably expect the consumer to
read, let alone understand, the pre-printed (“fine print” or “boiler-
plate”) terms on the document, the consumer nevertheless manifests
her consent to the document’s terms when she signs it, performs it, or
clicks “agree” on a website containing it.63 Such manifestations of as-
sent, plus consideration, are well established as contract law’s re-
quirements to form a contract.64
In short, while individuals presented with adhesion contract
form documents typically do not read most of the document’s terms,
let alone negotiate (for different terms) with the business that drafted
the document,65 the individual can choose not to manifest assent to
62. See Warkentine, supra note 60 at 470–71. See also Melissa T. Lonegrass,
Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism - The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscio-
nability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 10 (2012) (“[W]hile recognizing that an imbalance in
bargaining power, the use of standard forms, and lack of an opportunity to negotiate
are all indications of procedural unconscionability, most courts employing a conven-
tional approach to procedural unconscionability will not find a typical consumer form
contract, which meets these criteria, to be procedurally unconscionable per se . . .
Only those form contracts that suffer from additional procedural deficiencies will be
subjected to special scrutiny.”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 11 (“The prevailing under-
standing is that courts will not invalidate a provision as substantively unconscionable
absent clear evidence of extreme unfairness. The standard parroted by most courts
requires the offending provision be one that ‘no man in his senses and not under delu-
sion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other,’ a formulation that has remained unchanged for 250 years. Thus, according to
the conventional view, the offending provision must not merely be ‘unreasonable,’ but
must be ‘harsh’ or ‘oppressive’ in nature, or the terms so one-sided as to ‘shock the
conscience.’”).
63. See, e.g., Francis J. Mootz III, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Con-
tracting in the Electronic Age, 4 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 271, 284 (2008)
(“[C]ourts have readily concluded that clicking an ‘I agree’ icon next to an electronic
presentation of the seller’s terms forms a contract and manifests the purchaser’s as-
sent to those terms.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent, and Internet Con-
tracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1323 (2005) (“Many courts analyzing click-wrap
agreements have found the act of clicking an ‘I agree’ button to be an explicit manifes-
tation of assent to contract terms.”).
64. See supra note 42 (citing Restatement and Ricks).
65. David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of
Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 747 (2012) (referring to “the widespread
belief that adherents ignore dispute resolution terms in standard form contracts”);
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 671 (2011) (Summarizing the “scant” empirical work available and
concluding “Even when the standard form contract is available, very few people read
it.”).
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the document, and thus not to form a contract.66 Adhesion contracts,
like other contracts, are not formed (do not exist) unless the party
against whom enforcement is sought manifested his or her consent to
the contract’s terms by signing, clicking, performing, or similar voli-
tional action. This simple and hugely important fact refutes asser-
tions that adhesive arbitration agreements, or arbitration arising out
of such agreements, is “mandatory” or “forced” arbitration. What
some call mandatory or forced arbitration is better called adhesive
arbitration, recognizing that it is subset of contractual arbitration,
because it, unlike some other arbitration,67 does not occur unless the
parties have contracted to arbitrate the dispute, and contracts are—
in the absence of duress or perhaps other defense—consensual, not
forced or mandatory.68
B. Adhering Party’s Manifestation of Assent May Not Extend to
the Entire Document, and Even If It Does, Some of the
Document’s Terms May Be Unenforceable
As just explained, when a business presents its adhesion con-
tract form document to a consumer who signs, clicks, or performs it,
the consumer manifests her consent to the document’s terms, gener-
ally. However, contract law recognizes exceptions. To put it another
way, the contract’s terms may include some, but not all, of the words
on the document. This distinction was explained by Karl Llewellyn,
lead drafter of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, which is perhaps
contract law’s most important statute. Llewellyn described the typi-
cal buyer’s assent to the typical seller’s form document as “specific”
assent to the “few dickered terms” buyer and seller discuss, and
66. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 205 (2005) (in contract cases “the parties had the ability to walk away from the
deal altogether. This ‘walk-away’ power represents the ultimate caveat to claims of
inequality of bargaining power—there is always a choice, always an alternative to
entering the deal. That choice may be one among relatively unpleasant choices, but
that alone cannot defeat the meaningfulness of the choice. But courts rarely acknowl-
edge the power simply to do without or to seek alternatives to the proffered bargain.”).
67. See supra text at notes 5156. See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in
Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 398 (2009)
(“This form of arbitration is ‘mandatory’ only in the sense that it is imposed by the
stronger party as a precondition to transacting with the weaker party. It is, therefore,
both more accurate and user-friendly to name this form of arbitration “adhesionary”
or “disparate-party” arbitration.”); id. (“[T]o describe this process as “mandatory arbi-
tration” is at least misleading, if not wholly inaccurate. The use of that phrase is
likely to create confusion with so-called court-annexed arbitration. The latter is in-
deed mandatory because state legislatures obligate litigants to undergo this process
before they can proceed with their lawsuits.”).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
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“blanket” assent “to any not unreasonable or indecent term the seller
may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms.”69
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agree-
ment does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or
even to read the standard terms. . . . Customers do not in fact
ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms. They
trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly
by others similarly situated. But they understand that they are
assenting to the terms not read or not understood, subject to
such limitations as the law may impose.70
Among these limitations, the customer does not assent to a term on
the seller’s form document if the seller “has reason to believe that the
[customer] would not have accepted the agreement if he had known
that the agreement contained the particular term.”71 This reasoning
protects consumers and other adhering parties from a document term
that:
• is “bizarre or oppressive,”
• “eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to,” or
• “eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.”
because such a term is not part of the contract.72
While only a few states have expressly adopted this Restatement
section,73 its core idea (just summarized) is widely endorsed,74 and is
69. Karl Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
71. Id. § 211 cmt. f.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682
P.2d 388, 396–97 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting section 211(3)); Sutton v. Banner Life Ins.
Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C. 1996) (“We agree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s
approach in Darner Motor adopting section 211(3)”); Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97
F.Supp.3d 359, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 211(3)) (“Courts do not enforce terms of agreements that are unconscionable. It is
recognized that where the offering party has reason to believe ‘that the party mani-
festing assent’ to a contract ‘would not do so’ if she ‘knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.’”) (internal citations omitted).
See also Barnes, Fairer, supra note 61, at 263 (2007) (“Subsection 211(3) . . . was
incorporated into the second Restatement but then promptly discarded by a substan-
tial majority of courts and commentators.”); James J. White, Form Contracts Under
Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315 (1997)) (most cases decided under section
211(3) came from Arizona); Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer
Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 736 (2016) (“The mystery of section 211 is
its overwhelming absence from modern contract law cases. Section 211 is rarely cited
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very much embodied in the widely-recognized unconscionability doc-
trine, because the sorts of adhesive terms just listed are especially
likely to be held unconscionable, and thus unenforceable.75 The adhe-
siveness of a contract greatly increases the likelihood a court will find
it “procedurally unconscionable,” and some courts go as far as
“equat[ing] the finding of a contract of adhesion with the finding of
procedural unconscionability.”76 But a court’s finding of procedural
with respect to any standardized contract dispute, and even where cited, it rarely
provides relief to the non-drafting party.”) (footnote omitted).
74. It is consistent even with a libertarian commitment to freedom of contract. As
libertarian contracts scholar Randy Barnett writes,
[P]arties who sign forms or click ‘I agree’ are manifesting their consent to be
bound by the unread terms in the forms. They would rather run the risk of
agreeing to unread terms than either (a) decline to agree or (b) read the
terms. Refusing to enforce all of these terms would violate their freedom to
contract. But parties who click ‘I agree’ are not realistically manifesting their
assent to radically unexpected terms. Enforcing such an unread term would
violate the parties’ freedom from contract.
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 639
(2002). See also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contrac-
tual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 889–90 (1992) (“unless the presence of a clause that
deviates from commonsense expectations is brought to the attention of the other party
by its prominence and even by a requirement of some additional formality, the draft-
ing party has no reason to believe that the other party consented to it.”).
75. The rule of Restatement § 211(3) “is closely related to the policy against un-
conscionable terms and the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.” RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (citing id. §§206 & 208) (1981). See also
Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
[C]ontract law has ample ammunition when sellers become too greedy. Al-
though the evolved judicial strategy has many labels, the tools employed by
courts largely reflect Llewellyn’s idea that courts should presume express
consumer assent to any negotiated terms and, so long as the consumer has
had a reasonable opportunity to read the standard terms, courts should find
tacit or “blanket” assent to conscionable standard terms. Courts should also
be empowered to strike any “unreasonable or indecent” boilerplate. Two of
the most prominent judicial avenues for accomplishing these goals are the
doctrine of unconscionability and section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.
Id. at 748.
76. Warkentine, supra note 60, at 547 (noting that California courts “equate the
finding of a contract of adhesion with the finding of procedural unconscionability”).
See also Catherine Riley, Signing in Glitter or Blood?: Unconscionability and Reality
Television Contracts, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 106, 120 (2013) (“Habitu-
ally, courts assume procedural unconscionability in contracts of adhesion . . . .”);
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 37, at 1258 (“In some cases, courts point
to the adhesive nature of form contracts as evidence that the terms therein are ‘invol-
untary’ and thus procedurally unconscionable.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1258 n.201
(“The majority of courts, however, find that the fact that a contract is adhesive is not
alone enough for a finding of procedural unconscionability.”) (citation omitted).
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unconscionability is generally insufficient to prevent enforcement of a
contract term.
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that
both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required
before courts will grant relief from a challenged term. Judicial
decisions have not consistently followed this principle, however,
and some courts have suggested a vaguely mathematical meta-
phor in which a large amount of one type of unconscionability
can make up for only a small amount of the other.77
So contract law’s dispositive question in policing adhesion con-
tracts is usually whether the challenged contract term is substan-
tively unconscionable. That determination, as John Murray aptly
summarizes, “is concerned with whether a contract, or a term of a
contract, is overly harsh, one-sided, or manifests an outrageous de-
gree of unfairness.”78 While this determination can be difficult to pre-
dict—and surely varies from court to court, perhaps depending
somewhat on the judge’s ideology or temperament79—one can safely
77. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also
Lonegrass, supra note 62, at 11–13 (discussing conventional requirement to make a
strong showing of both forms of unconscionability, and sliding scale’s similar require-
ment that both forms be present, however a lesser showing of one form may be accept-
able with a large amount of the other form present); John E. Murray, Jr., Revised
Article 2: Eliminating the “Battle” and Unconscionability, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 593,
606–08 (2011) (discussing requirement of most courts that both substantive and pro-
cedural unconscionability be present, and a “sliding scale” approach that allows a
large amount of one form of unconscionability to make up for a lack of the other). E.
Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Murray, Jr., Judicial Vision, supra note 23, at 265 (“ ‘Proce- R
dural’ unconscionability is concerned with the circumstances under which the con-
tract was negotiated and formed including the conspicuous or inconspicuous form in
which the allegedly unconscionable term is found and, in particular, whether a genu-
ine negotiation occurred, versus a take-it-or-leave-it demand that precluded any
choice by the party with inferior bargaining power. Where only one party dictates the
terms, the agreement is a ‘contract of adhesion’ which is ‘procedurally’
unconscionable.”).
78. Murray, Jr., Judicial, supra note 23, at 266 (footnote omitted). See also
Farnsworth, supra note 77. See also Unconscionable Contract or Term., Unif. Com-
mercial Code §. 2-302 cmt. 1 (“The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bar-
gaining power.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §208 cmt. c (1981) (“[G]ross
disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that
a contract is unconscionable.”).
79. Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 34 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 9, 9 (2013) (studying 174 California appellate decisions determining unconscio-
nability of arbitration clause in a standard-form contract and finding inconsistency in
about 23% of case-precedent pairs; “We find that conflicting political ideology of the
benches that hear the two cases is highly correlated with inconsistency. That is, when
we can directly compare pairs of cases, conservative judges are more likely to enforce
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conclude that only a tiny portion of the terms on common adhesion
contract form documents are unconscionable, or otherwise unenforce-
able due to Restatement § 211(3) or any other doctrine of contract
law.80
Perhaps for this reason, legislatures and administrative agencies
have supplemented contract law’s policing of adhesion contracts with
statutes and regulations prohibiting various terms that had appeared
in adhesion contracts (because courts often enforced them) until en-
actment of the statute or regulation.81 Indeed, most of consumer law
consists largely of statutes and regulations prohibiting various adhe-
sion contract terms,82 as do fundamental doctrines of employment,83
labor,84 securities,85 and franchise law.86 The enormous growth over
a contract as written and decide inconsistently with precedents delivered by liberal
judges; liberal judges are more likely to hold an arbitration provision unconscionable
and decide inconsistently with precedents delivered by conservative judges.”). See also
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 66668 (1999) (Alabama Supreme Court justices
who receive campaign funding from business are less likely than justices receiving
campaign funding from plaintiffs’ lawyers to hold arbitration clauses unconscionable).
80. See Lonegrass, supra note 62, at 10.
81. Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power
in Contract Law, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1054 (2014) (“Examples abound of
laws and regulations aimed at resolving the very concerns that have led courts to turn
to bargaining-power analysis. In a number of different areas, legislatures and agen-
cies have prohibited contracts from including terms deemed abusive to one of the
parties.”).
82. See, e.g., id. at 1054–55 (“State usury laws limit the amount of interest that
lenders can charge to certain types of borrowers. The Federal Trade Commission
(‘FTC’) has issued regulations dictating terms that must, and must not, be included in
payday loans, credit card agreements, and other consumer-oriented financial con-
tracts.”) (footnotes omitted). Consumer law is replete with mandatory rules prohibit-
ing various contract terms such as holder-in-due-course clauses, 16 C.F.R. 433.2(a),
waivers of exemptions, id. 444.2(a)(2), assignments of wages, id. 444.2(a)(3), and
many nonpossessory security interest in household goods, id. 444.2(a)(4).
83. See, e.g., Helveston & Jacobs, supra note 81, at 1055 (“The Occupational
Safety and Health Act and minimum wage laws establish mandatory requirements
for employment contracts.”) (footnotes omitted).
84. An employee’s right to join a labor union may not be contracted away pre-
dispute; so-called “yellow dog” contracts are unenforceable under federal labor law. 29
U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (Securities Act anti-waiver provision); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77cc(a) (2012) (Securities Exchange Act anti-waiver provision: “Any condition, stipu-
lation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory
organization, shall be void.”).
86. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 680–81 (2013) (“[M]ost state statutes regulating franchise relation-
ships prohibit franchisors from requiring their franchisees to waive the franchisor’s
liability for a violation of those state franchise laws when entering into a franchise
agreement.”) (footnote omitted); Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J.
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the last hundred or so years of such legislation and regulation is
largely the result of policymakers’ decisions to prohibit enforcement
of adhesive contract terms that would have been enforced had con-
tract-law doctrines been the only grounds on which to deny
enforcement.
C. Conforming Adhesive Arbitration Law to Law Governing
Adhesion Contracts Generally
1. Overview and the Case for Centrism over Conservatism
The previous two subsections explained that adhesive contracts
are consensual, not forced or mandatory, but are subject to contract
law’s defenses to enforcement (such as duress and misrepresenta-
tion); and particular adhesive terms may be beyond the scope of the
adhering party’s consent under reasoning summarized in Restate-
ment § 211(3) or, although consensual, too harsh for law to enforce,
under either contract law’s unconscionability defense or non-contract
law. Therefore, to treat adhesion contracts’ arbitration clauses like
adhesion contracts’ other clauses, arbitration law must use contract
law’s low standards of consent—which allow a signature, click, or
other manifestation of assent to make adhesive arbitration agree-
ments presumptively enforceable—but then override this presump-
tion when the arbitration clause is:
1) part of a contract induced by duress, misrepresentation, or
other conduct constituting a defense to contract enforcement;
2) beyond the scope of the adhering party’s assent under rea-
soning like that of Restatement § 211(3); or
3) so harsh that it is analogous to non-arbitration adhesive
terms prohibited by law.
In other words, to conform adhesive arbitration law to law governing
adhesion contracts generally, arbitration law must apply the general
contract law governing adhesion contracts and serve as an analog to
the large body of statutes and regulations (in consumer law, employ-
ment law, and similar areas) prohibiting various adhesive terms.
This task is better performed by the Centrist Position than by
the Conservative or Progressive Positions. Both the Moderately and
857, 912 (2014) (“Although similar to contracts, franchises differ because franchise
law entails certain mandatory rules (e.g., limitations on termination) and attempts to
deter renegotiation in ways that contract law generally does not.”) (footnote omitted);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-14-201 (“A franchisor may not in this state . . . require a fran-
chisee to prospectively agree to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel
that would . . . relieve a franchisor from any liability . . . .”).
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Very Conservative Positions endorse the separability doctrine (dis-
cussed above87) and thus fail the first just-listed criterion for treating
adhesive arbitration clauses like other adhesive contract clauses—
not enforcing a contract induced by duress, misrepresentation, or
other conduct constituting a defense to contract enforcement. By sep-
arating an arbitration agreement from the larger contract containing
it, the separability doctrine largely removes contract defenses’ protec-
tion from the main right traded away by an arbitration agreement—
the right to litigate—and thus fails to police adhesive arbitration
agreements as much as our law polices other adhesion contracts.88
In addition, the Very Conservative Position adopted by current
law fails the third criterion because it exempts adhesive arbitration
agreements from otherwise-applicable legal limits protecting against
arguably-harsh terms related to legally-erroneous decisions and class
actions. Both of these anomalies in current arbitration law would be
fixed by law adopting the Centrist Position. The following two
paragraphs explain.
Current (Very Conservative) law facilitates enforcement of arbi-
trators’ legally-erroneous decisions. While outside the arbitration
context courts do not enforce adhesion contracts prohibiting appeal,
and thus trading away the right to correct the initial adjudicator’s
legally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims,89 courts rou-
tinely enforce adhesive arbitration agreements effectively trading
away that right.90 In contrast, the Centrist Position would vacate ar-
bitrators’ legally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims when
87. See supra text at notes 45–50.
88. Id. See also Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1239.
89. Id. at 1249 (noting virtually no authority outside the arbitration context for
enforcing pre-dispute contract provision prohibits appeal).
90. Id. at 1251 (“[C]ourts routinely enforce [contract clauses prohibiting appeal]
in adhesive arbitration agreements. That is, courts routinely enforce adhesive arbi-
tration agreements that trade away the right to correct legally erroneous decisions by
the initial adjudicator, the arbitrator. In fact, most every arbitration agreement does
this. Most every arbitration agreement trades away the right to correct legally errone-
ous decisions by the initial adjudicator, as there is generally no right to correct legally
erroneous arbitration awards.”); see Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and
the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 500 (2009) (“Arbitra-
tion typically does not have an appeals process, unless the parties agree by contract to
create one. Courts review arbitration awards only on narrow, usually procedural,
grounds, and the United States Supreme Court has curtailed the ability of parties to
expand that review by contract.”); Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption
Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency Regulation, 6 Y.B.
ON ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 62–63 (2013) (“Arbitration awards are virtually unreview-
able on the merits and are rarely vacated.”).
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the award arises out of adhesive or other pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.91
Also, current (Very Conservative) law enforces adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements’ “class waivers”—provisions trading away the right
to participate in a class action.92 In contrast, before such enforcement
was approved by the Supreme Court’s 2011 AT&T v. Concepcion93
decision, courts rarely enforced non-arbitration adhesion contracts
purporting to trade away the right to participate in a class action.94
While courts now generally enforce adhesive arbitral class waivers,
the Centrist Position would treat arbitral class waivers like other
class waivers, so the right to participate in a class action would be no
more easily traded away in an adhesive arbitration agreement than
91. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1259 (“Courts could give de novo
review to arbitrators’ decisions on questions of mandatory law. I have long supported
this and propose the following law reform, whether enacted by Congress, the CFPB,
or perhaps the Supreme Court: In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration
awards, a state or federal court shall vacate an award arising out of an agreement
providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties where the award
was based on the arbitrators’ error of law and, at the time of their most recent agree-
ment submitting the controversy to arbitration, the parties could not have formed an
enforceable contract to avoid such law. The final clause—‘at the time of their most
recent agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration, the parties could not
have formed an enforceable contract to avoid such law’ ensures that only awards aris-
ing out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate would be subject to de novo review, and
ensures that de novo review would apply only to questions of mandatory, not default,
law. This rule would fix the anomaly of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
even adhesive arbitration agreements, but not other pre-dispute contracts trading
away the right to appeal legally erroneous decisions. This rule would make arbitra-
tion agreements as enforceable as other agreements, but not more so.”).
92. Id. at 1232 (“[F]ollowing the Supreme Court’s 2011 AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion decision, courts generally enforce adhesive arbitral class waivers.”). See
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; American Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11 (2013).
93. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1264. (“In sum, the conservative
Justices comprising the majorities in Stolt and Concepcion see “bilateral” arbitra-
tion—the simple type of arbitration contemplated by the FAA—as the norm and see
class arbitration as a strange process that a few parties might choose, but which
should not be imposed on parties who have agreed to arbitrate without specifically
addressing class arbitration. And Concepcion strongly suggests that courts may not
consider it a strike against the enforceability of an arbitration agreement that the
agreement provides only for arbitration and not for class arbitration, even if that has
exculpatory effect. Concepcion reads the FAA as preempting state law—even state
law categorized as “unconscionability” or some other ground for the revocation of any
contract—that “[r]equir[es] the availability of classwide arbitration.” (citing Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–53).”).
94. Id. at 1266–67 (citing and summarizing cases).
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in an adhesive non-arbitration agreement.95 In other words, arbitra-
tion law under the Centrist Position would defer to other law in de-
ciding when, if ever, class waivers are enforceable.
2. Unless Unconscionable, Enforce Arbitration Agreements’
Limitations on Discovery, Evidence, and Identity of
Adjudicator
The previous paragraphs summarize how the Centrist Position
rejects the three important and controversial parts of current law—
(1) separability doctrine (contract defenses), (2) correction of legally-
erroneous decisions, and (3) class waivers—that enforce adhesive ar-
bitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts. On
these three topics, the Centrist Position advances the principle that
arbitration law should be congruous with non-arbitration law, so ad-
hesive arbitration agreements are only as enforceable as other adhe-
sion contracts.
However, this principle of congruity should not be taken to the
extreme. In a few ways—relating to discovery, evidence, and the
jury—adhesive arbitration agreements should remain more enforcea-
ble than other adhesion contracts.96 In other words, courts should
continue enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements reducing parties’
access to discovery, evidentiary rules, and juries, even when courts
would not enforce analogous reductions in non-arbitration adhesion
contracts.
To see why, consider the alternative—a rule enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements only when they provide for the same discovery, evi-
dence rules, and juries available in litigation. For example, if to be
enforceable an agreement to “arbitrate” had to use (1) the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery, (2) the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and (3) have juries, then so-called “arbitration” would be
95. Id. at 1270 (“[W]e have three non-arbitration-law fora–amendments to rules
of civil procedure, statutes, and case law–in which to make law about class actions
generally and class waivers specifically. Any or all of these fora are better suited to
making that law than is arbitration law. Accordingly, arbitration law should be ag-
nostic about class waivers and should defer to these other bodies of law. This article’s
centrist proposal does exactly that. The proposal in the Appendix states that if any
arbitration “agreement requires claims to be brought on an individual, rather than
class, basis then such requirement shall be as enforceable as such a requirement in a
non-arbitration agreement would be under similar circumstances.” This does not say
that arbitral class waivers should or should not be enforceable. It says that arbitra-
tion law should follow other law on the circumstances in which they are enforceable.
In short, it says arbitration law should defer to other law in deciding whether a class
waiver is enforceable.”).
96. Id. at 1271.
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nearly identical to civil litigation in federal courts.97 Therefore, en-
forcing adhesive arbitration agreements that reduce discovery, evi-
dentiary rules, and juries is necessary to preserve “arbitration” as
private adjudication, significantly different from the governmental
adjudication we call “litigation,” and thus to preserve “arbitration” as
that term is used in the Federal Arbitration Act,98 other governing
law, and ordinary speech.99
97. Id. at 1277.
98. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Some contend “the Federal Arbitration Act was never
intended to permit companies to impose arbitration on unknowing consumers and
employees, but rather was merely intended to allow two sophisticated businesses to
enter into predispute arbitration agreements.” Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Bind-
ing Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729–30 (2001). See also Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitra-
tion Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 308 (2015) (Congress “intended the FAA to allow
enforcement only of arbitration agreements between merchants. Congress did not in-
tend the FAA to apply to consumer contracts.”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Miscon-
struction: How the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted
by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 111–12 (2006) (“The FAA was a bill of limited
scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal eco-
nomic strength.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act
Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 118 (2016) (The FAA “was
enacted to cover privately-negotiated arbitration agreements between merchants . . .
the Supreme Court has expanded the statute to . . . compel arbitration of . . . con-
sumer disputes . . . .”).
However, the text of the FAA did not make enforceable only arbitration agree-
ments between “merchants” or “businesses.” It made enforceable all arbitration agree-
ments “involving commerce” between all sorts of parties, except for “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. (2012). While the legislative history
reflects concerns about non-employment adhesion contracts, see Moses, supra, at 106
(citing Senator Walsh), these concerns did not find their way into the statute. Con-
gress knew how to except individuals from the FAA and chose to except some employ-
ees but not any consumers.
When the FAA was enacted “very few transactions between large merchants and
individual consumers . . . would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen
under the jurisdiction of the FAA.” Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.REV. 637, 647 (1996) [hereinafter, Sternlight, Panacea]. The vast increase in con-
sumer transactions now held to involve commerce under the FAA reflects not only an
increase in long-distance consumer transactions, but also the Supreme Court’s expan-
sion of the Commerce Clause to cover transactions previously considered beyond the
reach of federal legislation. See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s
Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 385, 459 (1992). “If applying the FAA to consumer contracts is inconsis-
tent with the intent of the Congress that enacted it, that inconsistency is more
properly blamed on the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause than on the
Court’s interpretation of the FAA.” Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-
Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. L. Rev. 167, 180 n.76 (2004).
99. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1271.
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In addition, allowing adhesive arbitration agreements to reduce
discovery, evidentiary rules, and juries is good policy. Arbitration
should, within the bounds of the unconscionability doctrine, be free to
compete against litigation by offering different adjudicators and dif-
ferent rules of discovery and evidence.100 The United States is the
only major nation to make extensive use of jury trials in civil
cases,101 and “the civil jury bears a large share of responsibility for:
(1) the cost and intrusiveness of U.S. discovery; (2) the theatrics of
U.S. trials; and (3) the complexity of U.S. evidence law.”102 So arbi-
tration’s lack of a jury fits with arbitration’s tendency to reduce dis-
covery103 and evidentiary rules; and the whole package is quite
mainstream and reasonable to all but only an oddly provincial Ameri-
can. Among these oddly provincial Americans “who place a high value
on the procedural rights lost by substituting arbitration for litigation”
are, I suspect, “a disproportionately large number of lawyers.”104 The
procedures more prevalent in litigation than arbitration tend to cre-
ate paid work for lawyers, so many lawyers may think they have a
financial interest in discouraging arbitration, and some probably do
have such an interest.
In sum, lawyers lobbying against enforcement of adhesive arbi-
tration agreements may vindicate Upton Sinclair’s observation that,
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends on his not understanding it.”105 And even if lawyer-self-in-
terest plays no role, lawyers may be especially likely to value litiga-
tion’s more elaborate procedures over arbitration’s less elaborate
100. Id. at 1274–75.
101. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
193–94 n.1 (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil jury as “a course that the rest
of the civilized world took long ago”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 267 (1977); Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel,
Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 357 (2003).
102. Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Compara-
tive Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 868
(2002).
103. See infra Section IV.F.
104. Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law (With
A Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 221
(1998) [hereinafter, Ware, Exceptional].
105. Upton Sinclair, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT LICKED 100
(1935).
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procedures simply because lawyers are trained in litigation’s proce-
dures and accustomed to them, or because lawyers tend by tempera-
ment to be comfortable with “process values,”106 and thus less
comfortable with the “rough justice” associated with arbitration.107
All of which should guide lawyers to temper their fondness for the
procedures more abundant in litigation than arbitration with a hum-
ble acknowledgment that “Procedural excess has long been the bane
of many legal decision systems, and commonly has served as the jus-
tifiable basis for public dissatisfaction with the institutions of the
law.”108
The previous paragraphs argued that adhesive arbitration agree-
ments should be allowed to reduce parties’ access to discovery, evi-
dentiary rules, and juries. That said, such agreements should be
subject to contract-law defenses, such as unconscionability, so courts
can police arbitration agreements’ fairness on these three procedural
topics. In other words, the Centrist Position (like current law) allows
parties substantial freedom of contract on discovery, evidence, and
identity of the adjudicator, but not complete freedom of contract, so
courts can protect consumers, employees, and others from overly-
harsh adhesion contracts.109 This should meet the concerns of
progressives and plaintiffs’ lawyers that claimants in complex cases
need litigation’s more elaborate procedures, particularly its more ex-
tensive discovery, because “proof is relatively complex and the pre-
106. John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 657, 659 (1994) (“Process values, that is, the goals and positive contributions of
good procedure, are of both the instrumental and the noninstrumental variety. In-
strumental values are those associated with the quality of the decision that emerges
from the process. Noninstrumental values are those inherent in the procedure it-
self.”); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)- partial Enough“ in A World of Embedded Neu-
trals, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 495, 534 (2010) (“Procedural justice
matters because if people perceive a dispute resolution or decision-making process as
procedurally fair, they also are more likely to perceive the outcome as substantively
fair. Perceptions of procedural justice also strongly influence compliance and percep-
tions of the legitimacy of the institution that provides or sponsors the process.”).
107. Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Ju-
dicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 163 (2013) (“The
availability of flexible ‘rough justice’ is a vaunted feature of arbitration.”); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dispute
Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 338
(2003) (“[H]arsh formalities of litigation . . . may fall particularly hard upon less so-
phisticated, less well-represented parties to a dispute. Consequently, arbitration may
provide more satisfactory results when it accords these parties rough justice.”).
108. John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-Making Functions, Ex Parte Com-
munications, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH L.
REV. 1135, 1135 (1993).
109. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1274–75.
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litigation distribution of evidence is largely in the possession of the
defendant. Therefore, extensive discovery is required for the plaintiff
to meet his burden of proof.”110 In sum, contractual freedom tem-
pered by unconscionability-policing is centrist moderation that allows
arbitration to differ from litigation on discovery, evidence, and iden-
tity of the adjudicator, but not differ in such a harsh way as to be
unconscionable.
3. Progressives’ Assertions About Adhesive Arbitration’s Evils
Progressives would go farther than the centrist reforms summa-
rized above. Progressives would completely prohibit enforcement of
individuals’ adhesive arbitration agreements. Progressives generally
justify this position with assertions that adhesive arbitration agree-
ments are “forced” on consumers and have effects that are, on bal-
ance, bad for consumers. The previous subsections explained that
moving from current (Very Conservative) law to the Centrist Position
would fix the one aspect of current law—the separability doctrine—at
least possibly requiring courts to enforce some “forced” arbitration
clauses. But what of progressives’ other assertion—that adhesive ar-
bitration agreements’ effects tend, on balance, to be bad for consum-
ers? This assertion generally rests on two more-specific assertions:
1) consumers with disputes against businesses tend to fare
worse in arbitration than they do in litigation;111 and
2) enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements does not tend to
reduce the prices consumers pay for the goods and services cov-
ered by such agreements.112
If these two assertions—(1) worse consumer outcomes and (2) no
price reduction—are true, then the case for an exception to the law’s
usual presumption for enforcing adhesive contract terms might well
have been made. If these two assertions are true, then enforcing con-
sumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements might help one party to the
agreement (the business), but harm the other party, the consumer.
While businesses are ultimately owned by people and one can plausi-
bly believe that helping business owners is as good as helping con-
sumers, this article is written for those who may not share that
110. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND.
L.J. 239, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing].
111. See infra Section III. That is, suppose enforceable arbitration agreements re-
sult in fewer successful claims by consumers against businesses and lower settlement
and award payments on claims that are successful, as well as more successful claims
by businesses against consumers and higher payments to businesses on their success-
ful claims.
112. See infra Section IV.
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belief,113 so I set it aside. Instead, the next two sections of this article
question the evidence for the two more-specific assertions.
Section III shows that the most relevant empirical data does not
support the belief that consumers with disputes against businesses
tend to fare worse in arbitration than they do in litigation. And even
if newer empirical data showed that enforceable adhesive arbitration
agreements tend to produce worse (than litigation) outcomes for con-
sumers, that would not be a reason to prefer a prohibition of consum-
ers’ adhesive arbitration agreements to the Centrist Position’s
enforcement of them. That newer data would instead be a reason to
try the Centrist Position—(1) repeal the separability doctrine, (2)
treat arbitral class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers, and (3)
vacate arbitrators’ legally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law
claims—and see if these three reforms bring arbitration’s outcomes
in line with litigation’s.
Section IV rebuts assertions that enforcement of adhesive arbi-
tration agreements tends not to reduce the prices consumers pay. In
contrast to these assertions, the standard view among economists
across the ideological spectrum is that anything that lowers busi-
nesses’ costs tends over time to reduce the prices those businesses
charge. This analysis is supported by voluminous evidence from a
wide variety of sources. While the standard economic analysis has
not been shown empirically with respect to adhesive arbitration
agreements, no reasoning suggests why it should apply any less to
arbitration agreement than to anything else that lowers businesses’
costs. While some suggest that the CFPB has shown the absence of a
price-reducing effect from adhesive arbitration agreements, the
CFPB study they cite was not conclusive, and was followed by the
CFPB repeatedly endorsing the standard economic analysis’s conclu-
sion that enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements tends to
lower prices.114
113. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If
Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 85 (2007) (“The gist of my idea is that ‘little’
guys (consumers and certain lower level employees) would be provided, by statute,
with an opportunity to take their disputes to binding arbitration rather than litiga-
tion. If the ‘little guys’ chose arbitration over litigation, post-dispute, companies
would have to agree to such arbitration, and the results of the arbitration would then
be binding on both ‘little guy’ and company. If on the other hand the ‘little guys’ pre-
ferred to litigate their disputes, they would reserve that right.”).
114. CFPB, Arbitration Agreements Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, http://files.con
sumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPB_Arbitration_Agreements_Notice_of_Proposed_
Rulemaking.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, Proposed Rule]; (“To the extent providers would
pass these costs through to consumers, providers’ costs would be lower.”).
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III. EFFECTS OF ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
ON DISPUTE OUTCOMES
A. Empirical and Other Approaches to Comparing Outcomes in
Arbitration and Litigation
1. Beliefs and Knowledge
a. Arbitration Should Be Compared to Litigation of Similar
Cases
As I wrote a decade ago, compared to litigation, “[i]t is possible
that adhesive arbitration results in . . . generally lower awards for
adhering parties like consumers and employees.”115 More broadly, it
is possible that consumers and other individuals with disputes
against businesses tend to experience worse outcomes in arbitration
than they do in litigation. “Worse outcomes” include fewer successful
claims by consumers against businesses and lower settlement and
award payments on claims that are successful, as well as more suc-
cessful claims by businesses against consumers and higher payments
to businesses on their successful claims. For example, if consumers
subject to enforceable arbitration agreements leave more of their
meritorious claims unpursued because these claims could only be
cost-effectively pursued as part of class litigation precluded by an ar-
bitral class waiver, that would constitute “worse outcomes” for con-
sumers, even if consumers fare as well in disputes that are arbitrated
as they do in disputes that are litigated.
While I continue to acknowledge the possibility that consumers
and other individuals with disputes against businesses tend to expe-
rience worse outcomes in arbitration than they do in litigation, belief
that this is not merely possible, but established, seems common.116
115. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements —
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB.
251, 259 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees]; Drahozal, Un-
fair, supra note 53, 743–44 (A “possible difference between arbitration and litigation
is the expected outcome. The individual may expect to be more (or less) likely to pre-
vail in arbitration than in court, and may expect to recover more (or less) in damages.
Conversely, the corporation may expect to be more (or less) likely to prevail in arbitra-
tion than in court, and may expect to pay more (or less) in damages.”).
116. For example, New York Times news articles (not editorials) contend arbitra-
tors “commonly consider the companies their clients” and “have twisted or outright
disregarded the law” to rule favorably towards the companies. Jessica Silver-Green-
berg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbi-
tration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html. “[T]he rules of arbitration largely
favor companies, which can even steer cases to friendly arbitrators, interviews and
records show.” Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
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However, this belief is not supported by the most relevant empirical
data. That “most relevant empirical data” is discussed below, after a
discussion of less relevant data and other less valid ways of assessing
the belief that individuals with disputes against businesses tend to
experience worse outcomes in arbitration than they do in litigation.
That belief cannot be shown by anecdotes about particular con-
sumers who fared badly in arbitration.117 Litigation has its own hor-
ror stories,118 and it is “essential not to analyze arbitration in
isolation, but instead, to compare it to the alternatives.”119 The rele-
vant alternative to arbitration is litigation because, as discussed
above, non-enforcement of consumers’ arbitration agreements would
allow litigation by consumers who otherwise would be held to have
traded away their right to litigate.120
Even as debate rises from anecdotes to empirical studies, the
need to compare arbitration with litigation remains. Therefore, stud-
ies that gather data on arbitration, but not litigation, cannot by
themselves support or contradict the belief that consumers and other
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice
.html?_r=1. See also Levitin, supra note 40 (“When arbitrators make plain legal or
factual errors, their rulings still stand. As a result, arbitration is more likely to pro-
duce erroneous outcomes than the court system. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the financial firm picks the arbitrator. The major arbitration associations get
their business from the financial firms, not consumers, and are thus incentivized to
cater to the financial firms in order to get repeat business.”). David Lipsky writes that
“the Times series is a seriously biased and one-sided attack on” arbitration. David B.
Lipsky, The New York Times’ Attack on Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2016, at 6.
117. For such anecdotes, see, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, The Arbitration Trap: How
Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers, (Sept. 2007), http://www.citizen.org/doc-
uments/Arb- itrationTrap.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbi-
tration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2815–16
(2015).
119. Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 551
(2008).
120. As two of the leading empirical researchers on arbitration write, “the proper
basis for comparison is to similar cases in court. Court adjudication is the default
means of dispute resolution. Parties that agree to arbitrate contract out of that de-
fault. To evaluate arbitration meaningfully thus requires a comparison to the likely
means by which the disputes otherwise would be resolved . . . .” Christopher R.
Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 HAS-
TINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 80 (2011) [hereinafter, Drahozal & Zyontz, Creditor Claims]. See
also Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Con-
sumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 918 (2010) [hereinafter,
Drahozal & Zyontz, Empirical Study] (“[O]ne must have a baseline for comparison to
evaluate the cost, speed, and outcomes of consumer arbitrations; data on arbitration
proceedings alone are not enough.”).
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individuals tend to experience worse outcomes in arbitration than lit-
igation.121 For example, Alexander Colvin’s Empirical Study of Em-
ployment Arbitration122 reports an employee win rate in arbitration
and says this rate is “lower than employee win rates in litigation,”123
but does not cite any source of data on employee win rates in litiga-
tion, let alone any basis for assessing the extent to which the litiga-
tion cases studied are comparable to the arbitration cases studied.124
As Colvin acknowledges, “we may be comparing apple and oranges
here in that the characteristics of cases in arbitration may differ sys-
tematically from those in litigation.”125 Similarly, a study by David
Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher finds that consumers win
35% of the arbitration cases they filed,126 but does not analyze cases
consumers file in court, let alone comparable cases consumers file in
court.127 As Horton and Chandrasekher acknowledge, “to truly assess
arbitration, one must be able to contrast its output with results in
litigation. Unfortunately, though, there are little data on civil ver-
dicts, let alone consumer cases specifically.”128
b. Arbitration’s Repeat Player Effect Should Be Compared to
Litigation’s Repeat Player Effect
The inability of studies that gather data on arbitration, but not
litigation, to support or contradict the belief that consumers tend to
experience worse outcomes in arbitration than litigation extends to
studies finding that businesses who arbitrate often (“repeat-players”)
do better in arbitration than businesses who arbitrate rarely.129
121. Important studies of consumer arbitration are listed in Horton & Chan-
drasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 76–77, and older empirical studies of con-
sumer, employment, and securities arbitration are listed in Drahozal & Zyontz,
Empirical Study, supra note 120, at 919–29.
122. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011).
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. See also David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbi-
tration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 462 (2016) [hereinafter Horton &
Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration] (“[E]mployees “win” — defined as recover-
ing $1 or more — 18% of [employment arbitration] matters. These successful plain-
tiffs recovered an average of $203,362, with a median of $52,129.”). We conclude that
employees are less likely to be victorious when they face a “high-level” or “super” re-
peat-playing employer (collectively “extreme repeat players”).
125. Colvin, supra note 122, at 7.
126. Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 63.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 77.
129. Colvin, supra note 122, at 17–20; Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution,
supra note 8, at 102–15; id. at 113 (“[C]onsumers facing high-level and super repeat-
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Since at least 2000, opponents of adhesive arbitration have cited this
“repeat player bias” to impugn the neutrality of “arbitrators who de-
pend for their livelihood on repeat business.”130 However, the repeat-
player effect may be at least as prevalent in litigation as in arbitra-
tion.131 As Horton and Chandrasekher write, parties “who are regu-
larly embroiled in litigation,” have long exploited a “variety of ways”
to “capitalize on their experience to gain the upper hand over one-
shotters.”132 So litigation may have a “repeat-player effect” that
equals or even exceeds arbitration’s. That is, businesses who litigate
often may do better in litigation than businesses who litigate rarely,
and the gap between repeat players and “one-shotters” in litigation
may be wider than the analogous gap in arbitration.133 Conse-
quently, evidence of a “repeat-player effect” in arbitration has little
relevance without evidence showing whether litigation has a compa-
rable repeat-player effect.134
playing defendants are strongly disadvantaged in the arbitral forum relative to con-
sumers facing one-shot defendants . . . ”); see also Horton & Chandrasekher, Employ-
ment Arbitration, supra note 124, at 462 (concluding “employees are less likely to be
victorious when they face a ‘high-level’ or ‘super’ repeat-playing employer”); Lisa B.
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238–39 (1998);
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 205–10 (1997).
130. Letter from John Vail, AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, to the United
States Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 21, 2000), at
4, https://docgo.org/us-federal-trade-commission-vail; see also Miriam A. Cherry,
Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis to In-
validate Employment Contracts that Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 267, 269
n.8 (1998) (“[A]rbitration companies, for the sake of their own profit margins, may
abandon fair procedural protections and instead cater to the employers who have
hired them to perform a service.”).
131. Research revealed no published studies addressing this.
132. Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 68 (quoting “Marc Ga-
lanter’s canonical article, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change”).
133. See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches
to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 752
(2001) [hereinafter Ware, Gilmer] (“The most important point about the repeat-player
effect, however, is that this effect may be at least as prevalent in litigation as in
arbitration.”)
134. Zev Eigen and David Sherwyn make the same point with respect to employ-
ment disputes. Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, Deferring for Justice: How Adminis-
trative Agencies Can Solve the Employment Dispute Quagmire by Endorsing an
Improved Arbitration System, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 265 (2016) (“[T]he
proper comparison for repeat player employers in arbitration is repeat player employ-
ers in litigation. We know of such studies.”).
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c. Epistemological Humility Outside the Natural Sciences
i. Isolating a Single Variable
More fundamentally, arbitration and litigation cannot be com-
pared with the rigorously empirical method of the natural sciences—
studies that control for all variables except the one being tested.135 In
particular, studies of how consumers fare in arbitration and litigation
cannot control for the many variables among cases. The facts of each
case are unique, so no study can control for every variable that might
distinguish the studied cases in arbitration from the studied cases in
litigation. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow writes, “[r]esearch concerning
the effects of ADR programs is especially difficult due to the problems
of developing control groups; indeed, how can one case be subjected to
both ADR and litigation?”136 In other words, because the same cases
cannot be sent to both arbitration and, in an otherwise parallel uni-
verse, litigation, we cannot know whether the forum variable (“arbi-
tration or litigation”) or something else, like cases’ merits, caused any
difference in outcomes between arbitrated cases and litigated
cases.137
135. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Not the City of God: The Multiplicity of Wrongs and
Rules, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (“The scientific model seeks to identify specific
variables, to isolate one variable from the cluster of other variables with which it is
embedded, and then to evaluate the effect or significance of that variable.”); Barry C.
Scheck, Convicting the Guilty, Protecting the Innocent, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 233, 234 (2006) (“[S]cientists control one variable so as to observe the im-
pact of that variable on the entire process.”); Barry Sullivan, On the Borderlands of
Chevron’s Empire: An Essay on Title VII, Agency Procedures and Priorities, and the
Power of Judicial Review, 62 LA. L. REV. 317, 429 (2002) (“Law is not a laboratory
science, and it is not possible in law to isolate a single variable, preserving an other-
wise controlled environment.”).
136. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1924 (1997).
137. Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2014) (“[T]here is no natural way to make
cases heard in arbitration identical in all respects to cases heard in civil litigation.
Can the observed variance be attributed to inequities inherent in the arbitral forum
or are there material differences in cases being adjudicated between the forums?”); see
also David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1287 (2009) [hereinafter, Schwartz, Fairness] (“Differences in underlying case
merit (whether the plaintiff should win) and case value (how much) can undermine
the accuracy and even the meaning of numbers that report mere outcomes.”).
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ii. Experiments and Surveys
As a way around this problem, a researcher trying to determine
the effects of forum (arbitration or litigation) could conduct experi-
ments that mimic arbitration and litigation of the same mock case.
However, we could never know how different the results of such mock
arbitrations and litigations would be from the results of real arbitra-
tions and litigations because the mock arbitrators, mock judges, and
mock jurors might not behave like real arbitrators, real judges, and
real jurors—even if they are same people who really serve in those
roles—because participants would know the case was mock, not real.
Also problematic in learning the effects of forum are surveys ask-
ing lawyers and parties to report data about their cases in arbitration
and litigation.138 Surveys are notoriously vulnerable to inaccuracies
due to respondents’ ignorance, dishonesty, and self-deception. As
Robert Glicksman and Dietrich Earnhart write,
There is a risk when conducting any survey that the respon-
dents will not provide accurate information, either because they
do not have it or because they intentionally supply inaccurate or
misleading information. Survey respondents may provide dis-
honest responses, for example, because they want to make a
good impression on those asking the questions (and believe that
accurate answers will not do so) or because they are convinced
that inaccurate responses are in their self-interest. These kinds
of responses may bias the results of any survey.139
These inaccuracy problems with surveys are widely recognized across
a range of research areas.140 Moreover, these inaccuracy problems
138. See, e.g., Gough, supra note 137, at 102–03 (“[A] survey of approximately
1,890 attorney members of the National Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”)
. . . the largest organization of practicing plaintiff-side employment attorneys in the
country” had a response rate of thirty-seven percent.).
139. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness
of Government Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Indus-
try, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 331 (2007).
140. See, e.g., Cindy M. Meston et al, Socially Desirable Responding and Sexuality
Self-Reports, 35 J. SEX RES. 148, 148 (1998) (“Socially desirable responding, the ten-
dency to tailor responses for the purpose of looking good, has been a topic of concern in
self-report assessment for over six decades . . . . The tendency for respondents to pre-
sent themselves in a favorable light can undermine the validity of self-report indices
of sexuality . . . .”); Adam J. Berinsky, Can We Talk? Self-Presentation and the Survey
Response, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 643, 644–45 (2004) (“If surveys are used as measures of
the public will, then failure to account for the social consequences of the survey inter-
view will distort the political information that they transmit. For example, some re-
spondents could feel uncomfortable discussing certain ‘sensitive’ topics such as racial
issues and, as a result, may give answers that are somewhat less than forthright. In
the aggregate, such behavior could lead to polling results that misrepresent underly-
ing public sentiment.”).
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are especially troubling when the survey’s response rate is low and
those who do respond have a stake in the survey’s results,141 like
businesses and lawyers surveyed about arbitration versus
litigation.142
2. Empirical Studies Should Try to Compare Similar Cases
(Apples to Apples)
With experiments and surveys so problematic in learning the ef-
fects of forum (arbitration or litigation), the best empirical research-
ers can do is try to find similar cases in arbitration and litigation and
then compare the results, while acknowledging that similarity is a
matter of degree and will never be perfect, so no study can entirely
eliminate the possibility that differences between the arbitration
141. See, e.g., Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United
States, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 273–74 (1993) (“Kleck’s estimate of the num-
ber of self-defensive uses of guns is a projection based on surveys, and is subject to a
serious criticism. The respondents were gun owners who have a vested interest in
exaggerating both the need for self-defense, and the effectiveness of their guns in pro-
viding it . . . . Even more likely than deliberate dishonesty among respondents to
surveys is self-deception and outright error concerning the need to use a gun in self-
defense.”); Rosa L. Matzkin, Nonparametric Survey Response Errors, 48 INT’L ECON.
REV. 1411, 1414 (2007) (“Self-reported health may generate biases not only because it
is a subjective measure, but also because older workers may use poor health to justify
decreasing the amount of hours worked, when their true reasons for decreasing hours
of work are less sociably acceptable. In fact, Ettner (1997) provides evidence that wo-
men report health less frequently than men as a reason for retirement, which is con-
sistent with the fact that it is more socially acceptable for women to retire due to
reasons other than health.”).
142. See, e.g., Mei Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DIS-
PUTE RESOL. J. 10, 15, 78–79 (1997) (survey of 36 companies with implemented arbi-
tration plans, asking basic questions about their plans’ development, coverage,
features, and the parties’ experiences under them; the 36 employers surveyed re-
present a 45% response rate); Alexander Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequal-
ity of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 85 (2014) (survey of
480 attorneys who specialize in representation of employees; surveyed what percent-
age of potential clients with employment claims the attorneys agreed to represent,
and whether those clients were covered by mandatory arbitration agreements or were
free to proceed to litigation); Gough, supra note 137, at 10203 (“[A] survey of approxi-
mately 1,890 attorney members of the National Employment Lawyers Association
(“NELA”) . . . the largest organization of practicing plaintiff-side employment attor-
neys in the country” had a response rate of thirty-seven percent.”); David Sherwyn,
Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to
Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 38–42 (2003) (survey of 288 attorneys, made up of two
sub-groups: 41 plaintiff attorneys and 247 defense attorneys, representing a response
rate of 31%; the survey asked both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers “their opinions as to
whether arbitrators, judges, and juries are: (1) more likely to give employees or em-
ployers their desired results; (2) better able to understand complex legal issues; and
(3) better able to understand complex factual issues.”).
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cases studied and the litigation cases studied might explain any dif-
ferences in outcomes between the two sets of cases. As the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) explains
[T]he disputes that are filed in arbitration differ from the dis-
putes that are filed in litigation. . . . [T]hese differences result
from decisions that the parties make about arbitration and liti-
gation, such as the company’s decision to have an arbitration
clause, the consumer’s willingness to initiate either arbitration
or litigation, the company’s or consumer’s decision to invoke the
arbitration clause in a given litigation, and the parties’ decision
to settle or litigate. Disputes, in short, are not randomly as-
signed to the two different fora. They exist in one forum or the
other because of purposeful decisions by one or both parties.
And the known outcomes — principally the cases resolved
through an arbitrator’s or court’s decision — likewise reach that
form of outcome, at least in part because of purposeful decisions
by one or both parties.143
For these reasons, no empirical study can eliminate the possibil-
ity that differences between the arbitration cases studied and the liti-
gation cases studied might explain any differences in outcomes
between the two sets of cases. Therefore, scholars and policymakers
should scrutinize empirical studies’ efforts to control for variables
that might plausibly correlate with parties’ decisions about arbitra-
tion and litigation, and no matter how thorough those controls,
should remain somewhat skeptical toward empirical studies’ conclu-
sions—because of irremovable doubt about the extent to which the
studied arbitration cases are similar on the merits to the studied liti-
gation cases.
With controlling for the merits of cases in arbitration and litiga-
tion such a “redoubtable task,”144 it is unsurprising that few studies
undertaking this task have been published. Even the CFPB seems to
have found this task too daunting. The CFPB’s 2013 preliminary re-
port on arbitration listed under the heading “future work” that it
“will consider how—if at all—we might meaningfully compare the
disposition of cases across arbitration and litigation (including class
143. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), § 5 at 7 (2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY]; see also Ware, Gilmer, supra note
133, at 756 (“[C]ases go to arbitration when, and only when, there is an arbitration
agreement. The [parties that] use arbitration agreements may be systematically dif-
ferent from the [parties that] do not use arbitration agreements.”).
144. Gough, supra note 137, at 102 (describing “controlling for merits of cases
presented to decision-makers in various forums” as a “redoubtable task”).
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litigation), both in terms of substantive outcome and in terms of pro-
cedural variables like speed to resolution.”145 However, the CFPB’s
2015 report of its study shows it did not attempt such a
comparison.146
a. The One Study Comparing Consumer Arbitration and
Litigation
Research revealed only one study attempting to identify similar
consumer cases in arbitration and litigation and then compare
them.147 In that study, Christopher Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz
compared debt collection cases brought by business claimants in arbi-
tration to debt collection cases brought by business claimants in
court. They found
• In the court cases studied, creditors won some relief as often,
or more often, than in the arbitration cases studied (i.e., con-
sumers prevailed more often in arbitration than in
court). . . .
• In the court cases studied, prevailing creditors were
awarded as high a percentage, or a higher percentage, of
what they sought than in the arbitration cases studied (i.e.,
consumers fared better, or at least no worse, by this measure
in arbitration than in court). . . .
• The rate at which debt collection cases were disposed of
other than by award or judgment (e.g., by dismissal, with-
drawal, or settlement) did not appear to differ systematically
between arbitration and litigation. . . .
145. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, SECTION 1028(A) STUDY
RESULTS TO DATE, Section 6, p. 130 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_
cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
146. See, e.g., CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143. Nevertheless, interest
groups have used the CFPB’s March 2015 report’s data to draw their own compari-
sons. See, e.g., CFPB, Letter to CFPB Director Cordray from The American Bankers
Association, the Consumer Bankers Association and The Financial Services Round-
table, 8, (July 13, 2015), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/07/March-10-2015-
Consumer-Arbitration-Study-Comment-Letter.pdf.
According to the Study, in arbitrations where customers obtained relief
on affirmative claims and the Bureau could determine the amount of the
award, the customer’s average recovery was $5,389 (an average of 57 cents
for every dollar claimed). By contrast, based on 73 of 74 individual federal
court claims in which a judgment was entered for the customer, the average
amount awarded to the customer was $5,245.17 At the other end of the spec-
trum are class members in consumer class action settlements. The Study
states that cash payments to “at least 34 million consumers” during the pe-
riod studied were “at least $1.1 billion.” This means that the average class
member’s recovery was a mere $32.35.
Id.
147. Drahozal & Zyontz, Creditor Claims, supra note 120, at 80.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\23-1\HNR102.txt unknown Seq: 46  6-MAR-18 12:03
74 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 23:29
• The rate at which consumers responded (i.e., did not default)
also did not appear to differ systematically between arbitra-
tion and litigation. . . .148
In sum, the one study attempting to identify similar consumer
cases in arbitration and litigation, and then compare them, does not
support the belief that consumers tend to fare better in litigation
than arbitration.149
B. What if Empirical Studies Showed Consumers Tend to Fare
Worse in Arbitration?
1. Distinguish Class Actions from Individual Claims and
Distinguish Claims by Consumers from Claims
against Consumers
While the most relevant empirical study does not show consum-
ers faring worse in arbitration than litigation, suppose it did? More
broadly, suppose the best empirical data showed consumers exper-
iencing worse outcomes in arbitration than litigation? Such hypothet-
ical data can plausibly be envisioned by distinguishing among
various disputes businesses have with individuals. First, distinguish
class actions from individual (non-class) claims. And then distinguish
individual claims brought by consumers against businesses from in-
dividual claims brought by businesses against consumers.  While the
last of these types of claims (Business v. Consumer) is the subject of
the one empirical study (Drahozal and Zyontz) attempting to identify
similar consumer cases in arbitration and litigation, that study may
not be very relevant to the other two types of claims: Consumer v.
Business, and especially Class Action of Consumers v. Business.
Much as my writing on the outcome effects of forum (arbitration
or litigation) distinguishes among various types of disputes busi-
nesses have with individuals,150 thoughtful critics of adhesive arbi-
tration agreements also make such distinctions. For example, while
148. Id. at 80–81.
149. Similarly, the one study attempting to identify similar employment cases in
arbitration and litigation does not support the belief that employees tend to fare bet-
ter in litigation than arbitration. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitra-
tion and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP.
RESOL. J. 44, 53 (2004) (“The results are consistent with arbitrators, at least those
participating in AAA-sponsored arbitration, not acting in a materially different fash-
ion than in-court adjudicators.”).
150. Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, supra note 115, at 274 (distin-
guishing “aggregatable” claims—claims that, if litigated, could be pursued as part of a
class action—from other claims); id. at 268 (distinguishing “small-yet-meritorious
claims” from “claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury award.”); Stephen J. Ware,
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David Schwartz suggests “the simpler procedures and presumably
lower process costs of arbitration”151 may be fine for individuals’ sim-
ple disputes with businesses, Schwartz says arbitration is worse than
litigation for plaintiffs in “complex individual employment disputes
and both employment and consumer class actions.”152 In these more-
complex cases, Schwartz says claimants need litigation’s more elabo-
rate procedures, particularly its more extensive discovery, because
“proof is relatively complex and the pre-litigation distribution of evi-
dence is largely in the possession of the defendant. Therefore, exten-
sive discovery is required for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof
. . . .”153
Jean Sternlight draws a similar distinction when she says that
“while individual arbitration may work well for ‘procedurally easy’
claims, it does not work well for those many consumer claims that are
‘procedurally difficult’ (specifically claims of which individual con-
sumers are not aware or that they cannot reasonably present on their
own).”154 Sternlight states that, while “consumers almost never initi-
ate individual claims against companies in arbitration,”155 consumer
class actions are very important. So:
Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 98–99 (2001) [hereinafter Ware, Judicial Regulation] (distin-
guishing claims by a consumer against a business from claims by a business against a
consumer).
151. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing, supra note 110, at 241 n.5.
152. Id. at 240.
153. Id. at 242 (arguing “[d]efendants’ keen interest in arbitration of high-cost/
high-stakes cases is . . . the hope that tamping down process costs—primarily by se-
verely limiting discovery—will translate into tamping down ultimate liability costs”);
see also Levitin, supra note 40(“[A]rbitrations are not subject to standard rules of evi-
dence and procedure, including the right to obtain information about the other party
related to the case. This can make arbitrations more streamlined, but it also affects
outcomes. The defendant often holds most of the evidence relevant to the case, but
plaintiffs are often not allowed to get the evidence necessary to prove their cases by
requesting documents or taking depositions.”).
154. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consum-
ers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 93 (2012) [here-
inafter, Sternlight, Difficult Claims]. Sternlight defines procedurally difficult
(i) the consumer does not realize she has potentially been injured; (ii) the
consumer does not realize that an injury she has suffered may be legally cog-
nizable; (iii) the consumer’s claim is difficult and expensive to present, rela-
tive to the anticipated recovery; or (iv) the consumer seeks injunctive or other
group relief.
Id. at 97–101.
155. Id. at 99 (“JAMS Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jay Welsh
reported to this author that JAMS handles at most a few hundred consumer arbitra-
tion claims. He further explained that most of these are from claims alleging that
certain credit card companies violated federal collections statutes, asserted to fend off
potential collections actions by those companies. The AAA handles a broader range of
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By permitting companies to use arbitration clauses to exempt
themselves from class actions, Concepcion will provide compa-
nies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and
other harmful acts without fear of being sued. In many contexts,
if plaintiffs cannot join together in a class action, lack of knowl-
edge, lack of resources, or fear of retaliation will prevent them
from bringing any claims at all.156
In sum, Sternlight and Schwartz argue that, in Schwartz’s words,
“the economically rational motivation for” businesses to use adhesive
arbitration agreements is to require arbitration of what would other-
wise have been litigation of “high-cost/high-stakes claims,” especially
class actions.157 This emphasis on class actions by opponents of adhe-
sive arbitration is not new; in 2000 Sternlight published an article
disputes than does JAMS, but even AAA handles quite few claims brought by consum-
ers against companies. While precise numbers are hard to obtain, in one informal
report AAA stated it handled roughly 1,000 claims by consumers per year.”).
156. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Ac-
cess to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (2012). See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The
End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 173–74 (2015) (“I thought the Supreme
Court would decide Concepcion the way it did, and that doing so would take us down a
road that could lead to the end of class actions against businesses. [A]re class actions
headed for demise? I continue to fear that they very well might be.”); Myriam Gilles
and Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (describing “the coup de grace adminis-
tered to consumer class actions by [Concepcion]. All of the doctrinal developments of
recent years circumscribing the reach of class actions pale in import next to [Concep-
cion’s] game-changing edict that companies with possible exceptions that warrant
close scrutiny may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action
waiver language in their standard form contracts with consumers (or employees or
others)); Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 63 (“After Concepcion,
some plaintiffs’ lawyers, whom we call “arbitration entrepreneurs,” have tried to over-
come their inability to aggregate disputes by bringing scores of discrete proceedings
against the same company. Nevertheless, they have been unable to prosecute enough
matters to replicate the deterrent or compensatory functions of the traditional class
action.”).
157. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing, supra note 110, at 240–42 (citing Schwartz,
Fairness, supra note 137, at 1264–83. See also Levitin, supra note 40 (“[M]ost impor-
tantly, binding mandatory arbitration provisions are often crafted so as to preclude
class actions, including class arbitrations. Class actions are the only practical re-
course for addressing widespread, small-dollar harms—the category under which
most consumer claims fall. Preventing class actions is a license for unscrupulous busi-
nesses to steal from their consumers. If a bank overcharged all of its 25 million depos-
itors $30 annually, the bank would have pocketed $750 million in unauthorized fees,
but no individual consumer would bother litigating or even arbitrating. As one federal
judge colorfully put it, the class action is an essential tool for justice because “only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
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expressing her concerns about whether the class action would survive
the spread of adhesive arbitration agreements.158
Supporting the belief that class claims are central to the debate
over enforcing consumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements is the
sense that consumers seem to bring very few non-class claims against
businesses in arbitration or litigation. The CFPB found “that pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements are being widely used to prevent con-
sumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a class basis, and
that consumers rarely file individual lawsuits or arbitration cases to
obtain such relief.”159 So in the debate over enforcing consumers’ ad-
hesive arbitration agreements, perhaps consumers’ individual claims
are merely a sideshow, while class actions are the main event. This
hypothesis about the centrality of class actions is consistent with the
158. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Ac-
tion, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) [hereinafter,
Sternlight, Class Action] (“[P]otential defendants know that because many claims are
not viable if brought individually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail to initiate claims
once it is clear that class relief is unavailable. The potential defendants also believe
that, should plaintiffs choose to pursue individual claims in arbitration, defendants’
exposure still will be much lower than it would have been in class action litigation.”).
159. CFPB, Proposed Rule, supra note 114, at 4; Levitin, supra note 40 (“Arbitra-
tion’s ‘efficiency,’ however, largely derives from the fact that it prevents small-dollar
claims from ever being heard. If one were to compare the cost of a single class action
that decided millions of claims versus the cost of individually arbitrating each of those
claims, arbitration would be utterly inefficient. Eliminating meritorious claims is
cheaper, but not efficient.”).
Professor Sternlight emphasizes the paucity of individual arbitration claims
brought by consumers, noting that the two major arbitration providers handle
“roughly 1,000 claims by consumers per year” (American Arbitration Association) and
“at most a few hundred” (JAMS). Sternlight, Difficult Claims, supra note 154, at
99–100. However, she compares this number of individual consumer arbitration
claims, not to the number of individual consumer litigation claims, but to the higher
number of consumers covered by class actions and the very high number of consumers
who complain to entities ranging from eBay and PayPal to credit card issuers to the
Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 101–03. So this data is consistent with the CFPB’s
finding suggesting that both individual litigation and individual arbitration are rela-
tively unattractive to most aggrieved consumers. See also CFPB, Proposed Rulemak-
ing, supra note 114, at 99 (“[T]he relatively small number of arbitration, small claims,
and Federal court cases reflects the insufficiency of individual dispute resolution
mechanisms alone to enforce effectively the law for all consumers.”) On the hand,
Ramona Lampley argues “it is premature to conclude that the class action is a more
effective dispute resolution platform than individual arbitration.” Ramona L. Lam-
pley, The CFPB Proposed Arbitration Ban, the Rule, the Data, and Some Considera-
tions for Change, BUS. L. TODAY, May 2017, at 1, 4 (suggesting improvements to
individual arbitration the CFPB could mandate).
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behavior of the CFPB, which engaged an exhaustive study of con-
sumer arbitration in financial services and ended up issuing a rule
that would significantly affect only one aspect of it—class actions.160
Perhaps class claims are central to the debate over adhesive arbi-
tration agreements. Perhaps businesses gain little by shifting indi-
vidual claims (by or against consumers) from litigation to arbitration,
and businesses’ primary reason for seeking enforceable adhesive ar-
bitration agreements with consumers is to prevent class actions.161
Perhaps some businesses even go so far as to write adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements that make arbitration of individual claims better for
consumers than litigation of individual claims would have been. And
perhaps businesses add this pro-consumer sweetener to persuade
courts to enforce these arbitration agreements—because that pro-
consumer sweetener costs the businesses much less than they save by
eliminating class actions.162
160. See CFPB, Arbitration Agreements Rule, supra note 12 (“[T]he final rule pro-
hibits covered providers of certain consumer financial products and services from us-
ing an agreement with a consumer that provides for arbitration of any future dispute
between the parties to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class action
concerning the covered consumer financial product or service.”). See supra note 13.
161. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, CFPB Is Attacking Arbitration Via Class
Action Waivers, LAW 360 (October 13, 2015) (“[Alan] Kaplinsky testified the following
at the hearing: Although the CFPB’s proposal reflects an inclination not to outright
prohibit the use of arbitration, let’s make it perfectly clear. By requiring companies to
insert in their arbitration provisions language excepting class actions from arbitra-
tion, the bureau is in reality proposing an outright ban. If this proposal becomes a
final regulation, most companies will simply abandon arbitration altogether. That’s
because the cost-benefit analysis of using arbitration will shift dramatically.”); Ster-
nlight, Class Action, supra note 158, at 9 (“[D]efense counsel and other arbitration
advocates readily observe that arbitration can be used to deter the filing of a class
action suit, or secure dismissal of a class action that was nonetheless brought. The
potential defendants know that because many claims are not viable if brought indi-
vidually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail to initiate claims once it is clear that class
relief is unavailable. The potential defendants also believe that, should plaintiffs
choose to pursue individual claims in arbitration, defendants’ exposure still will be
much lower than it would have been in class action litigation.”).
162. David L. Noll, Rethinking Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
649, 664–65 (2012) (“For the individual claimant, the [AT&T] agreement makes pur-
suing a claim a lucrative undertaking. A $100 claim litigated to judgment can result
in a $7,600 award against AT&T, with AT&T paying double the claimant’s attorneys’
fees. Why would a profit-maximizing corporation provide outsized incentives for indi-
viduals to assert claims against it? The answer involves the possibility that by doing
so, the corporation could also eliminate plaintiff-favoring features of aggregate litiga-
tion through the aggregation ban. . . . Stated differently, agreements such as AT&T’s
reflect a bet that the settlements, judgments, premium payments, and attorneys’ fee
awards that result from encouraging individuals to sue will be less than the com-
pany’s liability exposure if aggregation is permitted.”). See also Horton & Chan-
draseker, Revolution, supra note 8, at 74 (“Like legislatures, which prod plaintiffs to
bring certain lawsuits by offering bounties such as treble damages, companies
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The hypothesis that class actions are central to the debate over
enforcing consumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements is consistent
with the centrality of class actions to the broader debate over civil
justice reform.163
amended their class arbitration waivers to encourage individual customers to arbi-
trate small-bore complaints. For example, Verizon Wireless promises to pay any con-
sumer who wins an arbitral award that exceeds its settlement offer at least $5,000
and reimburse her attorneys’ fees. AT&T Mobility LLC pledges $10,000 and doubles
attorneys’ fees to any consumer who recovers more in bilateral arbitration than it
offers to resolve the case . . . .”). Id. Arpan A. Sura and Robert A. DeRise, Conceptual-
izing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 KAN. L.
REV. 403, 434 (2013) (“In Concepcion, AT&T’s adhesive arbitration agreement “con-
tain[ed] so many pro-consumer terms that the Court had characterized it as ‘essen-
tially guaranteeing’ consumers the ability to press meritorious claims that would
make them whole.”).
163. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Re-
thinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL.
F. 71, 71 (2003) (“Though on its face the class action appears to be nothing more than
an elaborate procedural joinder device, in recent years it has become the focal point of
much political and legal debate.”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Mis-
aligned Interested: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1752, 1771 (2013) (“[D]efendants fought back [against growing class actions],
not only by vigorously defending lawsuits but also by launching broad political and
public relations efforts.”); Class Action Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (ATRA),
http://www.atra.org/class-action-reform/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) (describing class
actions as “a means of defendant extortion and national policy-making by local court
judges” and advocating legislative reforms); Class Actions, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE
FOR LEGAL REFORM (ILR), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/class-actions
(last visited Nov. 22, 2017) (describing “frivolous” class actions “which cry out for re-
form” and advocating “enactment of the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act”);
Class Actions, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=369 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2017) (“Public Citizen believes in preserving the availability of class actions
as a means of vindicating the rights of people who could not effectively bring suit on
an individual basis. Accordingly, the Litigation Group participates in cases aimed at
preserving the ability of plaintiffs to maintain class actions in both state and federal
courts.”); Issue Advocacy, AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE (AAJ), https://www.justice.org/what-
we-do/advocate-civil-justice-system/issue-advocacy (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) (“The
American Association for Justice (AAJ) protects the civil justice system by advocating
on issues before Congress and federal agencies with the goal of ensuring that people
have a fair chance to receive justice through the legal system – even when it means
taking on the most powerful corporations. . . . Class actions allow individuals who
have been harmed to join together to hold even the largest corporations accountable
for violating the law, but this important right is under attack. AAJ advocates to pre-
serve class actions to ensure that corporations cannot evade accountability through
the civil justice system.”); Class Action Preservation, TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUB. JUS-
TICE, http://www.publicjustice.net/what-we-do/access-to-justice/class-action-preserva-
tion/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) (“Public Justice is the only public interest
organization in the country that both aggressively prosecutes a wide range of class
actions and has a special project to preserve class actions and prevent their abuse. . . .
Class action lawsuits are a powerful legal device. Properly used, they are often the
only way to achieve justice. Abused, they can impose enormous injustice – and sup-
port corporate wrongdoers’ attempts to eliminate them entirely.”).
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Class actions have been controversial since they first prolifer-
ated in the 1970s—a time when Professor Arthur Miller de-
scribed a “holy war” in which one side saw the class action as a
knight in shining armor, while the other side saw it as a “Frank-
enstein” monster. Not much has changed throughout several de-
cades of this “holy war,” and this war is not likely to end
anytime soon. As Professor Deborah Hensler et al., explain,
whether the benefits of class actions outweigh their costs “is a
deeply political question, implicating fundamental beliefs about
the structure of the political system, the nature of society, and
the roles of courts and law in society. . . . [T]his political ques-
tion is . . . unlikely to be resolved soon.”164
In short, debate over adhesive arbitration may be little more than a
rather predictable application of the broader debate about class
actions.
If this is accurate then we may yet see empirical data of the sort
hypothesized above.165 That is, we may see studies of Consumer v.
Business claims that do as well as the Drahozal and Zyontz study of
Business v. Consumer claims at ensuring that the arbitration claims
studied are comparable to the litigation claims studied. And we may
see studies of actual and potential Class Actions of Consumers v.
Business that do as well at ensuring that the potential arbitration
claims studied are comparable to the potential litigation claims
studied.
For example, such a study might examine two large, competing
businesses like Hertz and Avis, or Hilton and Marriott. Suppose that
each business violated the same consumer law in the same way at
about the same time. And suppose each business has thousands of
customers who each have similar small claims against the business,
but only one of the two businesses’ consumer contracts includes an
arbitration clause. The study might find that the consumers not sub-
ject to arbitration received an average of, say, fifty dollars from a
class action settlement but the average recovery of consumers subject
to arbitration was lower because most of those consumers left their
claims unpursued and thus recovered zero.
164. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1267–68 (quoting Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class
Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979), and DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS 471-72 (2000)).
165. See supra text at notes 149–50 (“While the most relevant empirical study
does not show consumers faring worse in arbitration than litigation, suppose it did?
More broadly, suppose the best empirical data showed consumers experiencing worse
outcomes in arbitration than litigation?”).
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Research revealed no such study, although the CFPB and Profes-
sors Horton and Chandrasekher have perhaps taken steps in this di-
rection. CFPB Director Cordray writes “that group lawsuits [class
actions] get more money back to more people. In five years of group
lawsuits, we tallied an average of $220 million paid to 6.8 million
consumers per year. Yet in the arbitration cases we studied, on aver-
age, 16 people per year recovered less than $100,000 total.”166 How-
ever, the CFPB study from which these numbers come did not
generally attempt to compare similar disputes (actual or potential
disputes) covered by arbitration agreements and not so covered.167
Like Director Cordray of the CFPB, Professors Horton and Chan-
drasekher argue that consumer recoveries are reduced by enforceable
arbitral class waivers. Horton and Chandrasekher write that plain-
tiffs’ lawyers’ post-Concepcion attempts to bring lots of similar indi-
vidual arbitration claims against the same business have failed “to
replicate the deterrent or compensatory functions of the traditional
class action.”168 But Horton and Chandrasekher, like the CFPB, do
not try to compare similar disputes (actual or potential disputes) cov-
ered by arbitration agreements and not covered.
In sum, we currently lack empirical studies of actual or potential
class or individual claims by consumers against business that do as
well as the Drahozal and Zyontz study of Business v. Consumer
claims at ensuring that the potential arbitration claims studied are
comparable to the potential litigation claims studied. But it is plausi-
ble to anticipate such studies showing what Cordray, Horton, and
Chandrasekher suggest—that enforceable adhesive arbitration
agreements, especially if they include class waivers, tend to produce
worse outcomes for consumers with (actual or potential) claims
against businesses even if, as Drahozal and Zyontz found, arbitration
outcomes are at least as good as litigation outcomes for consumers
defending businesses’ claims against consumers.
166. Richard Cordray, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html?emc
=edit_th_20170822&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=39190842.
167. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 8 at 28 (For class actions in
federal court from 2008 to 2012, “we estimate a total of $1.1 billion in 251 settlements
reporting data on the dollar amount of payments.”).
168. Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 63 (“After Concepcion,
some plaintiffs’ lawyers, whom we call ’arbitration entrepreneurs,’ have tried to over-
come their inability to aggregate disputes by bringing scores of discrete proceedings
against the same company. Nevertheless, they have been unable to prosecute enough
matters to replicate the deterrent or compensatory functions of the traditional class
action.”).
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2. Until Very Conservative Current Law is Changed, Data
Always Shows Arbitration under that Law
To reiterate, while the most relevant empirical study does not
show consumers faring worse in arbitration than litigation, suppose
new and more relevant empirical data show that enforceable adhe-
sive arbitration agreements tend to produce worse outcomes for con-
sumers with actual or potential class or individual claims against
businesses? Such new data would not significantly support the Pro-
gressive Position of prohibiting adhesive arbitration agreements be-
cause such data would necessarily be data about what occurs under
existing (Very Conservative) law, as distinguished from what would
occur if the law adopted the Centrist Position.169
In other words, empirical studies of consumer arbitration yield
data about arbitration’s outcomes (including potential claims left un-
pursued) under existing law—which includes widespread enforce-
ment of arbitral class waivers, as well as the separability doctrine,
and deferential judicial review of arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory
law.170 All three of these Very Conservative aspects of current law
would be changed by the Centrist Position,171 which would likely
make arbitration agreements’ outcomes more favorable to consumers.
So even if empirical data showed that enforceable adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements tend to produce worse outcomes for consumers with
(actual or potential, class or individual) claims against businesses,
that would not be a reason to prefer progressives’ prohibition of adhe-
sive arbitration agreements over the Centrist Position’s enforcement
of them. Such data would instead be a reason to try the Centrist Posi-
tion—(1) treat arbitral class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers,
(2) repeal the separability doctrine, and (3) vacate arbitrators’ le-
gally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims—and see if these
three reforms bring arbitration’s outcomes in line with litigation’s.
Overturning the Supreme Court’s broad enforcement of arbitral
class waivers may be the Centrist Position’s most impactful reform
because, as explained above, class claims may be the main factor
driving businesses to use adhesive arbitration agreements.172 That
169. Similarly, Professors Horton and Chandrasekher point out that the CFPB’s
study “is limited” because “it precedes Italian Colors (decided in 2013) and cannot
capture the full impact of Rent-A-Center (decided in 2010) and Concepcion (decided in
April 2011).” Horton & Chandrasekher, Revolution, supra note 8, at 87. In short, stud-
ies inevitably study data generated under whatever law was in effect at the time.
170. See supra notes 87–94.
171. See supra Section II.C.1.
172. See supra note 157.
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is, businesses may gain little by shifting individual claims (by or
against consumers) from litigation to arbitration, and businesses’ pri-
mary reason for seeking enforceable adhesive arbitration agreements
may be to prevent class actions. If this is true, then treating arbitral
class waivers like non-arbitral class waivers would likely make arbi-
tration’s outcomes more favorable to consumers than they are now,
and might bring arbitration’s outcomes in line with litigation’s.
In addition, the Centrist Position would repeal the separability
doctrine.173 This repeal would allow parties to litigate (rather than
arbitrate) contract defenses.  Presumably consumers more often than
businesses raise such defenses because the business nearly always
drafts the contract and seeks to enforce its arbitration clause, while
the consumer opposes enforcement. If the consumer sued the busi-
ness, repeal of the separability doctrine would make the business’s
motion to compel arbitration (of the merits of the consumer’s claim)
harder to win because the business would have to overcome the con-
sumer’s contract defense. This additional obstacle to enforcement of a
consumer arbitration agreement would give the consumer more
power in negotiating post-dispute about modifications to the pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreement. For example, the consumer might
(through her lawyer) say to the business “We’ll withdraw our opposi-
tion to your motion to compel arbitration if you agree that the arbi-
tration will be before Arbitrator X on Date Y with Procedural and
Evidentiary Rules Z”—with X, Y, and Z all favorable to the consumer.
The business might agree to some or all of X, Y, and Z—even if unfa-
vorable to the business—to avoid incurring the costs and uncertainty
of litigating consumer’s contract defense. To the extent this occurs,
the Centrist Position’s repeal of the separability doctrine would tend
to make arbitration’s outcomes better for consumers.
Finally, the Centrist Position would vacate arbitrators’ legally-
erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims.174 This would go a
long way toward calming worries that arbitrators tend to favor busi-
nesses over individuals.175 If a consumer’s claim under one of con-
sumer law’s many mandatory provisions176 is denied by the
arbitrator, the Centrist Position would entitle the consumer to a
173. See supra notes 45–50.
174. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1248–59.
175. See supra notes 116 & 130.
176. Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1256 (“Many statutes and regu-
lations in consumer, employment, and other areas of law prohibit enforcement of vari-
ous contract terms.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\23-1\HNR102.txt unknown Seq: 56  6-MAR-18 12:03
84 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 23:29
court’s de novo determination of whether the arbitrator correctly ap-
plied that law. If the court concluded the arbitrator incorrectly ap-
plied that mandatory law, the court would vacate the arbitration
award, which would help the consumer.
3. Conclusion
In sum, the best empirical data does not show consumers faring
worse in arbitration than litigation. But if it did, that showing would
not significantly support prohibiting enforcement of consumers’ adhe-
sive arbitration agreements (the Progressive Position) over the Cen-
trist Position of treating consumers’ adhesive arbitration agreements
like consumers’ other adhesive agreements. That is because hypo-
thetical data showing consumers faring worse in arbitration than liti-
gation would be data about arbitration under the Very Conservative
Position embodied in current law, not data about arbitration under
the Centrist Position, which likely would make arbitration outcomes
more favorable for consumers.
IV. PRICE AND RELATED EFFECTS OF ENFORCING ADHESIVE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. Standard Economic Analysis and the CFPB’s Endorsement of It
While Section III casts doubt on the belief that consumers with
disputes against businesses tend to experience worse outcomes in ar-
bitration than they do in litigation, this section questions the other
assertion offered as support for prohibiting consumers’ adhesive arbi-
tration agreements. That is the assertion that enforcement of such
agreements has no effect on the prices consumers pay.177
177. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 40 (“[F]inancial services companies do not ap-
pear to be passing the cost savings of arbitration on to consumers in general.”); id.
(“When Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Capital One and HSBC dropped arbitra-
tion clauses as the result of a litigation settlement their prices did not go up. Nor did
mortgage rates go up when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stopped buying mortgages
with arbitration clauses or when Congress later banned arbitration clauses in mort-
gages.”); J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221,
254 (2017) (“There is no empirical support for this cost-savings claim”); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscio-
nability Analysis As A Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 757, 851 (2004) [hereinafter Stempel, Unconscionability] (“[T]here is
nothing to suggest that vendors imposing arbitration clauses actually lower their
prices in conjunction with using arbitration clauses in their contracts. Similarly,
there is no solid support for the theoretical idea that by using arbitration clauses,
vendors are able to refrain from price increases that would otherwise occur.”); Kathe-
rine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and coercion under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, 77 N.C.L. REV. 931, 969 (1999) (“[T]he prevalence of arbitration clauses
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Contrary to this assertion, standard economic analysis suggests
that enforcement of adhesive consumer arbitration agreements tends
over time to lower the prices of the goods and services consumers buy.
As economist and law professor Omri Ben-Shahar writes, many com-
mentators presume “that arbitration is cheaper for business than liti-
gation,”178 at least for the businesses that choose to use arbitration.
On this assumption, Ben-Shahar writes, in the absence of enforceable
arbitration clauses,
some of the cost of [consumers’] access to litigation would be
rolled into the price of the service. In highly competitive indus-
tries, most if not all this cost would be reflected in higher prices
to consumers; whereas in concentrated industries, only part of
this cost would be borne by consumers, and the rest by the ven-
dors, depending on the elasticity of demand.179
While this is the standard economic analysis, the one study at-
tempting to assess it empirically found no statistically significant evi-
dence to support it.180 That study was conducted by the CFPB in
2015. However, despite this study, in 2016 and again in 2017 the
CFPB endorsed the standard economic analysis’s conclusion that en-
forcement of arbitration agreements tends to lower prices. Referring
to a proposed regulation that would reduce such enforcement, the
CFPB in 2016 said it “believes that most providers [businesses]
would pass through at least portions of some of the costs described
above to consumers. This pass-through can take multiple forms, such
as higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the products or
services they provide to consumers.”181 The CFPB’s 2017 final rule
then again endorsed the standard economic analysis’s conclusion:
“the Bureau acknowledges that most providers will pass through at
least portions of some of the costs described above to consumers. This
in consumer transactions represents windfalls to the sellers, not cost-saving devices
for the buyers”); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Elimi-
nate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75, 95 (2004) (“[N]o published studies show that the impo-
sition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.”).
178. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Courts: Economic Analysis, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 461 (Horst
Eidenmüller ed., 2013).
179. Id. Elasticity is explained infra note 221.
180. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 7 (“We do not find any
such statistically significant evidence of increases in prices to consumers that we can
associate with eliminating pre-dispute arbitration clauses.”).
181. CFPB, Proposed Rule, supra note 114, at 295.
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pass-through can take multiple forms, such as higher prices to con-
sumers or reduced quality of the products or services they provide to
consumers.”182
To reiterate, the CFPB repeatedly and ultimately endorsed the
standard economic analysis’ conclusion that enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements tends to lower prices.
B. Cost Savings to Business and the CFPB’s Treatment of Them
The CFPB’s 2015 study says “[f]or arbitration provisions to lower
the prices consumers pay for financial services, they must first lower
costs for the companies that use them. Second, these companies
would then have to pass along at least some of the resulting cost sav-
ings to consumers.”183 These two steps correspond to the two steps of
the standard economic analysis summarized above by Ben-Shahar.
Almost no one challenges the first step—that enforcement of ad-
hesive arbitration agreements tends to lower the costs of the busi-
nesses that use such agreements.184 Strangely, though, the CFPB
Study minimizes the unanimity of consensus on this point. After not-
ing that “companies that use pre-dispute arbitration provisions may
benefit from a range of possible costs savings,”185 the CFPB Study
says:
Some scholarship takes the view, therefore, that pre-dispute ar-
bitration clauses accordingly reduce a company’s overall dispute
resolution costs. Not all commenters agree on this point. One
commenter has asserted that carrying out arbitrations involves
costs that are not associated with comparable dispute resolution
proceedings in federal or state court.186
182. CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12, at 681.
183. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 2.
184. Research revealed no doubt about this premise among consumer arbitration’s
many critics or its few defenders. There is one scholar who doubts that employers
benefit from adhesive arbitration agreements with their employees. Michael Z. Green,
Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for
Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 420 (2000) (“[M]andatory arbitration
may be bad for employers, absent some empirical evidence to the contrary.”). Id. at
400 (“As a matter of general practice, the use of mandatory arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism for employment discrimination claims has failed to give em-
ployers an overall advantage. Instead, this article will show that the use of mandatory
arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination disputes presents a signif-
icant number of disadvantages for employers.”); id. at 402 (“[W]ith evidence of re-
sounding results on behalf of employers in the litigation process and absent evidence
that arbitration will provide similar results, employers have no real advantage and
little incentive to use mandatory arbitration.”).
185. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 1 or 2.
186. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 2–3.
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This passage by the CFPB does not accurately represent the
sources it cites, as it fails to cite even a single commenter who does
not agree that arbitration clauses “reduce a company’s overall dis-
pute resolution costs.” The passage cites three commenters as agree-
ing that arbitration clauses reduce businesses’ dispute-resolution
costs and no commenter who disagrees.187 While the CFPB’s passage
emphasizes a commenter’s point that businesses carrying out arbitra-
tions incur costs they would not incur in litigation, this commenter
went on to say “Companies are willing to incur those costs because,
on average, the aggregate costs of resolving disputes in arbitration
are lower than the aggregate costs of resolving disputes in litigation
in court.”188
This mischaracterization of a source by the CFPB is quite star-
tling. In an effort to create the apparently-false impression that even
one commenter dissents from the consensus that arbitration clauses
“reduce a company’s overall dispute resolution costs,” the CFPB
stretches so far as to cite a commenter who expressly supports that
consensus by saying “the aggregate costs of resolving disputes in ar-
bitration are lower than the aggregate costs of resolving disputes in
litigation.” The CFPB’s stretching to manufacture dissent continues
in a footnote in which the CFPB says “Another commenter explained
that some of its member organizations find arbitration agreements to
be of limited overall value.”189 This does not even purport to rebut the
consensus that arbitration agreements tend to reduce a company’s
187. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 3 (citing Ware, Judicial
Regulation, supra note 150, at 90; Amy J. Schmitz, Building Bridges to Remedies for
Consumers in International eConflicts, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 779, 779–80
(2012) (“[C]ompanies often include arbitration clauses in their contracts to cut dispute
resolution costs and produce savings that they may pass on to consumers through
lower prices.”); Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, supra note 115, at 254–57
(“The consensus view is that businesses using adhesive arbitration agreements do so
because those businesses generally find that those agreements lower their dispute-
resolution costs.”); Steven E. Abraham & Paula B. Voos, The Ramifications of the Gil-
mer Decision for Firm  Profitability, 4 EMP. RIGHTS AND EMP. POL. J. 2 (2000) (finding
increase of shareholder returns of 1–4% for securities firms after the Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp. decision, which the authors describe as an indication that
such firms benefited from being able to require that employees arbitrate, rather than
litigate, employment-related disputes.).
188. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 3 (quoting Letter from
David Hirschmann and Lisa A. Rickard, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND U.S. CHAM-
BER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM TO CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, to
Monica Jackson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Dec. 11, 2013), at 41, http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB__arbitration_cov
er_letter.pdf).
189. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 3.
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overall dispute resolution costs, but rather suggests only that the
value of this reduction is “limited.”190
While the CFPB loosely refers to “scholarship tak[ing] the view”
“that pre-dispute arbitration clauses” “reduce a company’s overall
dispute resolution costs,”191 the sources cited by the CFPB actually
make the subtler point that “businesses using adhesive arbitration
agreements do so because those businesses generally find that those
agreements lower their dispute resolution costs.”192 In other words,
the sources the CFPB cites do not claim that use of adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements would necessarily reduce every business’s costs, but
rather suggest that businesses actually using adhesive arbitration
agreements presumably continue to do so because they find such
agreements have in fact tended to lower their costs. In contrast, a
business that tried using adhesive arbitration agreements and found
that using them raised its costs would presumably stop using them.
Of course, some businesses using adhesive arbitration agree-
ments may harm themselves by using them, as people sometimes
make mistakes and businesses are run by people. Similarly, some
businesses not using adhesive arbitration agreements might benefit
from using them. Given the variety of businesses and their situa-
tions, use of adhesive arbitration agreements might well benefit some
businesses, but not others. The standard economic analysis conclud-
ing that enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements tends to
lower consumer prices does not rest on the premise that all busi-
nesses would benefit from using adhesive arbitration agreements, or
even that all businesses using adhesive arbitration agreements bene-
fit from them, but only that businesses using adhesive arbitration
agreements tend to benefit from them. This seems, despite the
CFPB’s stretching to sow doubt, an uncontroversial premise inspiring
widespread consensus.
190. And, more fully, what that commenter said was “the credit union industry
does not make significant use of arbitration agreements. NAFCU’s member credit un-
ions generally find arbitration agreements to be of limited value. However, some
credit unions use pre-dispute arbitration agreements for some products and services
and it is important that this tool not be eliminated from the market.  As the CFPB
certainly understands, arbitration agreements are a matter of contract and should
generally be enforced just like any other contract provision.” Letter from Dillon Shea,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS, to Monica Jackson, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (June 22, 2012), https://www.cuinsight.com/press-re-
lease/nafcus-comments-to-cfpb-on-arbitration-agreements.
191. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 2–3.
192. Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, supra note 115, at 254–57.
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C. Passing-on Cost Savings to Consumers
1. Economics: Lower Costs to Businesses Tend to Lower Prices
to Consumers
While nearly everyone presumes that enforcement of adhesive
arbitration agreements tends to lower the costs of the businesses that
use them, debate centers on whether this cost-reduction for busi-
nesses tends to lower prices for consumers. More broadly, this debate
about whether businesses pass on their cost savings to consumers
goes beyond adhesive arbitration agreements to adhesive contract
terms generally.
The standard economic analysis, as the above quote from Ben-
Shahar puts it, is that businesses’ costs are “rolled into the price”
consumers pay, so higher costs to businesses (sellers) tend to raise
prices to consumers (buyers), while lower costs to sellers tend to
lower prices to buyers. Although Ben-Shahar directs the University
of Chicago’s Institute for Law and Economics, the belief that sellers’
costs affect the prices they charge their customers is not unique to
“Chicago School” or other conservative economists, but rather is the
standard analysis across the field of economics. For example, fa-
mously liberal Nobel-prize-winning economist Paul Krugman193 and
his co-authors explain that “a fall in the price of an input makes the
production of the final good less costly for seller. They are more will-
ing to supply the good at any given price, and the supply curve shifts
to the right.”194 This “increase in supply leads to a fall in the equilib-
rium price and a rise in the equilibrium quantity.”195
193. Paul Krugman’s blog is entitled “The Conscience of a Liberal” https://krug-
man.blogs.nytimes.com. In 2008, he won The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2008, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/eco-
nomic-sciences/laureates/2008/krugman-facts.html.
194. PAUL KRUGMAN, ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 66 (2007).
195. Id. at 73. See also JAMES D. GWARTNEY, RICHARD L. STROUP, RUSSELL S.
SOBEL & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 448–49
(15th ed. 2015) (“In the long run, existing firms will have the opportunity to expand
(or contract) the sizes of their plants, and firms will also be able to enter and exit the
industry. As these long-run adjustments are made, output in the whole industry may
either expand or contract. If economic profit is present, new firms will enter the in-
dustry to capture some of those profits. Current producers will have an incentive to
expand the scale of their operations to capture some of the additional profits, too. This
increase in supply will put downward pressure on prices.”); HENRY BUTLER, CHRISTO-
PHER DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 498 (3d ed.
2015) (“In the short-run, firms are capable of earning economic profits because it
takes time for new firms to construct plants and enter the market, and existing firms
cannot immediately expand production beyond the capacity of current plants. In the
long-run, economic profits attract new firms to the market and encourage existing
firms to expand their plant and output. As firms move into industries earning positive
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This standard economic analysis—lower costs to businesses (sell-
ers) yield lower prices to their customers (buyers)—is supported by
voluminous evidence from a wide variety of sources. To give just a
few examples of lower costs to sellers leading to lower prices for buy-
ers, much evidence indicates that:
• Computer manufacturers’ costs of obtaining semiconductors
fell in the 1980s to the early 2000s and that lowered the price
of computers and other products.196
• Textile manufacturers’ labor costs fell when they moved from
New England to the South197 and off-shore198 and that low-
ered the price of clothes.
• Decreasing the cost of transporting large vehicles and their
materials by moving production and assembly closer to cus-
tomers lowered vehicle prices.199
• In the 1980s, television manufacturers from Japan and Korea
relocated their production to factories in Mexico resulting in
lower labor costs and regulatory costs. The lower cost of pro-
duction allowed the manufacturers to significantly reduce the
price of the televisions they sold in the United States and to
undercut competitors with production facilities based in na-
tions with higher labor costs.200
economic profits, industry supply expands. The result of this increase in supply is to
force the market price down. As the market price drops, so do economic profits. In the
long-run, the entry of firms into industries earning positive economic profits elimi-
nates those profits.”).
196. See CLAIR BROWN AND GREG LINDEN, CHIPS AND CHANGE: HOW CRISIS RE-
SHAPES THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 77–94 (2009) (In addition to computers, the
reduced costs of semiconductors resulted in reduced prices on cell phones, game con-
soles, and mobile devices.); see also James Curry and Martin Kenney, The Organiza-
tional and Geographic Configuration of the Personal Computer Value Chain, in
LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE: INDUSTRY DYNAMICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
114–15 (Martin Kenney and Richard Florida eds., 2004) (observing prices decrease as
off-shoring and vertical integration lower costs); Gordon E. Moore, Intel: Memories
and the Microprocessor, 125 DAEDALUS 55, 55–57 (1996).
197. See TIMOTHY W. VANDERBURG, CANNON MILLS AND KANNAPOLIS: PERSISTENT
PATERNALISM IN A TEXTILE TOWN 3 & n. 1–2, 10. See also Broadus Mitchell, The Rise
of Cotton Mills In the South 168–169 (February 6, 1918) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Johns Hopkins University) (The Project Gutenberg EBook 2011), http://www
.gutenberg.org/files/37784/37784-h/37784-h.htm.
198. See Frederick H. Abernathy, John T. Dunlop, Janice H. Hammond, and
David Weil, Globalization in the Apparel and Textile Industries: What Is New and
What Is Not?, in LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 196, at 25–27.
199. See Timothy Sturgeon and Richard Florida, Globalization, Deverticalization
and Employment in the Motor Vehicle Industry, in LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE,
supra note 196, at 77.
200. See Martin Kenney, The Shifting Value Chain: The Television Industry In
North America, in LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 196, at 94–100.
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• In the 1990s, Japanese makers of flat screen displays engi-
neered lower-cost methods of manufacturing which helped
them reduce their prices.201
• Fracking lowers the costs of businesses extracting natural
gas which is lowering prices of natural gas.202
• Some air carriers lower their costs by maximizing use of the
aircraft and the space on the aircraft which lowers airfare
prices.203
• Reducing manufacturing costs has dramatically lowered the
price of solar energy panels.204
• In the Taiwanese economy generally, when growth industries
experience cost decreases, those industries reduce their prod-
uct prices accordingly.205
In sum, the standard economic analysis that lower costs to sell-
ers yield lower prices for buyers is supported by a vast amount of
data from diverse sources showing a strong pattern over a long time.
The previous pages’ economic reasoning generally applies re-
gardless of the source of sellers’ lower costs. Much as reductions in
sellers’ costs for labor or semiconductors tended over time to lower
prices to buyers, any contract term that tends to lower sellers’ costs
tends over time to give buyers lower prices.206
201. See Thomas P. Murtha, Stefanie Ann Lenway, and Jeffrey A. Hart, Industry
Creation and the New Geography of Innovation: The Case of Flat Panel Displays, in
LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 196, at 178.
202. See ALEX PRUD’HOMME, HYDROFRACKING: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW
29–30, 54, 55–56 (2014); see also Gregory Meyer, Frantic Fracking Sends US Natural
Gas Prices into Freefall, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
45d75ad0-fe7f-11e2-97dc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz356JNzkzK; Thiemo Fetzer, Frack-
ing Growth 18 (March 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (Kondard-Adenauer Foun-
dation), (available at http://www. trfetzer.com).
203. See Stephen Holloway, STRAIGHT AND LEVEL: PRACTICAL AIRLINE ECONOMICS
358–59 (2008).
204. See Nicoletta Marigo & Chiara Candelise, What Is Behind the Recent Dra-
matic Reductions in Photovoltaic Prices? The Role of China, 3 ECONOMICA E POLITICA
INDUSTRIALE 5, 28–29 (2013).
205. See Tay-Cheng Ma, Do Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Cost Changes?, 42
APPLIED ECONOMICS 1183, 1184, 1190, 1193–94 (2007) (for examples, see table on page
1190).
206. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 367 (1991)
[hereinafter Craswell, Passing]; Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the
Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485–87 (1974) (“[H]arsh terms will . . . in
equilibrium, yield lower prices.”).
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2. Price is Just Another Contract Term and Lower Costs Can
Affect Non-Price Contract Terms
Adhesive contract terms that reduce sellers’ costs may benefit
buyers through lower prices or some other beneficial change in the
transaction, including better non-price contract terms. Conversely,
law prohibiting such cost-lowering terms may harm buyers through
higher prices or some other negative change in the transaction, in-
cluding worse non-price contract terms. As the CFPB wrote about its
2017 final rule “the Bureau acknowledges that most providers will
pass through at least portions of some of the costs described above to
consumers. This pass-through can take multiple forms, such as
higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the products or ser-
vices they provide to consumers.”207 An example of such “reduced
quality” would be a negative change to a non-price contract term,
such as reducing the frequent-flier miles a consumer receives for us-
ing a credit card.
More broadly, from an economic perspective, a non-price contract
term “is merely a product feature—no different from price or a [car’s]
sunroof . . . regulated by market forces.”208 As Marcus Cole writes,
“non-price terms of contracts are no different than price terms in the
ways in which they react to underlying market conditions. In other
words, what happens to prices happens to other terms as well.”209 So
a reduction in sellers’ costs tends to be passed on to consumers in the
form of better contract terms, whether the better term is price, a non-
price term, or some combination of the two. For example, the cost
savings a business receives from enforceable arbitration agreements
might be passed through to consumers, not in the form of lower
prices, but rather in the form of adjustments to some other contract
term,210 such as more reward miles. For brevity, however, some of
207. CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12, at 681.
208. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 168 (2013).
See also Radin, supra note 58, at 1229–30 (“[T]he collapse of any distinction between
the product, traditionally thought of as the object of exchange, on the one hand, and
the contract, traditionally thought of as the agreement fixing the terms of the ex-
change, on the other . . . is a trope that has become very prominent in contract theory,
[and] has become the dominant position of economic analysis.”). In contrast, some
non-economic perspectives object to this view. Id. (“The contract-as-product view de-
nies the traditional liberal normative underpinning of contract as instantiation of
freedom of the will, or at least renders it problematic.”).
209. G. Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers
Should Agree to Form Contracts Without Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
413, 438 (2015).
210. I raised this possibility in a previous article. See Ware, Case for Enforcing,
supra note 115, at 257 n.10.
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what follows will simply say lowering businesses’ costs tends to lower
consumer prices, rather than (more elaborately) say lowering busi-
nesses’ costs tends to lower consumer prices or improve some other
consumer contract term.
D. Even in Non-Competitive Markets, Lower Costs to Businesses
Tend to Lower Consumer Prices
The analysis of consumers’ benefit from adhesive contract terms
that reduce sellers’ costs becomes more complicated if the source of
the business’s cost-savings (here enforceable arbitration agreements)
affects consumers’ willingness to pay for the product in question, and
the analysis becomes still more complicated if different consumers
are affected to different degrees.211 However, these complications are
not significantly present in the context of consumers’ adhesive arbi-
tration agreements—under the widely-held view that very few con-
sumers notice arbitration clauses at the time of contracting.212 If
consumers do not notice the arbitration clause, then the clause can-
not affect their willingness to pay or implicate their varying prefer-
ences. Leaving aside these inapplicable complexities, we can return
to the general point of the standard economic analysis—if a contract
term lowers businesses’ costs then it will also tend to lower consumer
prices or “lower” (improve) non-price terms of consumers’ contracts.
Do contract terms lowering businesses’ costs tend to have these
pro-consumer effects only in competitive markets? Some commenta-
tors and courts can be read to imply this,213 and a few say it more
211. See, e.g., Craswell, Passing, supra note 206, at 368–83.
212. See, e.g., Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 98, at 691 (1996) (“Arbitration
clauses are often buried in seemingly insignificant places, camouflaged as insignifi-
cant junk mail, written in very small print, and written in technical terms not likely
to be meaningful to most.”).
213. BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & SHEPHERD, supra note 195, at 183 (Adhesion contracts
“reduce transactions costs and benefit consumers because, in competition, reductions
in the cost of doing business show up as lower prices (here, a slightly lower rate of
interest on the loan).”). See, e.g., Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs. Inc., 372 F.3d
903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (“People are free to opt for bargain-basement adjudication-or,
for that matter, bargain-basement tax preparation services; air carriers that pack
passengers like sardines but charge less; and black-and-white television. In competi-
tion, prices adjust and both sides gain. ‘Nothing but the best’ may be the motto of a
particular consumer but is not something the legal system foists on all consumers.”);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Terms of use are no
less a part of ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed with which
the software compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a
package’s contents, is how consumers are protected in a market economy. . . . ProCD
has rivals, which may elect to compete by offering superior software, monthly up-
dates, improved terms of use, lower price, or a better compromise among these
elements.”).
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clearly. For instance, Joshua Fairfield says “Drafters [of adhesion
contracts] pass cost savings along only in competitive markets. Un-
less there is a reason not to do so, companies will quite rationally
pocket the savings.”214 Similarly, Andrew Schwartz writes:
savings generated by contracts of adhesion need not be shared
with the consumer. Rather, they can be—and, given the fiduci-
ary duties that corporate managers owe to shareholders, gener-
ally will be—retained by the business. Of course, in competitive
markets, some or all of the cost savings will likely be returned to
the consumer. In reality, however, many companies, ranging
from Facebook to Con Edison, have monopolistic market
power.215
In the adhesive arbitration context, Jean Sternlight asserts:
The same economics that oppose regulation in the presence of
perfect competition instead justify regulation where, as here,
the conditions for perfect competition do not exist. . . . Some
have argued that regulation of consumer arbitration will likely
harm consumers by causing prices and interest rates to in-
crease. However, absent perfect competition, such regulation
may well cause prices to drop or stay the same rather than
rise.216
The distinction between a perfectly competitive market and a monop-
oly (along with intermediate conditions, such as “monopolistic compe-
tition”) is part of the standard economic analysis (summarized above
by Omri Ben-Shahar217) of the extent to which changes in businesses’
costs are passed through to consumers. While the entire cost-change
is passed through to consumers only under conditions of perfect com-
petition,218 some of the cost-change is passed through to consumers
under non-competitive conditions, even monopoly. A good explana-
tion of this point is by economists Jerry Hausman and Gregory
Leonard:
214. Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1409 (2009). See also id. at 1436 (It is “likely that
corporations will therefore simply pocket drafting cost savings.”).
215. Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Ad-
hesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354 (2011).
216. Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Consumer Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY’S L. J. 343, 365
(2016) [hereinafter, Sternlight, Hurrah].
217. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (6th ed. 2003)
(“The forces of competition tend to make opportunity cost the maximum as well as
minimum price.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (9th ed. 2014)
(“[P]rice tends toward alignment with opportunity cost . . . under competition.”).
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To begin with the extreme case of a monopolist, price will de-
crease when marginal cost decreases. This claim is unexcep-
tional to any student of intermediate microeconomics.  However,
we have been continually surprised over the years that many
lawyers at the antitrust agencies refuse to accept this proposi-
tion and instead claim that a monopolist will “pocket the cost
savings” and not pass any of them on to consumers. This claim
is based on the incorrect assertion that only competition forces a
firm to pass along cost savings. In fact, however, profit max-
imization by the firm causes it to pass along at least some of the
cost savings in terms of a lower price, even if the firm is a
monopolist.
Why does profit maximizing behavior cause a monopolist to pass
along to consumers some of the cost savings? A monopolist sets
its price so that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. If the
monopolist lowers its price (by a small amount), three effects
result. First, the monopolist achieves lower revenue on its ex-
isting unit sales; second, it sells more units because of the lower
price; and third, its total costs increase because of the extra pro-
duction. At the profit maximizing optimum, the net effect of
these three terms is zero—they cancel each other out. However,
if the last term, which is the cost of the extra production, be-
comes smaller due to efficiencies, the total net effect becomes
positive because the added revenue from the price decrease ex-
ceeds the added production cost. Thus, the monopolist can in-
crease its profits by reducing its price, causing marginal
revenue and marginal cost to be equal once again.219
Richard Posner, Russell Korobkin, and Richard Craswell are among
the many scholars concurring in this point that even monopolists
pass along a portion of their cost savings to consumers.220
219. Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer
Viewpoint, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 707, 708–09 (1999) (citations omitted).
220. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 37, at 1211–12. See also RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 335 (9th ed. 2014) (“[I]f the monopolist’s . . .
costs fall (unless these are fixed costs), the optimum monopoly price will fall and out-
put will rise”); id. at 378 (“[I]n the very long run virtually all [costs] are variable.”);
Craswell, Passing, supra note 206, at 369 (“[T]he presence or absence of a monopoly
seller would have little effect on most of the conclusions reached in this section.”);
ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 277
(2011) (“In general a monopoly will pass to consumers only part of a cost-saving tech-
nological advance. After the change in technology, the firm’s profit margin will be
higher. This standard in sharp contract with the impact of technological change in
perfectly competitive markets, where—as stated earlier—all of the cost saving is
passed along to consumers.”); Timothy J. Muris & Bilal Sayyed, Three Key Principles
for Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 9 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 9 (2010) (refer-
ring to “the mistaken view that firms only pass-on cost savings because of competitive
pressures”); id. (“The economic literature establishes, with little or no disagreement,
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In short, businesses’ cost savings tend, to some extent, to be
passed through to consumers even in non-competitive markets. More
precisely, the extent to which changes in businesses’ costs are passed
through to consumers is determined by the elasticity221 of supply and
demand in the relevant markets.222 Therefore, considering non-com-
petitive markets indicates that the size of the price reduction caused
by a cost-savings to business (such as enforcement of its adhesive ar-
bitration agreements) will vary, while strengthening the underlying
generalization that business cost-savings tend, to some extent, to
lower consumer prices (or improve consumers’ non-price terms) re-
gardless of whether the business operates under perfect competition,
monopoly, or anything in between.
That even a monopolist tends to pass through some of its cost
savings to consumers does not imply that monopoly is as good as com-
petition for consumers. Just as standard economic analysis teaches
that prices tend to be lower in competition, the same reasoning ap-
plies similarly to suggest that non-price contract terms tend to be bet-
ter for buyers in competition. Marcus Cole explains:
as the level of competition in a market for a good or service de-
creases, we should not be surprised to see a proportionate in-
crease in pricing power by suppliers. And, in a similar vein, as
the level of competition in a market for a good or service de-
creases, we should not be surprised if we see a qualitative and
quantitative increase in the “one-sided” terms contained in the
form contracts associated with the purchase of such a good or
service.223
In sum, consumers tend to get better prices and better non-price con-
tract terms in competition than monopoly. But consumers benefitting
from more competitive, rather than less competitive, markets is sepa-
rate from the point that businesses in less competitive markets—
that merger-specific marginal cost savings will, at least in part, be passed on to con-
sumers whenever the merged entity will face a downward sloping demand curve, as
do almost all real-world firms.”).
221. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 331–33 (9th ed. 2014) (“The
effect of price on quantity and hence on revenue (price times quantity) is summarized
in the useful concept of elasticity—the proportional change in one variable caused by
a proportional change in another. Here we are interested in the elasticity of demand
with respect to price—in other words, the proportional effect on the quantity de-
manded of proportional change in price. To illustrate, if a 1 percent price increase
would cause the quantity demanded to fall by 2 percent, the elasticity of demand with
respect to price (or, for brevity, simply the elasticity of demand) is -2.”).
222. See, e.g., Craswell, Passing, supra note 206, at 367.
223. Cole, supra note 209, at 438–39.
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even monopolies—pass through some of their cost-savings to consum-
ers.224 However (un)competitive a market, if enforceable adhesive ar-
bitration agreements reduce costs to businesses (an uncontroversial
premise),225 then standard economic analysis suggests they also tend
to reduce prices to consumers.226
E. CFPB Believes Enforcement of Adhesive Arbitration Agreements
Lowers Prices
The previous subsections explained the standard economic anal-
ysis’s conclusion that, however (un)competitive a market, if enforcea-
ble adhesive arbitration agreements reduce costs to businesses (an
uncontroversial premise)227 then they also tend to reduce prices to
224. Of the consumer financial services sector, Jean Sternlight writes:
Given the apparent absence of perfect competition in these industries, it is
not too surprising to hear that in fact some companies collaborated with one
another to impose arbitration on consumers. . . . This hardly has the ring of
perfect competition in action.
The same economics that oppose regulation in the presence of perfect compe-
tition instead justify regulation where, as here, the conditions for perfect
competition do not exist. Some regulations, such as antitrust law, are used to
directly prohibit monopolies or other forms of imperfect competition. Other
regulations, like those governing appropriate safety of consumer products, or
marketing of medicines, or airplane safety, are designed to provide protection
that an unregulated imperfect market would not provide. In the consumer
financial context, it appears that regulation is needed to prevent companies
from taking advantage of consumers through class action prohibitions.
Some have argued that regulation of consumer arbitration will likely harm
consumers by causing prices and interest rates to increase. However, absent
perfect competition, such regulation may well cause prices to drop or stay the
same rather than rise.
Sternlight, Hurrah, supra note 216, at 364–65 (2016). The last sentence of this pas-
sage finds no support in the earlier sentences of this passage. The case against price-
fixing (or adhesion-contract-term-fixing) rests on the consumer welfare enhancement
that comes from more, rather than, less competitive markets. This is separate from,
and does not even slightly undercut, the standard economic analysis that businesses’
cost savings from (from adhesive arbitration agreements or anything else) tend, to
some extent, to be passed through to consumers in even non-competitive markets.
Increasing the amount of that pass through is an argument for competition over mo-
nopoly, but the absence of competition is not an argument against the belief that some
pass through nevertheless occurs. Sternlight’s stronger argument—analogizing regu-
lation of adhesive arbitration agreements to regulations governing appropriate safety
of consumer products is discussed below. See infra Section V and especially text ac-
companying n.272 (quoting Sternlight & Jensen).
225. See id.
226. What Professor Douglas Baird says of warranties is as true of arbitration
agreements: “Even a monopolist looks for efficient warranty terms. Using inefficient
terms compromises the monopolist’s ability to extract rents. She is much better off
providing quality goods and efficient terms and charging as much as she can from
them.” Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 941 (2006).
227. See supra Section IV.B.
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consumers. Even the CFPB—author of the one study finding no sta-
tistically significant evidence to support this conclusion in the arbi-
tration context—nevertheless endorses this conclusion in that
context. After anticipating that business’ costs were likely to rise due
to the CFPB’s proposed restriction on adhesive arbitration agree-
ments, the CFPB said it “believes that most providers would pass
through at least portions of some of the costs described above to con-
sumers.”228 In other words, the CFPB believes the standard economic
analysis’s conclusion survives the CFPB’s inability to find statisti-
cally significant evidence to support it.
While the standard economic analysis is that, by lowering costs
to businesses, enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements tends over
time to lower prices to consumers, or to improve non-price terms of
consumers’ contracts, the CFPB’s 2015 Report found no statistically
significant evidence that enforceable arbitration agreements lower
consumer prices.229 The CFPB studied two groups of credit card
228. CFPB, Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 114, at 295 (“The Bureau believes
that most providers would pass through at least portions of some of the costs de-
scribed above to consumers. This pass-through can take multiple forms, such as
higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the products or services they provide
to consumers. The rate at which firms pass through changes in their marginal costs
onto prices (or interest rates) charged to consumers is called the pass-through rate.”).
See also CFPB, Arbitration Agreements Rule, supra note 12, at 681 (“[T]he Bureau
acknowledges that most providers will pass through at least portions of some of the
costs described above to consumers. This pass-through can take multiple forms, such
as higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the products or services they pro-
vide to consumers. The rate at which firms pass through changes in their marginal
costs onto prices or interest rates charged to consumers is called the pass-through
rate.”).
229. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, § 10 at 5 n. 9; See also Levitin,
supra note 40 (“[F]inancial services companies do not appear to be passing the cost
savings of arbitration on to consumers in general.”); id. (“When Bank of America,
JPMorgan Chase, Capital One and HSBC dropped arbitration clauses as the result of
a litigation settlement their prices did not go up. Nor did mortgage rates go up when
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stopped buying mortgages with arbitration clauses or
when Congress later banned arbitration clauses in mortgages.”); Glover, supra note
177, at 254 (“There is no empirical support for this cost-savings claim.”); Stempel,
Unconscionability, supra note 177, at 851 (“[T]here is nothing to suggest that vendors
imposing arbitration clauses actually lower their prices in conjunction with using ar-
bitration clauses in their contracts. Similarly, there is no solid support for the theoret-
ical idea that by using arbitration clauses, vendors are able to refrain from price
increases that would otherwise occur.”); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 177, at 969
(“[T]he prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer transactions represents wind-
falls to the sellers, not cost-saving devices for the buyers.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Embrac-
ing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 106 (2006) (noting
lack of “empirical proof” that “merchants pass cost of one-sided form contracts on to
consumers”); Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 177, at 95 (“[N]o published studies
show that the imposition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.”).
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issuers: (1) those legally-barred—by settlement of an antitrust
case230—from using arbitration clauses for at least three and a half
years (the “treatment group”), and (2) those not so barred (the “con-
trol group”).231 The CFPB used a difference-in-differences analysis232
“to measure how much, if at all, the treatment group (i.e., issuers
that stopped using pre-dispute arbitration provisions) changed their
pricing of new accounts over time relative to how much the control
group changed their pricing of new accounts over the same time pe-
riod.”233 The CFPB found no statistically significant difference in the
230. See Nancy A. Welch & Stephen J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et
al.: The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in
Credit Card Agreements, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, at 18, http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2014/fall/ross-etal—v—ameri-
can-express-et-al—-the-story-behind-the-spre.html; Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher
R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2013) (showing per-
centage of credit card issuers using arbitration clauses and percentage of credit card
debt subject to them).
In mid-to-late 2009, two events occurred that had a significant effect on
the use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements. First, in July 2009,
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) settled a consumer fraud lawsuit with
the Minnesota Attorney General by agreeing to stop administering new con-
sumer arbitration cases. Prior to the settlement, the NAF had the largest
caseload of consumer arbitrations (almost all debt collection arbitrations) in
the United States.
Second, in December 2009, four of the largest credit card issuers settled
a pending antitrust suit (Ross v. Bank of America) by agreeing to remove
arbitration clauses from their consumer and small business credit card
agreements for three-and-one-half years.
Id.
231. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, §10 at 8 (“To detect price impacts
associated with changes relating to pre-dispute arbitration clauses, we begin with
data for our ‘treatment’ group, which is composed of all the Ross settlers (issuers that
ceased using arbitration provisions during our study period) whose data are in the
CCDB. We then compare the treatment group with a ‘control group,’ meaning issuers
that did not alter their use of arbitration provisions during the study period. The
issuers in our control group could have been Ross defendants that continued in the
litigation or they could have been issuers that were not involved in the litigation at
all. The issuers in the control group may or may not have used pre-dispute arbitration
provisions — what is important is that they did not change their usage of arbitration
agreements during the analysis period. Both our treatment group and our control
group contain a large sample of accounts from which to draw observations.”).
232. Id. at 10.
A difference-in-differences analysis requires a comparison between two time
periods: the period before an event and the period after an event. In our re-
gressions, the event separating the before and after periods was the date of
the Ross settlements. Settlements in Ross were formalized in Nov. and Dec.
2009. Accordingly, our ‘before’ period is the period from Nov. 2008 through
Oct. 2009. Our ‘after’ period is the period from Jan. 2010 through Nov. 2011.
233. Id. at 11.
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change in the “total cost of credit”234 across the two groups after one
group stopped using arbitration clauses.235
Despite this study, and commentators citing it to dispute the
standard economic analysis’s conclusion that enforcing adhesive arbi-
tration agreements tends to lower prices,236 the CFPB nevertheless
endorsed that conclusion in its 2016’s notice proposing a rule to pro-
hibit arbitration agreements’ “class waivers,”237 and again in its 2017
final rule prohibiting them.238
In the 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the CFPB
lists some business costs likely to increase due to the proposed regu-
lation,239 including “Costs Due to Additional Class Litigation.”240 The
234. Id. at 9, “Total cost of credit” is defined by the CFPB. “[T]o measure consum-
ers’ all-in costs, we calculate, on an annualized basis, a figure that includes every-
thing that consumers pay to keep and use their credit cards—all fees and interest
charges—as a percentage of the average cycle-ending balance for those accounts.”
235. Id. at 5–6 (“Using data from before and after that event, the Bureau has
looked to see whether it can find statistically significant evidence, at standard confi-
dence level (95%), that companies that eliminated arbitration raised their prices
(measured by total cost of credit) in a manner that was different from that of compa-
rable companies that had not changed their policies regarding arbitration provisions.
We are unable to identify any such evidence from the data.”).
236. Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Ad-
ministrative Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 115 (2015)
(“[T]he CFPB found that . . . arbitration clauses likely do not lead to lower prices for
consumers.”); Sternlight, Hurrah, supra note 216, at 365 (“[T]he CFPB study showed
that when companies in one consumer financial market were precluded from impos-
ing binding arbitration on their customers, in fact those companies’ prices did not
rise.”). See also Brenna A. Sheffield, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Financial Products: The CFPB’s Proposed Regulation and Its Consistency
with the Arbitration Study, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 219, 234 (2016) (“The CFPB also
reasoned that pre-dispute arbitration clauses that ban class action waivers do not
lower consumer prices. However, the Arbitration Study [the CFPB’s Arbitration
Study: Report to Congress (2015)] established that proving a correlation between ar-
bitration clauses and pricing is near impossible. . . . The CFPB recognized the diffi-
culty in proving the “pass-through” effect because so many factors affect pricing.”).
237. See CFPB, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, supra note 114, at 1 (“[T]he proposed rule
would prohibit covered providers of certain consumer financial products and services
from using an agreement with a consumer that provides for arbitration of any future
dispute between the parties to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class
action with respect to the covered consumer financial product or service.”).
238. See CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12, at 1 (“[T]he final
rule prohibits covered providers of certain consumer financial products and services
from using an agreement with a consumer that provides for arbitration of any future
dispute between the parties to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class
action concerning the covered consumer financial product or service. Second, the final
rule requires covered providers that are involved in an arbitration pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement to submit specified arbitral records to the Bureau and
also to submit specified court records.”).
239. CFPB, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, supra note 114, at 271 (“Providers’ costs cor-
respond directly to the three aforementioned effects of the proposed rule: (1) Providers
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\23-1\HNR102.txt unknown Seq: 73  6-MAR-18 12:03
Fall 2017] Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements 101
NPRM then endorsed the standard economic analysis’s conclusion:
“The Bureau believes that most providers would pass through at
least portions of some of the costs described above to consumers. This
pass-through can take multiple forms, such as higher prices to con-
sumers or reduced quality of the products or services they provide to
consumers.”241 The CFPB’s NPRM further endorsed the standard ec-
onomic analysis’s more specific conclusion that the extent to which
changes in businesses’ costs are passed on to consumers is deter-
mined by the elasticity of supply and demand in the relevant
markets.242
would experience costs to the extent they act on additional incentives for ensuring
more compliance with the law; (2) providers would spend more to the extent that the
exposure to additional class litigation materializes into additional litigation; and (3)
providers would incur a one-time administrative change cost or ongoing amendment
or notices costs.”).
240. Id. at 277 (“The major expenses to providers in class litigation are payments
to class members and related expenses following a class settlement, plaintiff’s legal
fees to the extent that the provider is responsible for paying them following a class
settlement, the provider’s legal fees and other litigation costs (in all cases regardless
of how it is resolved), and the provider’s management and staff time devoted to the
litigation.”).
241. Id. at 295.
242. Id. at 295–97.
The rate at which firms pass through changes in their marginal costs
onto prices (or interest rates) charged to consumers is called the pass-
through rate. . . .
Determining the extent of pass-through involves evaluating a trade-off
between volume of business and margin (the difference between price and
marginal cost) on each customer served. Any amount of pass-through in-
creases price, and thus lowers volume. A pass-through rate below 100 per-
cent means that a firm’s margin per customer is lower than it was before the
provider had to incur the new cost. Economic theory suggests that, without
accounting for strategic effects of competition, the pass-through rate ends up
somewhere in between the two extremes of: (1) No pass-through (and thus
completely preserving the volume at the expense of lowering margin) and (2)
full pass-through (completely preserving the margin at the expense of lower-
ing volume). For a case of a monopolist with a linear demand function (a
price increase of a dollar results in the same change in quantity demanded
regardless of the original price level) and constant marginal cost (each addi-
tional unit of output costs the same to produce as the previous unit), the
theory predicts a pass-through rate of 50 percent. The rate would be higher
or lower depending on how demand elasticity and economies of scale change
with higher prices and lower outputs. . . . The Bureau believes that providers
might treat a large fraction of the costs of additional class litigation as margi-
nal: Payments to class members, attorney’s fees (both defendant’s and plain-
tiff’s), and the cost of putative class cases that do not settle on a class basis.
The extent to which these marginal costs are likely to be passed through to
consumers cannot be reliably predicted, especially given the multiple mar-
kets affected.
Id.
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The CFPB’s 2017 final rule again lists some business costs likely
to increase due to the proposed regulation,243 including “Costs Due to
Additional Class Litigation.”244 The CFPB then again endorsed the
standard economic analysis’s conclusion: “the Bureau acknowledges
that most providers will pass through at least portions of some of the
costs described above to consumers. This pass-through can take mul-
tiple forms, such as higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of
the products or services they provide to consumers.”245 The CFPB’s
final rule further endorsed the standard economic analysis’s more
specific conclusion that the extent to which changes in businesses’
costs are passed on to consumers is determined by the elasticity of
supply and demand in the relevant markets.246
In short, the CFPB’s 2016 NPRM and its 2017 final rule join the
standard economic analysis in concluding that enforcement of adhe-
sive arbitration agreements tends to lower prices, so the CFPB’s rule
ending that enforcement with respect to class waivers would likely
raise prices. As the CFPB’s 2015 study found no evidence that en-
forcement of adhesive arbitration agreements had a statistically sig-
nificant effect on price,247 why would the CFPB nevertheless
conclude in each of the following two years that reducing such en-
forcement would likely raise businesses’ costs with some of that cost-
increase passed through to consumers?
The CFPB’s 2015 findings are consistent with its later conclu-
sions. First, while the 2015 CFPB study only looks at price,248 the
243. CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12, at 647, 653, 665, 675
(“Covered Persons’ Costs Due to Additional Compliance . . . Providers’ Costs Due to
Additional Class Litigation: Methodology and Description of Assumptions Behind Nu-
merical Estimates . . . Covered Persons’ Costs Due to Additional Class Litigation . . .
Covered Persons’ Costs Due to the Administrative Change Expense . . . .”).
244. Id. at 653 (“Additional investments in compliance are unlikely to eliminate
additional class litigation completely, at least for some providers. Thus, those provid-
ers that are sued in a class action will also incur expenses associated with additional
class litigation.”).
245. Id. at 681.
246. Id. at 681–82 (“Determining the extent of pass-through involves evaluating a
trade-off between volume of business and margin (the difference between price and
marginal cost) on each customer served. Any amount of pass-through increases price,
and thus lowers volume. A pass-through rate below 100 percent means that a firm’s
margin per customer is lower than it was before the provider had to incur the new
cost.”).
247. The NPRM specifically acknowledges that the Bureau’s 2015 study “[D]id not
find a statistically significant effect on the prices . . . .” CFPB, PROPOSED RULEMAKING,
supra note 114, at 298.
248. CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12. The CFPB study does
not examine non-price contract terms of credit card agreements, but only their price
terms as measured by the “total cost of credit” which the CFPB defines as follows:
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2016 NPRM and 2017 final rule join standard economic analysis in
recognizing that changes in sellers’ costs may be passed through to
buyers on price or on non-price contract terms or other qualities of
the product.249 Because the 2015 study did not examine non-price
terms of the agreements it studied, it may have overlooked a statisti-
cally significant difference between the treatment group and the con-
trol group with respect to some non-price term or other product
quality, such as frequent flier miles for using a credit card.
Furthermore, even focusing only on price, the time it takes busi-
nesses’ cost changes to be reflected in their prices varies, and may
never occur when the cost change is expected to be merely tempo-
rary.250 As Jason Scott Johnston and Todd Zywicki write in their cri-
tique the CFPB study:
[I]t is known that firms in the consumer services sector adjust
prices much more slowly in response to cost changes than do
firms in the manufacturing sector and that large firms adjust
prices more slowly than do small firms.
In light of what economists have learned about how firms adjust
prices to cost changes, it is hardly surprising that the CFPB
found that the four credit card issuers that agreed to remove
arbitration clauses for three and half years did not change their
credit card prices in a way that significantly differed from the
practices of other issuers. Even if the arbitration clause morato-
rium increased the costs to the subject firms, the moratorium
was only temporary. There is neither theoretical nor empirical
reason to have thought that such a temporary change in costs
would change credit card pricing. Moreover, the CFPB looked at
“[T]o measure consumers’ all-in costs, we calculate, on an annualized basis, a figure
that includes everything that consumers pay to keep and use their credit cards—all
fees and interest charges—as a percentage of the average cycle-ending balance for
those accounts.” CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 143, §10 at 9 n.19. This does
not suggest the CFPB studied non-price terms of the credit card agreements. If it did
not, then we would not know of a statistically significant difference in changes of the
non-price terms between the treatment group and the control group.
249. CFPB, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, supra note 114, at 295 (“The Bureau believes
that most providers would pass through at least portions of some of the costs de-
scribed above to consumers. This pass-through can take multiple forms, such as
higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the products or services they provide
to consumers.”).
250. Jason Scott Johnston & Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s Arbitration Study: A Summary and Critique, 35 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 5, 20 (May 2016) (“[F]inancial economists have long known that banks do
not adjust their deposit and loan rates quickly or fully to temporary changes in mar-
ket interest rates. Recent work indicates clearly that to explain bank pricing, one
needs to take account not only of current and recent values of factors such as money
market rates but also of expected future rates.”).
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whether prices changed differentially during the year after the
arbitration moratorium was imposed. Again, no evidence indi-
cates that financial services prices respond so quickly even to a
permanent change in costs and no sound theoretical reason ex-
ists to think that they would.251
In sum, standard economic analysis does not suggest businesses al-
ways change their prices immediately to reflect all their cost changes,
no matter how ephemeral. Rather, standard economic analysis con-
cludes that businesses’ cost-savings tend over time to lead to price
reductions or improved non-price terms of consumers’ contracts. As
the CFPB’s 2016 NPRM and 2017 final rule recognize, this conclu-
sion—as applied to arbitration—survives the 2015 study’s under-
standable failure to find statistically significant evidence of it.
F. Effects of Centrist Reforms on Price
If, as this Section argued likely occurs, enforcement of adhesive
arbitration agreements tends to reduce consumer prices, this pro-con-
sumer effect might be undone by the Centrist Position’s pro-con-
sumer reforms of the separability doctrine, class waivers, and legally-
erroneous awards. For example, if adhesive arbitration agreements
reduce business costs only because such agreements make class waiv-
ers more enforceable than they would be in a comparable non-arbitra-
tion agreement,252 then moving from current (Very Conservative) law
to the Centrist Position would end the cost-reducing effect of adhesive
arbitration agreements, and thus end their price-reducing effect.
Similarly, the Centrist Position would end the cost and price-reduc-
ing effects of adhesive arbitration agreements if those effects come
entirely from the separability doctrine, or from deferential judicial
review of legally-erroneous awards on issues of mandatory law. If the
cost and price-reducing effects of adhesive arbitration agreements are
entirely due to some combination of these three factors, then adoption
of the Centrist Position would end those effects.
However, even after adoption of the Centrist Position, adhesive
arbitration agreements might retain much of their cost and price-re-
ducing effects because those effects may result in part from arbitra-
tion reducing, compared to litigation, process costs such as “the time
and legal fees spent on pleadings, discovery, motions, trial or hearing,
and appeal.”253 Distinct from such process costs are “adjudicator
costs”—the costs of paying for the adjudicator (arbitrator, judge, jury)
251. Id.
252. Ware, Judicial Regulation, supra note 150, at 90, 94.
253. Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, supra note 115, at 258.
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and support for the adjudicator, such as employees of the court sys-
tem or arbitration organization, and the courthouse or hearing
room.254 Adjudicator costs tend to be higher in arbitration than liti-
gation because the government subsidizes the adjudicator costs of lit-
igation, but not the adjudicator costs of arbitration.255 Nevertheless,
arbitration’s non-adjudicator process costs may tend to be so much
lower than litigation’s as to more than make up for arbitration’s
higher adjudicator costs. As Jeffrey Stempel wrote, “[i]f the arbitra-
tion process is significantly faster and cheaper to undertake than liti-
gation, the comparative savings in disputing costs should far exceed
the higher, unsubsidized, user fees charged by private arbitration or-
ganizations.”256 “[C]ounsel fees and similar costs of pressing the case
generally dwarf user fees.”257
Arbitration had long been thought to be generally quicker and
cheaper than litigation largely because arbitration usually had much
less discovery and many fewer motions than litigation, and perhaps
also because arbitration’s pleadings and hearings were shorter and
faster than litigation’s.258 Supporting this general belief, some empir-
ical evidence indicates that employment arbitration tends to have
254. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 3, at 447–48.
255. See id. at 477 (“The fees litigants pay to courts do not cover the full cost of the
judge, jury, court clerk, other administrative personnel, and the courthouse itself. By
contrast, parties to arbitration must pay the arbitrator’s fee, as well as the adminis-
trative costs of the arbitration organization, and any cost of the hearing room.”).
256. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Court-
house at Twenty: Fait Accompi, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 329 (1996).
257. Id. See also Hirschmann & Rickard, supra note 188 (“[A] company that sets
up an arbitration program incurs significant administrative costs in connection with
carrying out arbitrations – costs that the company does not incur in connection with
judicial litigation . . . . Companies are willing to incur those costs because, on average,
the aggregate costs of resolving disputes in arbitration are lower than the aggregate
costs of resolving disputes in litigation in court.”).
258. Drahozal & Zyontz, Empirical Study, supra note 120, at 850 (“[A]rbitration is
less formal than litigation, with less discovery and fewer motions, and appellate re-
view of awards is limited.”); J.S. Christie, Jr., Article, Preparing for and Prevailing at
an Arbitration Hearing, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 265, 266 (2008) (“[C]ompared to liti-
gation . . . arbitration motion practice is rare and arbitration discovery normally is
limited. Generally, arbitrations are easier to schedule, because the parties do not
work around a court’s docket. The time required for an arbitration hearing is gener-
ally less than for a trial . . . . As a consequence, arbitration litigation expenses are
usually lower than court litigation expenses and arbitrations are usually completed
more quickly than trials.”); Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 137, at 1268 (“[L]imits on
discovery (and to a lesser extent on pretrial motion practice) hold down the actual
costs of arbitration relative to litigation.”).
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lower process costs than employment litigation.259 However, nearly
all of this evidence is a decade or two old, and arbitration’s discovery
and motions have apparently been increasing, so arbitration’s pro-
cess-cost advantage over litigation may be closing.260 On the other
hand, growing arbitral discovery is reportedly leading some parties to
draft their arbitration clauses with “meaningful limits on discov-
ery,”261 and research revealed no evidence or argument that arbitra-
tion tends to take as long as litigation,262 so arbitration’s general cost
259. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employ-
ment Arbitration under the Auspices of the AAA, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777,
824 (2003) (indicating that AAA employment arbitration offers affordable, substan-
tial, measurable due process to employees arbitrating pursuant to mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements and to middle- and lower-income employees); David Sherwyn,
Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:
A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 (2005) (studying
employment dispute resolution program adopted by anonymous business and report-
ing that “since instituting its DRP system, ADR Employer 1 has cut its outside coun-
sel fees in half”); G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 517, 521 n.24 (1989) (“[A]verage cost of defending customer-broker disputes in
court was $20,000 per case as compared with $8,000 per case in arbitration.”); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-15, ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997) (“report[ing] that
the overall cost of dealing with workplace disputes (including the annual cost of the
ADR program itself) was less than half of what the company had been accustomed to
spending on legal fees for employment-related litigation” during the first three years
after Brown and Root adopted an employee ADR program).
260. Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Un-
derstanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 111, 119
(2015) (“With its explosion in popularity, arbitration evolved into a different process
than that practiced when Congress enacted the FAA. . . . [A]s actually practiced today
in the most oft-used forums . . . arbitration involves more formalities and litigation-
like processes. In turn, these formalities increase costs due to more expansive discov-
ery, prehearing conferences, and motion practice.”); id. at 139 (“[M]any scholars ques-
tion the cost savings of modern arbitration. Litigation-like arbitration procedures—
including extensive document and e-discovery, motion practice, and pre and post-
hearing briefs—have become far more common, driving up arbitration costs dramati-
cally. . . . At best, the empirical evidence gathered to date is inconclusive as to
whether arbitration is still less expensive than litigation.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (“[A]rbitration proce-
dures have become increasingly like the civil procedures they were designed to sup-
plant, including prehearing discovery and motion practice. . . . Arbitration hearings
are now often preceded by extensive discovery, including depositions.”); id. at 12 (“Be-
cause discovery has traditionally accounted for the bulk of litigation-related costs, the
importation of discovery into arbitration (which traditionally operated with little or
no discovery) is particularly noteworthy.”).
261. John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract Clauses: A Potential Key to a Cost-Ef-
fective Process, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 9, 9 (Fall 2009).
262. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Cor-
porate Disputes: A Report on The Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 17, 26
(1998) (reporting over 65% of companies gave “saves time” as reason they use arbitra-
tion); Drahozal & Zyontz, Empirical Study, supra note 120, at 845 (“The average time
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advantage over litigation may have shrunk, rather than disappeared,
and arbitration’s speed advantage seems to continue.
G. Conclusion
In sum, the standard economic analysis concludes that enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements tends to lower consumer prices or
benefit consumers with non-price changes to their transactions. This
conclusion is based on reasoning standard across the ideological spec-
trum of economics and was repeatedly endorsed by the CFPB despite
its inability to find significant empirical evidence for it. To reiterate,
the CFPB’s 2017 final arbitration rule: “acknowledge[d] that most
providers will pass through at least portions of some of the costs de-
scribed above to consumers. This pass-through can take multiple
forms, such as higher prices to consumers or reduced quality of the
products or services they provide to consumers.” This reasoning and
conclusion are not refuted by evidence that the relevant markets di-
verge from models of perfect competition as the direction, if not the
degree, of the effects indicated by this reasoning and conclusion hold
in non-competitive markets, even monopoly. While these effects may
be reduced by changing from current (Very Conservative) arbitration
to the Centrist Position, some of these effects may well survive that
change because of arbitration’s tendency to reduce process costs rela-
tive to litigation.
from filing to final award for the consumer arbitrations studied was 6.9 months.”);
Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 149, at 51 (finding time to final hearing was about three
times faster in arbitration than in court); Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness
Act: It Need Not and Should Not be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289,
294 (2012) (“Professor Colvin’s work confirmed the speed advantage of arbitration. He
found that the mean time to resolve a case that proceeded to hearing and award was
approximately one year; in contrast, litigation takes at least twice as long.”);
Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 259, at 1572–73 (noting “few dispute the
assertion that arbitration is faster than litigation”). See also AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, Measuring the Costs of Delays in Dispute Resolution, http://go.adr.org/
impactsofdelay.html (“On average, U.S. district court cases took more than 12 months
longer to get to trial than cases adjudicated by arbitration (24.2 months vs 11.6
months).”).
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V. THE CASE FOR THE CENTRIST POSITION OVER
THE PROGRESSIVE POSITIONS
A. Tradeoffs in Shaping Law Governing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements to Benefit Consumers
Section IV explained that enforcing adhesive arbitration agree-
ments, like enforcing other adhesive contract terms that lower busi-
nesses’ costs, likely benefits consumers with some combination of
lower prices or better non-price contract terms. Rather than deny
that businesses’ savings from enforceable adhesive contract terms
tends to lower consumer prices, the stronger economic argument is
that enforcing adhesive contract terms tends to lower consumer
prices too much. As Russell Korobkin puts it,
standard form contracts are likely to contain inefficient terms
because most buyers will compare only a subset of product at-
tributes (“salient” attributes) among sellers when making a
purchase decision, even when all contract terms are readily
available . . . Because making nonsalient attributes “low qual-
ity” will save the seller money and not cost the seller customers,
sellers will have a profit incentive to skimp on quality for such
attributes. If price is a salient attribute for buyers, sellers in a
competitive market will actually be forced by market pressure
to make nonsalient attributes low quality, whether or not this is
the efficient level of quality for those attributes. This is because
they will need the resulting cost savings in order to compete on
price, which they must do to retain customers.263
Passing on savings from “low quality” adhesive terms is, as
Korobkin says, something “sellers in a competitive market . . . must
do to retain customers,”264 and, as discussed above, also something
other sellers can be expected to do because they benefit from doing so.
263. Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 781, 784 (2005) [hereinafter Korobkin, Possibility]. See also Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, supra note 37, at 1206; Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Informa-
tion in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J.
723, 743 (2008) (“[F]irms have a strong incentive to compete over several salient
transactional terms while racing to the bottom on others. This race to the bottom
allows firms to offset for the costs of competing over the salient terms, most promi-
nently the price.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act
and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 971 (2012) (“[I]mperfectly rational consumers
place excessive weight on short-term, salient prices and insufficient weight on long-
term, nonsalient prices. Faced with such biased demand, issuers offer low short-term
prices and high long-term prices to minimize the perceived total price of their product.
Losses on the low, below-cost, short-term prices are recouped through high, above-
cost, long-term prices.”).
264. Korobkin, Possibility, supra note 263, at 784.
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As Section IV explained, lowering costs to businesses in non-competi-
tive markets, even monopoly, tends to lower prices.265
Rather than deny that non-price contract terms (such as arbitra-
tion clauses) affect prices, sophisticated economic scholarship on ad-
hesion contracts generally begins with that tradeoff among price and
other contract terms and asks which legal rules tend to produce the
best mix of price and non-price—or, more precisely, salient and non-
salient—contract terms. Scholars advocating legal rules that aggres-
sively police adhesion contract terms emphasize sellers’ “incentive to
skimp on quality” of non-salient contract terms and thus to give con-
sumers overly low prices.266 In contrast, scholars cautioning against
legal rules that aggressively police adhesion contract terms often
emphasize two checks on sellers’ incentives toward low-quality
non-salient terms.267 These are: (1) sellers’ incentives to win the
business of an informed-minority of buyers for whom the relevant
contract term is salient,268 and (2) the reputational harm to sellers
265. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. See also David Horton, The Fed-
eral Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1043–44
(2012) (“[I]f arbitration clauses are not ‘salient’–do not actually affect adherents’
choices about products, services, and jobs–then adherents will not be able to force
drafters to offer optimal dispute resolution terms. Instead, no matter what most con-
sumers and employees actually prefer, companies will engage in a race to the bottom,
slashing procedural entitlements in order to one-up each other on the higher-profile
issues of price or wages.”); Gibson, supra note 208, at 212–13 (“[S]ellers will decrease
the quality of the nonsalient features and use the resulting savings to make the sali-
ent features more attractive. Boilerplate, as a nonsalient feature, will accordingly be
full of terms that reduce seller costs and shift risks to consumers, and sellers will use
the money they save to lower the price of the product.”).
267. James Gibson, supra note 208, at 199 (“[S]cholars have offered two distinct
arguments in favor of enforcing boilerplate even in the face of the mounting evidence
that it goes unread. The first is an ex ante argument that the market works, due to a
sufficiently large subset of consumers that actually do read the terms. The second is
an ex post argument that even when the market fails, reputational concerns keep
sellers from unduly aggressive enforcement of one-sided terms.”).
268. Compare, e.g., Baird, supra note 226, at 951 (“As long as there are enough
sophisticated buyers aware of the importance of having the right microprocessor, the
seller must choose well. The sophisticated buyer provides protection for those that are
entirely ignorant. Indeed, at first approximation, boilerplate is something the typical
consumer can safely ignore most of the time.”) and Cole, supra note 209, at 417–22
(emphasizing that, just as “price is, in an indirect but very real sense, determined by
the choices of the marginal consumer and the marginal producer,” adhesion contract
terms are determined by the marginal consumer and marginal producer of each non-
price term of the contract, and providing a colorful example of a credit card’s coverage
of a consumer primary car rental insurance coverage), with Michael I. Meyerson, The
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA.
L. REV. 583, 601 (1990) (“[T]here generally will be too few informed consumers to
produce a competitive market for contract terms.”).
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who enforce (as opposed to merely draft) low-quality non-salient
terms.269
However strong these factors, as Douglas Baird concludes:
There is nothing particularly special about what the law is do-
ing with respect to fine print as opposed to other hidden product
attributes. Of course, there may not be enough sophisticated
buyers to give a seller the right incentives. There are computers
with microprocessors that are too slow and warranties that are
too stingy that are sold to people like me every day. But the
question is not whether the market is perfect, but how we
269. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).
The existence of a one-sided contract does not imply that the transaction
will be one-sided, but only that the seller will have discretion with respect to
how to treat the consumer. . . .
Many one-sided contracts are found in consumer markets that have the fol-
lowing characteristics: The seller side of the market consists of repeat play-
ers who have a sunk cost in a reputation for dealing “fairly” with consumers,
in the sense of not taking advantage of one-sided terms as long as the con-
sumer deals fairly with them. The buyer side of the market consists of parties
that—because they do not have repeat dealings with particular sellers (the
market is competitive, so consumers can switch easily among sellers) and
because privacy rules or other barriers to pooling of information among sell-
ers prevent sellers from comparing notes about the behavior of individual
buyers—do not have a sunk cost in reputation and hence have no incentive to
deal fairly with sellers in the sense of honoring the terms of the contract.
In such a situation, the optimal set of contract terms does not depend
only on the relative costs and benefits associated with particular terms. It
also depends on the relative propensity of the parties to behave opportunisti-
cally, that is, to take advantage of contractual terms and, in so doing, impose
a cost on the other side that will exceed the benefit to the opportunistic party.
In the asymmetric-reputation case, the seller has little or no incentive to
behave opportunistically because if he does, he will suffer a loss of reputa-
tion, which is a cost.
Id. at 827, 829–30. See also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As an Agency Prob-
lem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 704–05 (2004) (“[C]lauses that initially appear to provide
sellers with significant discretion do not necessarily portend proseller abuse of that
discretion.”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses
and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 879 (2006) (“Tailored forgiveness deals with
the problem of hidden customer types. . . . [A] firm that has tough standard-form
terms and then delegates discretion to renegotiate when its managers believe that the
customer has not behaved opportunistically does not have to worry so much about
identifying opportunistic types before entering the contract. If it turns out that the
customer behavior was indeed opportunistic, its manager will insist upon adherence
to the unforgiving standard-form terms.”); Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1221 (1983) (“[I]f
legal liabilities are set lower than the obligations that the firm recognizes in its actual
practice, the gap can provide room to maneuver in the face of inevitable adversity.
The enterprise can build a reputation for allowing customers substantial recourse in
matters of return, repair, or alteration without committing itself to maintain the pol-
icy in any particular case.”).
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should shape legal rules to make markets work more effectively
with respect to all product attributes.270
In other words, lawmakers’ considerations in shaping legal rules to
police adhesion contract terms, like warranties and arbitration, re-
semble lawmakers’ considerations in shaping legal rules to police
product attributes like the speed of a computer. The possibility that a
computer’s slow processor hurts some consumers more than the price
increase that would result from legally-prohibiting such processors is
consistent with the possibility that many other consumers would be
hurt more by the price increase. Similarly, the possibility that an ad-
hesive arbitration clause hurts some consumers more than the price
increase that would result from prohibiting such clauses is consistent
with the possibility that many other consumers would be hurt more
by the price increase.
B. Defer to Non-Arbitration Law in Prohibiting Only “Unsafe”
Arbitration Clauses
Almost compatible with the previous Subsection’s analysis is the
following passage by Jean Sternlight, perhaps the leading scholarly
advocate of the Very Progressive Position, and economist Elizabeth
Jensen:
low prices neither are, nor necessarily should be, policymakers’
primary concern. Many government regulations clearly increase
companies’ costs, and these regulations may even increase
prices, but policymakers have determined that these regula-
tions make sense nonetheless. For example, we require manu-
facturers of tires, drugs, and cars to meet minimum standards
to protect public health and safety.271
This passage would be compatible with this article’s summary of
Korobkin, Baird, etc. if this passage had said of consumer product
safety regulations “these regulations likely increase prices” rather
than “these regulations may even increase prices.” However, if we ac-
knowledge a likely tradeoff between price and consumer product
safety regulation then Sternlight’s analogy of “tires, drugs, and cars”
to adhesive arbitration agreements is apt. Much as early-1900’s
progressives created the FDA to mandate minimum standards of
270. Baird, supra note 226, at 936–37.
271. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 177, at 95.
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drug safety,272 and mid-1900’s progressives created strict products li-
ability and the Consumer Product Safety Commission to mandate
minimum standards of auto safety,273 early 2000’s progressives cre-
ated the CFPB to mandate minimum standards of consumer credit
safety.274 In these and similar regulatory incursions on consumers’
freedom of contract, the strong progressive argument is not that the
relevant markets lack “perfect competition, [so] such regulation may
well cause prices to drop or stay the same rather than rise,”275 but
rather that the regulatory protection of consumers’ safety is worth
consumers paying the higher prices likely caused by the regulation.
And that is the argument I believe should incline progressives toward
the Centrist Position of continuing to enforce adhesive arbitration
272. Background: Research Tools on FDA History, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINIS-
TRATION https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/Back-
ground/default.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2016) (“FDA’s responsibilities derive from
statutes that date back to the early twentieth century. Harvey Wiley fought long and
hard to unify disparate interest groups behind a federal law to deal with serious
problems in the food and drug supply. Through Wiley’s crusading, the support of the
General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the work of muckraking journalists, the efforts
of state and local food and drug officials, cooperation from the American Medical Asso-
ciation and the American Pharmaceutical Association, and the impact of Upton Sin-
clair’s The Jungle, a novel depicting the filth of the meat packing industry, Congress
approved one of the landmarks of Progressive era legislation in 1906, the Food and
Drugs Act.”).
273. See, e.g., James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict
Products Liability: A Case Study in American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 443, 478–79 (1995) (describing “humanistic/progressive social considera-
tions” as the “philosophical underpinning” of strict products liability); Terry Carter,
Should this toy be saved?, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajour
nal.com/magazine/article/should_this_toy_be_saved/ (“The consumer movement
largely developed by Ralph Nader in the mid-1960s reached a pinnacle with the crea-
tion of the CPSC in 1972.”).
274. See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15
CHAP. L. REV. 23 (2011) (observing that articles by then Professor, now Senator, Eliza-
beth Warren (D-MA) “are widely considered the academic work that propelled the
Bureau into existence”); David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the
Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences 50–51, 100 (2011) (The CFPB
was “conceived by Harvard law professor and TARP Oversight Committee head Eliza-
beth Warren, first in a short 2007 article whose title—‘Unsafe at Any Rate’—con-
sciously linked her to the Ralph Nader crusades of the 1960s, and then a more
detailed, co-authored article a year later. . . . With a few exceptions, the legislative
blueprint for the new Consumer Bureau reads as if it came straight from these two
articles, as in many respects it did.”).
275. Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah, supra note 216, at 365 (“Some have argued that
regulation of consumer arbitration will likely harm consumers by causing prices and
interest rates to increase. However, absent perfect competition, such regulation may
well cause prices to drop or stay the same rather than rise. Consistent with this anal-
ysis, the CFPB study showed that when companies in one consumer financial market
were precluded from imposing binding arbitration on their customers, in fact those
companies’ prices did not rise.”).
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clauses that are safe for consumers, while prohibiting those that are
unsafe. “Unsafe” adhesive arbitration clauses are, this article has ar-
gued, arbitration clauses:
1) in contracts induced by duress, misrepresentation, or other
contract defense;
2) that deprive consumers of class actions; or
3) that preclude correction of legally-erroneous decisions of
mandatory law.
As noted above,276 this list derives from current non-arbitration law.
In other words, centrist arbitration law does not try to reinvent the
wheel by developing new bodies of law on these three complex topics,
but rather defers to the conclusions established areas of law have al-
ready reached after a long period of evolution and testing through
litigated cases. The following paragraphs elaborate, first addressing
class actions.
As Chris Drahozal explains, first among the “unintended conse-
quences [that] might result from restrictions on the use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts” is:
[C]onsumers and employees without disputes—who have no
complaint with their treatment by a business—likely will be
made worse off by legal restrictions on the use of arbitration.
The cost savings that businesses achieve through arbitration
benefit consumers by enabling the businesses to reduce prices
and employers to increase wages. Removing those cost savings
by restricting the use of arbitration will have the opposite
effect.277
To this sensible point, progressives sensibly reply that even consum-
ers who have no complaint with their treatment by a business may
have been harmed by the business’s violations of law, but not realize
it.278 So discovering and deterring such violations is an important
role for the plaintiffs’ lawyers who bring class actions, and enforcing
276. See Introduction.
277. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIA-
TION 89, 101 (2012).
278. Jean R. Sternlight, Difficult Claims, supra note 154, at 93 (opposing arbitral
class waivers reducing enforcement of a businesses’ violations of laws in cases in
which “the consumer does not realize she has potentially been injured”); id. at 119–20
(“[C]lass actions can solve the problem of consumers not knowing they were harmed,
or not knowing they were harmed in an illegal way. . . a class action could be filed on
behalf of persons who had been harmed by discriminatory lending or charged exces-
sive fees or exposed to harmful chemicals even if the vast number of the members of
the class had no idea they had been harmed, or harmed illegally. Only the named
plaintiff and the attorney for the named plaintiff would necessarily have to be aware
of the fact that the class members were allegedly harmed, or harmed in violation of
the law.”).
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class waivers hurts consumers who do not realize they would benefit
from a class action.279 Jean Sternlight, for example, opposes enforce-
ment of arbitral class waivers in part on this paternalist (or
“parentalist”280) ground.
Bolstering this paternalist argument against class waivers is an
externality argument. As Michelle Boardman writes,
there may be a free-rider problem when each individual con-
sumer signs away her right to a legal process that in the aggre-
gate provides public benefits. If the potential for class action is
to the benefit of all consumers but is paid for individually, for
example, I may wish the threat of class action to cabin a ven-
dor’s behavior even as I willingly trade my own right in ex-
change for a slightly cheaper contract (or perhaps I retain the
time it would take to discover the clause in exchange for the risk
of the clause).
. . . Here is not the place to debate the benefit of class actions to
the public. The point is that if provisions that restrict class ac-
tions or the right to sue in a convenient forum, or other clauses
used widely, leave vendors with an insufficient threat of suit
from consumers, the polity may choose to reinstate the threat
even though each individual would choose to accept the
clauses.281
279. Id. at 119–20; see also Sternlight, Hurrah, supra note 216, at 358 (“[C]lass
proceedings . . . allow financial consumers who may not realize they have been
wronged to participate in a class action where their rights can be adjudicated.”);
Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-
Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 451 (2014) (concluding individual, small-
claims arbitration, rather than class action, lacks “room to develop a business model
that harnesses the potentially large number of people who are harmed in small ways
by corporate practices, but who may not have any knowledge of the harm or lack any
incentive to pursue their small claims.”).
280. I prefer “parentalist” to “paternalist,” see Ware, Exceptional, supra note 104,
at 214 n.97 (“[M]andatory disclosure laws are ‘parentalist’ restrictions on autonomy”),
but that gender neutrality does not seem to have caught on.
281. Michelle E. Boardman, Consent and Sensibility, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1967,
1974 (2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VAN-
ISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted);
see also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to
Mandatory Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1755, 1815 (2016) (referring to the “litiga-
tion externality produced by class actions” and arguing “the strongest case for access
to courts and against mandatory arbitration might very well rest on this deterrence
externality. It is possible that various types of socially harmful conduct are insuffi-
ciently deterred by public enforcement and that private class actions create better
compliance, eliminate harmful conduct, and result in more accurate prices, to the ben-
efit of all.”).
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These two arguments against enforcing arbitral class waivers (pater-
nalism and externalities) resonate because paternalism and external-
ities are the standard arguments for limiting freedom of contract;
that is, they are the standard arguments for mandatory rules
preventing enforcement of some contract terms.282 And they are why
the Centrist Position, like Boardman’s article (“not the place to de-
bate the benefit of class actions to the public”), does not try to resolve
the long-running debate over class actions.283 Rather, centrist arbi-
tration law allows that debate to continue outside arbitration law,
which centrist arbitration law flexibly accommodates by making arbi-
tral class waivers as enforceable as comparable non-arbitral class
waivers.284
Similarly, the Centrist Position does not require arbitration law
to make the many difficult policy judgments about when paternalism
or externalities are severe enough to justify any of the many
mandatory rules of consumer law, employment law, and the like.
Rather, centrist arbitration law defers to such non-arbitration law on
which rules are mandatory by ensuring that arbitrators’ errors on
such law can be vacated de novo, while arbitrators’ errors on law con-
sisting of default rules can be vacated only under the deferential
standards of current arbitration law, such as FAA § 10.285 And the
Centrist Position does not require arbitration law to make the many
difficult policy judgments required to develop nuanced contract de-
fenses, like duress and misrepresentation. Rather, centrist arbitra-
tion law defers to contract law on its defenses, and merely applies
them to the right to litigate, by repealing the separability doctrine.286
In sum, the Centrist Position incorporates the accumulated wis-
dom of large bodies of non-arbitration law to prohibit the categories of
282. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
YALE L.J. 2032, 2084 (2012) (“The standard justifications for mandatory restrictions
on freedom of  contract are to protect people inside (paternalism) or outside (externali-
ties) the contract.”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Cor-
porate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 63 (1992) (“Contract theorists generally agree
that mandatory rules can be justified either by society wanting to protect the con-
tracting parties themselves (paternalism) or by society wanting to protect third par-
ties (externalities).”); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal
Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 267 (2006) (“A liberal state
has two basic rationales for regulating how individuals or groups use private property
and enter into contracts: externalities and paternalism.”).
283. Boardman, supra note 281; Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at
1267–68.
284. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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adhesive arbitration agreements that non-arbitration law has al-
ready determined pose a significant risk of harming consumers, while
facilitating courts’ nuanced judgments about remaining adhesive ar-
bitration clauses. Some of these remaining clauses might, compared
with litigation,287 require significantly:
1) higher filing fees;288
2) lesser remedies;289
3) shorter limitations periods;290 or
4) less convenient hearing locations.291
An arbitration agreement with such possibly “claim-suppressing”292
287. See Ware, PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.25; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Un-
conscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–96
(2004); Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About
How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97
MARQ. L. REV. 751, 770–71 (2014).
288. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding fees excessive and
unconscionable); Brower v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App.N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (same); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159 (Nev. 2004) (same).
289. Sec. Serv. Fed. Credit Union v. Sanders, 264 S.W.3d 292, 298–301 (Tex. App.
2008) (holding arbitration agreements’ attorney-fee provisions unenforceable because
in conflict with Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act, but sever-
able from arbitration agreement, and arbitration agreement otherwise enforceable).
290. McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 859 (2008) (finding shortened statute of
limitations was “harsh and one-sided when imposed on a consumer in a contract of
adhesion for a basic consumer service such as long distance telephone service”);
Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 732 (N.D. Cal. 2012) aff’d, 549
F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding significant shortening of statutorily-mandated
statute of limitations contributed to a finding of substantive unconscionability).
291. Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993);
Swain v. Auto Services, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
292. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing, supra note 110, at 239. See also Leslie, supra
note 98, at 266 (“[F]irms insert terms into their arbitration clauses to shorten statutes
of limitations, to reduce damages, or to prevent injunctive relief. These contract terms
are considered unconscionable — and, thus, unenforceable 3/4 in many states. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (the
FAA) to require deference to arbitration clauses; consequently, many courts allow
firms to bootstrap unenforceable contract terms into an arbitration clause in order to
make unconscionable contract terms enforceable.”) (footnotes omitted). Id. at 282
(listing “(1) truncated statutes of limitations, (2) damage limitations, (3) anti-injunc-
tion clauses, (4) fee-shifting provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses, and (6) non-coor-
dination agreements. Each of these provisions undermines consumer protection and
employment law. More importantly, these provisions would be contractually unen-
forceable in at least some jurisdictions but for the fact that they reside in an arbitra-
tion clause.”).
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procedures can be held unconscionable,293 as occurred in the cases
cited throughout the previous sentence’s list. While many cases have
applied the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements,
such unconscionability policing of arbitration agreements’ fairness is
now in some cases restricted by the Supreme Court’s extension of the
separability doctrine in Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson.294 But
that restriction would be lifted by the Centrist Position’s repeal of the
separability doctrine and thus leave courts fully capable of policing
arbitration agreements for unconscionability.
Therefore, a rigidly-categorical prohibition against all individu-
als’ adhesive arbitration agreements cannot be justified as needed to
police claim-suppressing arbitration procedures. Such prohibitions,
which unite the Very Progressive and Moderately Progressive Posi-
tions, are overbroad. Unconscionability policing is better done by case
law, which tends to be more sensitive to facts, and thus more flexible
and nuanced, than legislation and regulation, both of which inevita-
bly paint with a broader brush.295
293. This is acknowledged even by progressive opponents of adhesive arbitration,
such as the National Consumer Law Center. See The Model State Consumer & Em-
ployee Justice Enforcement Act, § IV(2), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/
model-state-arb-act-2015.pdf.
294. Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (“Under the FAA,
where an agreement to arbitrate includes an agreement that the arbitrator will deter-
mine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges specifically the enforce-
ability of that particular agreement, the district court considers the challenge, but if a
party challenges the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for
the arbitrator.”); Ware, Against Conservative, supra note 8, at 1237–38 (2016)
(“In Rent-A-Center, Jackson argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, so
he should have been free to litigate, rather than arbitrate, his claims against Rent-A-
Center. The Supreme Court rejected Jackson’s argument on the ground that the
[agreement’s] ‘delegation clause’ constituted his agreement to arbitrate whether other
portions of his arbitration clause were unconscionable.”); David S. Schwartz, Justice
Scalia’s Jiggery-Pokery in Federal Arbitration Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 75,
86 (2016) (After Rent-A-Center, “[c]ourts will have no choice but to compel arbitration
in every case, leaving it up to the arbitrators to determine how to respond to uncon-
scionable and overreaching arbitration agreements. All the sorts of remedy-stripping
arbitration clauses that have been struck down as unconscionable by courts will no
longer be judicially reviewable in the first instance, and subject only to the very lim-
ited judicial review allowable for arbitration awards.”).
295. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1273
(2011) (“[L]egislative intervention by its nature paints in broad strokes.”); Sternlight
& Jensen, supra note 177, at 100–01 (arguing that information inequality, expense,
and the “logistical realities” of arbitration make it inefficient to bring unconscionabil-
ity claims individually, and it is more efficient if courts or legislatures determine what
would be reasonable in the general circumstances and apply it to the class).
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In short, the Centrist Position is well calibrated to “shape legal
rules to make markets work more effectively” by continuing to en-
force adhesive arbitration clauses that are safe for consumers while
prohibiting those that are unsafe. In contrast, the Progressive Posi-
tions would lose the benefits of markets by preventing enforcement of
all adhesive arbitration agreements, and thus losing their likely
price-lowering and resolution-quickening effects, even to the extent
those benefits arise from genuine efficiencies arbitration achieves
over litigation due to arbitration’s lower process costs.
These efficiencies are unlikely to be realized under the Very Pro-
gressive Position of enforcing only post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments because such agreements would likely remain rare for several
reasons. First, after a dispute arises the parties may well be angry
with each other and thus disinclined to negotiate with each other, let
alone to negotiate cooperatively.296 Second, in any negotiation that
does occur after a dispute arises, each party has an incentive to drive
a hard bargain because the parties are stuck with each other in the
bilateral-monopoly sense that their dispute is with each other so they
cannot “shop around” to find someone else with whom they would
rather negotiate an agreement about this dispute.297 Moreover, if
particular disputing parties can cooperate well enough to form a post-
dispute agreement to arbitrate, they are probably able to, and better
served by, instead just forming a settlement agreement to end the
dispute entirely.298
So post-dispute arbitration agreements’ rarity would largely pre-
vent the very Progressive Position from capturing arbitration’s price-
lowering and resolution-quickening effects. And the Moderately Pro-
gressive Position—of enforcing individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration
agreements only when not adhesive—would similarly fail to capture
296. Ware, Principles, supra note 1, at §§ 3.23–3.30 (summarizing cooperative and
problem-solving approaches to negotiation).
297. This bilateral monopoly tends to make dispute negotiation more adversarial
than the transactional negotiation that precedes deals like the sale of a home, car, or
business. Id. §§ 3.4, 3.12; Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Un-
bundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 2006
n.18 (2014). As several scholars have noted, ex post, disputing parties’ interests likely
diverge in ways that make agreement over large matters difficult. Scott Baker, A
Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 895–96 (2004);
Drahozal, Unfair, supra note 53, at 746–78.
298. See Drahozal, Unfair, supra note 53, at 747 (Compared with a post-dispute
arbitration agreement, “it is only marginally more costly to settle the claim
altogether.”).
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arbitration’s price-lowering and resolution-quickening effects be-
cause, as noted above, individuals rarely form non-adhesive, pre-dis-
pute contracts.299 So, to the extent centrist reforms leave arbitration
with a process-cost advantage over litigation, adopting the Progres-
sive over Centrist Position would increase businesses’ costs and con-
sumer prices while benefitting no one except “those (like lawyers)
who sell process.”300
VI. CONCLUSION
James White quips that “for a nickel or a dime, almost all of us
would . . . agree to arbitrate,”301 and perhaps that is about the addi-
tional price each consumer would pay for every adhesive arbitration
agreement that would be prohibited by the Progressive Positions.302
Regardless of its amount, the key for progressives is to acknowledge
that this price effect probably exists. As explained above, the stan-
dard economic analysis concludes that businesses in competitive and
299. See id.
300. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge,
CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 433, April 18, 2002, at 9, http://www.cato.org/
pub_display.php?pub_id=1292.
[E]ven this is a benefit to society as a whole because to the extent that
the costs of adjudication are reduced, disputes can be resolved more effi-
ciently, i.e., fewer resources need to be devoted to adjudication.  Some bright
young people who would have become trial lawyers enter other fields instead.
Whatever those people produce is a gain to society from the cost savings of
arbitration.
Id. See also Ware, Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, supra note 115, at 258 (“The
only harm from process-cost savings comes to those (like lawyers) who sell process.
But even this is a benefit to society as a whole.”).
In this respect, the business’ process-cost savings from arbitration differ from the
savings a business achieves, as in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1991), by a forum-selection clause that relegates claims against it to a forum that it
finds geographically convenient. “As to the . . . savings to the cruise line, due to not
having to defend suits in remote locations, there is a corollary increase in expenses to
those passengers who must litigate far from home.” Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of
Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 66 (1995). By contrast, as to the business’ process-cost
savings from arbitration, there is no reason to expect a corollary increase in expenses
to consumers with disputes against the business, and in fact arbitration may reduce
consumers’ process costs.
301. James J. White, Contacting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 723,
742 (2004).
302. See CFPB, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RULE, supra note 12, at 682 (“Given the
extremely high volume of accounts covered under the final rule, the monetized cost of
this provision is miniscule when averaged across markets. Thus, even 100 percent
pass through of the monetized costs of additional Federal class settlements in every
market would result in an increase in prices of under one dollar per account per year
when averaged across all markets, although particular markets or providers might
see larger changes.”).
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non-competitive markets (including even monopolists) tend to lower
their prices as their costs fall.303 So progressives do not refute the
argument that enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements tends to
lower consumer prices if progressives show that some or all real-
world markets deviate from the model of perfect competition.304  In-
stead, progressives advance the debate toward consensus when they
acknowledge that legally-protecting consumers from “low-quality” ad-
hesive contract terms—like legally-protecting consumers from “low-
quality” cars or computers—likely raises prices.
Acknowledging that tradeoff emphasizes that the tradeoffs
lawmakers face in deciding whether to prohibit all adhesive arbitra-
tion clauses are not just tradeoffs about balancing consumer interests
against business interests. They are also tradeoffs about balancing
the interests of consumers who benefit from enforceable arbitration
clauses against the interests of consumers who do not.305 This article
has argued for the balance struck by the Centrist Position’s reforms.
These reforms—of class waivers, the separability doctrine, and le-
gally-erroneous decisions on mandatory-law claims—would prohibit
the categories of adhesion contracts that non-arbitration law has al-
ready determined pose a significant risk of harming consumers, while
enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements that do not fall into these
categories, but leaving these remaining adhesive arbitration agree-
ments (like other adhesive terms) subject to courts’ policing under the
unconscionability and related contract doctrines. This policing should
meet the concerns of progressives and plaintiffs’ lawyers that claim-
ants in complex cases need the procedures more prevalent in litiga-
tion than arbitration.
In sum, contractual freedom tempered by unconscionability-po-
licing is centrist moderation that allows arbitration to differ from liti-
gation on discovery, evidence, and identity of the adjudicator, but not
differ in such a harsh way as to be unconscionable. By continuing to
303. See supra Section IV.A–D.
304. Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah, supra note 216, at 361–63 (asserting “apparent
absence of perfect competition” in the consumer financial sector).
305. As Omri Ben-Shahar writes, better products
[C]ost more in competitive and noncompetitive markets alike. People make
different price-quality tradeoffs, and some consumers would prefer the
higher quality even at a higher price. But not all consumers would benefit.
Other consumers, particularly those with more constrained budgets, prefer
low prices over high quality. They shop at bargain basements and search for
marked-down products even if they have some defects. If class actions in-
crease the price of products, it is quite possible that the poor may come out as
net losers.
Ben-Shahar, supra note 281, at 1814.
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enforce high-quality or “safe” arbitration clauses, the Centrist Posi-
tion would enable arbitration, should it have lower process costs than
litigation, to reduce costs and prices, while speeding adjudication. In
contrast, the Progressive Positions’ overbroad prohibitions of all ad-
hesive arbitration would likely fail to realize these benefits.
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